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Law And Peace*
MYRES S. McDOUGAL**

The establishment and maintenance of a comprehensive peace,
through law rather than by arbitrary violence and coercion, is today commonly regarded as one of humankind's most urgent and difficult
problems. To achieve a productive understanding of what law may contribute to peace, of the inextricable interrelations of law and peace, it is
necessary that we observe the larger context of global processes of interaction that contain and condition both law and peace. We must formulate
appropriate conceptions of law and peace, note the inadequacies in our
inherited theories and procedures designed to serve peace and, finally, apply to the general problem, and numerous particular problems of promoting peace, certain relevant intellectual tasks. These tasks, extending beyond the unsystematic, anecdotal pursuit of random strategies in effective
power, or the traditional logical derivation from allegedly autonomous legal rules, include the postulation and clarification of basic community
goals, the examination of past trends in the achievement of such goals,
the exploration of the factors that affect degrees in achievement, the projection of possible futures, and the recommendation of alternatives in decision process and particular decisions that promise a higher degree of
success.
We proceed to explore these points of inquiry and intellectual tasks
seriatim.
I.

THE LARGER CONTEXT

In realistic perspective, it can be observed that the whole of humankind today constitutes a single comprehensive community, entirely comparable to its many internal territorial and other communities, in the
sense of interdetermination or interdependence in the shaping and sharing of all values.' This larger community is composed, not merely of an
aggregate of nation-states, but of expanding billions of individual human
beings who create, in addition to nation-states, a whole host of other
groupings and associations, such as international governmental organiza* This article was originally written as a background paper for the United States
Institute of Peace Conference on "Toward the Twenty-First Century: An Investigation of
the Roads to Peace," held June 20-21, 1988 at Airlie House, Airlie, Virginia. It will
eventually be published in the proceedings of that conference.
**Sterling Professor of Law, Emeritus, Yale Law School, New Haven. B.A., M.A.,
LL.B., University of Mississippi, 1927,1935; B.A., B.C.L., Oxford University, England, 1930;
J.S.D., Yale Law School, 1931.
1. Detailed description is offered in McDougal, Reisman & Willard, The World Community: A Planetary Social Process, 21 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 805 (1988).
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tions, political parties, pressure groups, and private associations specialized to all demanded values, in activities increasingly transcending all territorial boundaries. The interdependences that characterize this larger
community process, and all its internal component communities, include
both those within any, and every, particular value process and those that
cut across all value processes. The interdependent activities within, and
across, all value processes stimulate, affect and are affected by all decision
processes, lawful and unlawful.2
A most important component in this larger community process is an
ongoing, all pervasive process of effective power, totally global or earthspace in reach, in which decisions are in fact taken and enforced by severe deprivations or high indulgences, oftentimes irrespective of the
wishes of any particular participant.' For some centuries nation-states
have been, and remain, through the resources and people within their
boundaries, the principal institutions through which people wield effective power and have engaged in a continuous balancing of such power. In
a world in which people and goods are in continuous and increasing
movement, the bases of power are no longer hermetically sealed within
the boundaries of particular nation-states. Resources are important only
as potential values, dependent upon transnational activity; and as science
and technology advance and universalize, enlightenment and skill, as well
as conceptions of rectitude and responsibility, become of increasing significance as bases of power.
Upon close examination, it may be observed that the decisions taken
within this comprehensive process of effective power are of two different
kinds.4 Many decisions are of course taken through sheer naked power or
from considerations of expedience, without regard for common interest.
Goliaths do not always live, or balance power, easily with pygmies. Many
other decisions, however, may be observed to be taken from perspectives
of authority, in the sense that they are made by the persons who are expected to make them, in accordance with criteria expected by community
members, in established structures of decision, with enough bases in effective power to secure consequential control, and by authorized procedures. The continuous flow of this second type of decision may be realistically described as a comprehensive process of authoritative decision by

2. These interdependences are minutely outlined in M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L.
CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER ch. 1 (1980) [hereinafter McDOUGAL, LASSWELL

& CHEN].

3. See generally, McDougal, Reisman & Willard, The World Process of Effective
Power: The Global War System, in POWER AND POLICY IN QUEST OF LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR
OF EUGENE VICTOR RoSTOW 353 (M. McDougal & W. Reisman eds. 1985); G.
SCHWARZENBERGER, POWER POLITICS (3d ed. 1964); W. Reisman, Private Armies in a Global
War System: Prologue to Decision, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1973).
4. For descriptions of these two types of decisions and their interrelations, see M. McDOUGAL & W. REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS (1981) and M. McDoUGAL & W. REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE: THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE WORLD

COMMUNITY ch. 1 (1981).
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which the effective elites of the global community, after the fashion of
elites in lesser communities, seek to clarify and secure their common interests. The decision processes of the most comprehensive, global community affect the shaping and sharing of values both as between and within
all its constituent communities, of whatever geographic or functional
reach. The decision processes of the lesser regional, national, and local
communities in turn affect the distinctive decision processes and value
allocations of the larger community which they comprise. The two different kinds of decisions that comprise the global process of effective power,
those that employ arbitrary coercion and violence and those that seek
through authority to minimize such coercion and violence, are obviously
in continuous interaction and struggle. The most comprehensive global
community process thus moves incessantly through a continuum between
two polar extremes; that of the most intense violence and coercion, sometimes described as "war", and that which emphasizes persuasion and
community organized coercion, sometimes described as "peace".
It can be observed, further, that the most comprehensive process of
authoritative decision exhibited in the global community, as in lesser
component communities, is also composed of two different though closely
interrelated types of decision. The first are the constitutive decisions
which establish and maintain a process of authoritative decision. These
are the decisions that identify and characterize decision-makers, postulate and specify basic community policies, establish appropriate decision
structures, allocate bases of power for decision and sanctioning purposes,
authorize procedures for the making of different kinds of decisions, and
secure the performance of all the different decision functions (intelligence, promoting, prescribing, invoking, applying, terminating and appraising) necessary for clarifying and securing the more detailed policies
of the larger community.5 The second type of authoritative decisions are
those that continuously emerge from global constitutive process to establish and maintain a public order: these are the decisions that determine
how resources are allocated, planned, developed and employed, how
wealth is shaped and distributed, how human rights are promoted and
protected or deprived, how enlightenment is encouraged or blighted, how
health is fostered or neglected, how rectitude and civic responsibility to
the larger community are matured or repressed, and so on through the
whole gamut of demanded values.6 The quality of the constitutive process
that a community can establish tremendously affects the quality of the
public order it can achieve; conversely, the quality of the public order a
community achieves reciprocally affects the quality of the constitutive
process it can establish.

5. The basic features of the existing global constitutive process are described at length
in the references in note 4 above and in McDOUGAL, LASSWELL & CHEN, supra note 2.
6. For an outline of claims for the protection of public order values, see McDOUGAL,
LASSWELL & CHEN, supra note 2, ch. 3.
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RELEVANT CONCEPTION OF LAW

The most relevant conception of law in the global community, as in
lesser communities, is, as indicated above, in an ancient tradition revived
by the American Legal Realists, that of a comprehensive process of authoritative decision.' It is the process, a component of the global process
of effective power, by which the politically relevant members of the larger
community seek to clarify and secure their common interests and to minimize and regulate the assertion of arbitrary, unauthorized violence and
coercion, the other component of the global process of effective power. It
will be observed that, as authoritative decision, the term "law" includes
reference to both authority, in the sense of community expectations about
the requirements of decision, and control, in the sense of actual participation in the making and enforcement of decision. It may need emphasis
that the most minimal conception of law requires uniformities in decision
in accordance with community expectation; law is the very opposite of the
arbitrary, unauthorized use of violence and coercion. The members of the
global community, as in lesser communities, who are concerned with the
shaping and sharing of values will, further, focus attention, not upon isolated, anecdotal decisions, but upon the whole, comprehensive flow of authoritative decision.
A conception of law, whether for the global community or lesser communities, as a body of rules, though again of ancient origin, is hopelessly
myopic. In pluralistic and rapidly changing communities, rules are always
complementary, ambiguous, and incomplete. They do not apply themselves, and technology has yet to invent their automation. The only empirical reference, as faint as it sometimes is, of rules is to decision. For
established decision-makers, and others, the function of rules is to state
community goals and to guide toward the factors in many varying contexts that may affect rational choice. Rules are, thus, but one component,
however important, of a comprehensive process of authoritative decision.
The conception of "international law" as a body of rules regulating
the interrelations of nation-states is doubly myopic." Beyond the infirmities of its over-estimating of the potentialities of rules, it has infirmities
in the scope of the activities it seeks to make subject to law. The activities of humankind in global community process today spill across the
boundaries of nation-states in an ever accelerating and intensifying rate.
The contemporary conception of "transnational law" takes only a beginning account of the importance of individual human beings, and their
multiplicitous associations and groupings, in these new, transnational ac7. Lasswell & McDougal, Criteria for a Theory About Law, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 362
(1971). Background is given in W. REISMAN & A. SCHREIBER, JURISPRUDENCE: UNDERSTANDING AND SHAPING LAW (1987).

8. This theme is documented historically in McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, Theories
about InternationalLaw: Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence,8 VA. J. INT'L L. 189
(1967).
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tivities." A rational concern for peace in either a minimum or optimum
reference, must take these activities into still further account. The law
relevant to peace cannot be confined to the coordination of the activities
of nation-states. An appropriate law extends, must be extended, to the
whole global process of authoritative decision that guides and regulates
human activities across nation-state boundaries. In comprehensive conception this process of decision includes among its component features,
and interrelates, all the various "roads" to peace indicated in the call for
this symposium, such as international governmental organization, thirdparty decision-making, the facilitation and protection of diplomacy and
negotiation, conflict resolution, the organization of deterrence, the management of collective security, and so on.
III.

A

RELEVANT CONCEPTION OF PEACE

The most relevant conception of peace must make reference to the
least possible application of violence and coercion to the individual
human being and to the freedom of access of the individual to all cherished values. For community members and their decision-makers alike, a
viable conception of peace cannot today be limited to reference to a mere
absence of armed, and international, conflict. The peace demanded by
contemporary humankind is not that of the concentration camp (however
large) or that of the living dead (whatever the community).
The conception of peace, as contraposed to war, in the historic literature of international law is most imprecise. 10 The words "peace" and
"war" are characteristically employed, in high ambiguity, to make simultaneous reference both to the presence or absence of the facts of transnational violence and coercion and to the legal consequences to be attached
by authoritative decision to different intensities in violence and coercion.
The facts to which reference is made are those of the global process of
effective power in which many different participants (state and nonstate), for many varying objectives in expansion or conservation, employ
all instruments of policy (military, diplomatic, ideological, and economic),
in alternative stages of acceleration and deceleration in intensity of violence and coercion, in attack upon the bases of power (people, resources,
institutions) of other participants, and are themselves in turn the targets
of attack. The legal policies and sanctioning consequences that the authoritative decision-makers of the global community apply to the different aspects of this continuous process of violence and coercion vary with
many particular problems, such as the minimization of major coercions,
the conduct of hostilities, the termination of hostilities, the regulation of
minor coercions, and so on. In a first effort to minimize major violence
and coercion, through a law of "aggression" and "self-defense," authorita-

9. P. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1956).
10. For comprehensive review, see M. McDoUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1961) [hereinafter McDoUGAL & FELICIANO].
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tive decision-makers seek to prevent alterations in the existing distribution of values among nation-states by processes of unilateral and unauthorized coercion and to promote value changes and adjustments by
processes of persuasion or by community-sanctioned coercion. A second
effort, when persuasive strategies fail and violence and coercion break
out, is to reduce to a minimum the unnecessary destruction of values by
defining with as much specificity as possible the permissible maximum of
violence and destruction in particular types of situations. It has been
many times documented that our inherited concepts of "peace" and
"war," making such ambiguous reference to this vast maze of facts and
legal policies, cast but a darkening light upon the difficult problems in
public order that presently confront humankind.
It is suggested that a more relevant conception of peace can be found
in a specification of contemporary notions of world public order. A distinction is sometimes made between "minimum order," in the sense of
the minimization of unauthorized violence and coercion, and "optimum
order," in the sense of the greatest access of the individual human being
to the shaping and sharing of all the values of human dignity." It would
appear, however, that both these kinds of allegedly different public order
goals are indispensable to any workable conception of peace. Even when
conceived in the minimum sense of freedom from the fact and expectation of arbitrary violence and coercion, peace may be observed increasingly to be dependent upon maintaining people's expectations that the
processes of effective decision in public order will be responsive to their
demands for a reasonable access to all the values we today characterize as
those of human dignity. When peace is more broadly conceived as security in position, expectation, and potential with regard to all basic community values, the interrelationship of peace and human rights quite obviously passes beyond that of interdependence and approaches that of
identity. Hence, for reasons of interdependence or identity, there can be
but one answer to President John F. Kennedy's question "Is not peace, in
'1 2
the last analysis, basically a matter of human rights?
The basic community policies that underlie conceptions of peace and
human rights are in any democratic community the same policies that
underlie all law. Hence, it is no metaphor to conclude that peace and law
may appropriately be described as one side of the coin (of community
process and effective power) of which arbitrary violence and coercion are
the other side.

11. McDOUGAL, LASSWELL & CHEN, supra note 2, ch. 5.
12. THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY ISSUES, COMMON
CURITY: A BLUEPRINT FOR SURVIVAL 8 (1982):
A secure existence, free from physical and psychological threats to life and
limb, is one of the most elementary desires of humanity. It is the fundamental
reason why human beings choose to organize nation states, sacrificing certain
individual freedoms for the common good - security. It is a right shared by all regardless of where they live, regardless of their ideological or political
convictions.

SE-
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IV.

FORMULATING THE PROBLEM

The rising, common demands of peoples about the globe for increased protection from arbitrary violence and coercion and for greater
participation in the shaping and sharing of all cherished values are written large in contemporary shared consciousness. Yet the expectation of
impending major violence and coercion, employing weapons of apocalyptic destructive potential, continues to hang over the world, threatening
and intimidating all peoples and in measure paralyzing "human rights"
efforts to increase the participation of all individuals in the shaping and
sharing of values. It is this disparity between the demands of the peoples
of the world and responding community achievement that constitutes the
most general problem in shaping a global legal process designed better to
secure peace, whether peace is defined in minimum or optimum terms.
Utopian proponents of peace sometimes ignore that all efforts to improve authoritative decision for better securing peace, however defined,
must take place within the context of the contemporary global process of
effective power. This process of effective power, as we have noted, exhibits the major nation-states of the world, and especially those possessing
nuclear weapons and the capabilities for chemical and biological warfare,
engaged in a process of continually balancing power among themselves
and others and taking all measures necessary to insure that no single
state and its allies are able to secure a position of completely dominant,
centralized power. 13 There is no way that peoples cherishing peace and
common interest in all the values of human dignity, can avoid direct confrontation with peoples employing violence and coercion for purposes of
expansion in special interest and, when necessary, themselves employing
military force and other coercion in defense of their values. Humankind
has, unhappily, demonstrated down through the millennia that it is sometimes willing to employ the most destructive, unauthorized violence and
coercion against others not merely for self-protection, but to secure demanded, though unwanted, changes in the others. The threats and horrors of the contemporary scene need no new depiction or emphasis.
Alleged realists, in contrast, sometimes ignore that authority, as community expectation, is itself a form of effective power, and a form that
can be changed and improved. A most important base of power for the
decision-makers in any community derives from the expectations of the
members of that community that these are the established decision-makers and that they are authorized to make certain decisions, by specified
criteria of common interest, and to invoke certain sanctioning consequences to secure compliance. In an age of instantaneous global communication, this form of effective power, with its appeal to world opinion
and shared conceptions of rectitude, has enormous and increasing
importance.

13. Relevant historical perspectives are delineated in F.
(1963); C. MURPHY, THE SEARCH FOR WORLD

SUIT OF PEACE

HINSLEY, POWER AND THE PURORDER

(1985).
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For perspicuous proponents of peace, the realistic and immediate
challenge is that of introducing into the global process of effective power
more collectivized, perhaps even more centralized, perspectives and operations of authority, sustained by control. It is not, however, to be assumed that humankind is limited in choice between an anarchy of allegedly equal, independent, and sovereign territorial communities and some
fantasied omnicompetent universal state with all its threats to freedom
and the values of human dignity. The words federal, confederal, region,
alliance, and coalition are primarily meaningful in the present discussion
in their suggestion of the infinite variety of potential modalities in organization. The parts may be related to the whole in many different, and
changing, ways in a moving context. In the complex contemporary global
community process, there can be no magical modality or gimmick for securing peace.
It is of course necessary in any effort toward improvement, to begin
with the existing global process of authoritative decision, already collectivized in higher degree than many observers are aware. There is urgent
need for reexamination of the competences accorded, in the United Nations and elsewhere, for minimizing resort to major violence and coercion
and for the revision of these competences to make them accord more with
a genuine democracy and the capabilities for responsibility in the enforcement of decisions. One promising alternative requiring consideration, as
we will develop below, is that of enhancing the competence of regional
organization and functional groupings. Many improvements could be
made also in the multitudinous decisions emerging from global constitutive process in regulation of all the public order values other than power,
such as wealth, enlightenment, health, and so on. It is the flow in outcomes of decision with respect to these values that constitute the subject
matter of human rights and conditions the achievement of peace in both
minimum and maximum conception.
V.

THE INADEQUACIES OF EARLY THEORIES AND PROCEDURES

For some centuries the dominant conception of international law has
been, as we are too often reminded, that of a body of rules that regulate
the interrelations of nation-states.14 Grotius, building upon a number of
predecessors, established himself as the founder of modern international
law by recognizing the increasing importance of the nation-state and by
outlining a procedure by which an unorganized community of states
(without centralized legislative, executive, and judicial institutions) could
minimize the occurrence and devastation of major violence and coercion,
through assertions of reciprocity and retaliation. In Grotius' eloquent

14. This history is stated in detail in McDoUGAL, LASSWELL & REISMAN, supra note 8;
see also THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (R. Macdonald & D. Johnstone eds. 1983); see also MORISON, The Schools Revisited, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ch. 5 (1983); see also W. SCHIFFER, THE LEGAL COMMUNITY OF MAN-

KIND (1954).
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words "Quod tibi non vis, alteri non facias": what one does not wish done
to himself, he should not do to others.' This perception of common interest was built upon the fact, dubbed by later French scholars as le
d~doublement fonctionnel, that the same states that are claimants in one
case may be sitting as judges, through world opinion, in the next comparable case. In a community of a large number of states of relatively equal
effective power, even so primitive a procedure could do substantial justice
and maintain a modest peace. Grotius ransacked many versions of natural
law, sacred and profane, and a great range of prior practices by states and
other participants in search of appropriate authoritative rules.
In a recent book, Visions of World Order, the late Julius Stone reviews the major historic frames of jurisprudence and considers their past
and potential contributions to world public order. 6 It is clear from
Stone's presentation, and other surveys, that none of the major frames of
jurisprudence either recognize the degree of collectivization in the contemporary global process of authoritative decision or escape from the
shackles of the limited conception of international law as a body of rules
regulating the interrelations of states. In some frames the notion of community is truncated or imprecise, not permitting either comprehensive or
detailed description. Many conceptions of effective power stop short with
the nation-state as participant, and ignore authority as an important base
of power transnationally. Most frames define authority either in transempirical (religious or metaphysical) terms or in ambiguous, tautological
syntactic reference, encouraging endless verbal disputations about the
true source of the "obligation" or "binding force" of international law.
Many frames can conceive of control as emanating only from organized
and centralized governmental structures, thus foredooming inquiry at
both international and national levels. The futility of each major, inherited frame may be noted.
The oldest frame of jurisprudence, commonly described as that of
"natural law," deriving from times when religion and notions of physical
nature were often merged with law, did achieve conceptions of a larger
community of humankind and of a common human nature and, hence,
make immense contribution to the development of transnational perspectives of law. The conception of authority propounded by this frame was,
and is, however, characteristically in terms of religious or metaphysical
references, admitting of diametrically opposite interpretations, and, on
the rare occasions when the control dimension of power is addressed, the
conception of control put forward is observable only in appeals from naked power. The frame does not focus squarely upon common interest as a
15. H. Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law, 23 BRITISH YEAR-

L. 1 (1943), reprinted in H.
pers, E. Lauterpacht ed. 1975); T.C. AsSER
3OOK OF INT'L

LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW (collected paINSTITUTE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE GROTIAN

1985 (a commemorative colloquium held at The Hague, 8 April 1983 on the occasion of the Fourth Centenary of the Birth of Hugo Grotius).
16. J. STONE, VISIONS OF WORLD ORDER (1984).
HERITAGE
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guide to decision and characteristically makes unverified assumptions
about human nature (social or asocial) and by logical derivations from
such assumptions seeks to establish a body of prescriptions relating to
world public order, including peace. The greatest difficulties for world
public order are created by this frame when assumptions about the nature of individuals are transposed to territorial communities and such entities are believed to have absolute, unmodifiable attributes of equality,
independence, and sovereignty.
The positivist frame, in contrast with natural law, assumes that the
several nation-states constitute the principal communities of humankind
and that whatever transnational community exists, if any, is composed
only of these nation-states. The conception of law propounded by this
frame, in an ill-defined confusion of both authority and control, is in
terms of rules established by nation-state officials, as developed from an
earlier version of the commands of the sovereign. Since the devotees of
this theory can observe no global "sovereign," with centralized legislative,
executive and judicial institutions and officials, their theories by definition preclude a conception of international law as law. Indeed, the more
bold devotees of this frame flatly assert, in obedience to John Austin's
specifications, that international law is not law. A second version of this
frame, described as "dualist," asserts that, though both national law and
international law are equally law, they have a completely different set of
decision-makers, policies, structures, and procedures. A third version,
known as "monism," finds authority, not in a "sovereign" decision-maker,
but in some postulated global grundnorm, located in either agreement or
custom, and asserts that this grundnorm, by some mysterious derivational magic, without regard for effective power, dictates the content of
the law both of the larger community and of all its lesser communities. It
will be noted that these two latter versions of the positivist frame both
build upon the assumption that international law is merely a body of
rules that govern the interrelations of states. These rules are to be found,
in theory, largely in the past practices of states. The goofus bird flies
backward because, though it has no care for where it is going, it likes to
know where it has been.
The historical frame, with its emphasis upon the parochial uniqueness of every particular territorial community, has had great difficulty in
achieving a conception of transnational community. Though this frame
does, in contrast with that of natural law, seek to ground law in empirical
social process, the conception of law with which it commonly works is
that of some mysterious geist or spirit, which supposedly in any particular community emanates from its people as does their language, religion,
poetry and music. In such an approach, the lines between authority and
control are completely blurred, and few proponents of the approach are
able to isolate authoritative decision or a comprehensive constitutive process of decision from the whole flow of particular events in which values
are shaped and shared. The deep and pervasive determinism in the notion that law is somehow forever fixed by an ineluctable fate at some
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point in the past discourages all effort toward innovation and change and
renders sterile the various intellectual tasks indispensable to rational
decision.
Similarly, the sociological frame, despite its characteristic concern for
the scientific study of explanatory factors and social consequences, unhappily takes its basic conceptions of community and law largely from
the positivist frame. Too often its notion of community process is confined to activities within the nation-state, in neglect of the whole hierarchy of interpenetrating community processes from local through national
and regional levels to the global. It commonly finds authority in rules
established by nation-state officials, and even the most realistic proponents of the frame, find control only in organized and centralized institutions. Hence, the conception of international law for this frame continues
to be that of a supposed body of rules governing the interrelations of nation-states, in disregard of the role of other participants in transnational
community and power processes and without clear focus upon authoritative decision transcending state lines. The scientific study in any community of the causes and consequences of "rules," without clear relation to
decision, is a difficult task, and can scarcely be expected to contribute
greatly to the maintenance or improvement of world constitutive process
and public order.
The particular policies and procedures developed, under the aegis of
these inherited theories about international law, for the control of major
coercion and violence, sometimes called force, were most primitive. 7
There have, of course, for some centuries been reasonably observed policies for the protection of diplomats and facilitation of diplomacy; for the
making, application, and termination of international agreements; for the
protection of nationals abroad from abuses by other states; and for the
peaceful settlement of disputes, as through conciliation, mediation, and
arbitration. With respect to the more direct control of major coercions
and violence, the policies and procedures developed were, however, far
from being adequate or consistently observed. The most important effort
to control major coercion and violence, with roots reaching far back into
the Middle Ages, derived from a distinction between just and unjust
wars. 8 The basic thrust of bellum iustum was that resort to major violence could be regarded as legitimate self-help only for certain objectives,
such as redressing a received wrong, a wrong "serious and commensurate
with the losses the war would occasion" and which could not "be repaired
or avenged in any other way." The effective power of the Papacy made
possible some centralized administration of so general a concept of necessity and consequentiality. Yet even this modest effort to control major
coercion and violence fell before changes in community and effective

17. McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 10, chs. 1 and 3; H. Waldock, The Regulation
of the Use of Force Between States, 81 HAGUE RECUEIL DES COURS, 1952-I, at 455.
18. J. JOHNSON, JUST WAR TRADITION AND THE RESTRAINT OF WAR: A MORAL AND HISTORICAL INQUIRY (1981).
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power processes in the eighteenth century, and by the nineteenth century,
the requirement of bellum iustum was brought to an unobtrusive demise.
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, resort to coercion
came to be regarded as a prerogative of sovereignty, the legitimacy of
which non-participating states were not competent to judge. In the international law of the time, as Eugene Rostow has written, "war was the
sport of princes and the privilege of states, and could be undertaken for
power, glory, revenge, or many reasons beyond considerations of self-defense."' 9 International law offered no general prohibition of violence and
made no clear distinction between impermissible and permissible coercion. It attempted only the regulation and the humanitarization of violence once violence had in fact been initiated. Contending belligerents
were regarded as upon a plane of "juridical equality" and third states
that chose not to participate were said to be under a duty of "neutrality."
In deep paradox, though states were said to have a fundamental right to
independent existence, there was no prohibition against states waging war
and destroying one another. Decisions were to be taken by the relative
strength of states and violence was permissible, not only for self-help and
self-vindication in the conservation of values, but also for effecting
changes in the international distribution of values. In only less paradox, a
few authoritative prescriptions purported to govern the employment of
minor coercions, limited in dimension and objective, sometimes labelled
as "retorsion," "reprisal," "intervention," or "pacific blockade," and so
forth, and generally categorized as "measures short of war." Any such
governance was of course illusory: the initiating state could at any time
designate its operations as "war" and avoid the thrust of limitation.
The movement in the twentieth century toward a general prohibition
of major coercion and violence, and toward a collectivized administration
of that prohibition, is traceable through the Covenant of the League of
Nations, the Pact of Paris, and the Nuremberg verdict, with culmination
in the core provisions of the United Nations Charter.
It requires only brief note that for centuries international law purported to offer little protection to the citizens of a state against that state.
Traditional law exhausted its concern for human rights with the modest
protection afforded aliens."0
VI.

THE CONTEMPORARY AUTHORITATIVE

POSTULATION OF BASIC PUBLIC

ORDER GOALS

In 1945, spurred by the "rising, common demands" of individual
human beings from every corner of the globe to be free from "the scourge
of war" and for greater participation in the shaping and sharing of all the
values of human dignity, the framers of the United Nations Charter ef-

19. Rostow, Disputes Involving the Inherent Right of Self- Defense, in
20. C.

AMERASINGHE, STATE

THE INTERNA-

264, 283 (L. Damrosch ed. 1987).
RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS (1967).

TIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS
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fected two revolutionary changes in historic international law: in core provisions, the Charter postulated, and authoritatively prescribed, both a
general prohibition of the unauthorized employment of major coercion
and violence and a new protection of the fundamental human rights of
individuals, even against their own states.2 In its preambular clauses and
the statement of goals in Article 1, the Charter clearly recognized the intimate interdependence, if not identity, of peace and human rights and
made the protection of human rights coordinate with the maintenance of
peace. In Article 2(3) the Charter prescribed: "All members shall settle
their international disputes by peaceful means in a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered."
The most difficult problem for law in any community, a problem
greatly magnified in the global community by gross inequalities in the
distribution of effective power, is that of characterizing and minimizing
unlawful coercion and violence. In Articles 2(4) and 51, and certain auxiliary articles, the United Nations Charter makes an indispensable distinction between impermissible and permissible coercion and violence and
projects a set of complementary prescriptions, whose unitary and overriding policy is that of protecting and promoting peaceful change.
The most important of the new policies, that of a general prohibition
of unauthorized major coercion and violence, is stated very broadly in Article 2(4), which reads: "All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations."
It was, however, recognized that in the still primitively organized
global community, offering only modest expectation of the capability of
the general community for protecting its members, some right of self-defense by states is indispensable to the maintenance of even the most
modest minimum order. Hence, Article 51 of the Charter reads: "Nothing
in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary
to maintain international peace and security ...
"
The historic right of states to self-defense did not require them, like
sitting ducks, to await armed attack, and it is clear, despite occasional
literalist interpretations, that the framers of the Charter had no intent to
preclude response to imminent attack and to impose suicide. The most
rational construction of these complementary policies contraposed in Articles 2(4) and 51 would appear to be: the right of self-defense established
by the Charter, as in traditional practice, authorizes a state which, being
the target of activities by another state, reasonably decides, as third-party
observers may later determine reasonableness, that such activities require

21. The first of these developments is described in McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note
10, ch. 3; the second in McDOUGAL, LASSWELL & CHEN, supra note 2, ch. 4.
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it to employ the military instrument to protect its territorial integrity and
political independence, to use such force as may be necessary and proportionate to its defense.22 The employment of force that creates this expectation in a target state is in violation of Article 2(4) and is commonly
characterized as "aggression," the unlawful complement to lawful selfdefense.
Learning from the obvious difficulties in Grotius' dkdoublement
fonctionnel and the failures of the League of Nations, the framers of the
Charter projected, for the detailed administration of this basic distinction
between impermissible and permissible coercion and violence, a highly
collectivized and centralized structure of decision-making. Thus, in Article 24(1) the Security Council, with its veto for the protection of permanent members, was accorded "primary responsibility for the maintenance
of international peace and security," and the members agreed that the
Security Council, "in carrying out its duties under this responsibility,"
acted on their behalf. In other chapters of the Charter, elaborate provision was made both for the peaceful settlement of disputes and for employment of organized community force in the maintenance of public order. In Article 39 the Security Council was authorized to "determine the
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" and to recommend or take appropriate measures "to maintain or
restore international peace and security." In other articles possible measures, of varying intensity in coercion, are outlined in detail. The capstone Article 25 provides: "The Members of the United Nations agree to
accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance
with the present Charter."
The United Nations Charter, despite all its emphasis upon the importance of (and modest prescription about) human rights, does not itself
project a comprehensive and detailed bill of human rights. This gap in
constitutive prescription has, however, been remedied by a sequence of
cumulative subsequent developments. Building upon the provisions of the
Charter, the main features of a comprehensive global bill of rights have
been prescribed, if not yet effectively applied, through a whole host of
authoritative communications, including The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (now largely customary law); The Covenant on Political
and Civil Rights; The Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;
The Genocide Convention; and multiple specialized and regional pacts; as
well as by national constitutions and the vast flow of judicial and other
decisions that create the expectations of customary law. The outcome is,
thus, an authoritatively prescribed global bill of human rights entirely
comparable in content and reach to that maintained in contemporary,
more, mature national communities.23 It embraces the fundamental policies that underlie all law in any community that seeks a genuine clarifica-

22. The detailed application of this test is outlined in McDoUGAL & FELICIANO, supra
note 10, ch. 3.
23. This thesis is documented in McDOUGAL, LASSWELL & CHEN, supra note 2, ch. 4.
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tion of the common interests of its members. A world public order of
human dignity may endure many variations in the practices by which
particular values are shaped and shared if major value goals are kept
compatible and all practices are evaluated and accommodated by the criteria of common interest.
VII.

TRENDS IN PAST ACHIEVEMENT OF BASIC GOALS

It is common knowledge that the highly collectivized and centralized
structure of decisionmaking projected by the United Nations Charter for
characterizing and minimizing major coercion and violence was stillborn.
So complex an administrative structure, requiring the careful coordination of member states, could not survive the vast disparities in the effective power and interests of member states and the mounting intensity of
the struggle between an expansive totalitarian public order and an opposing order at least aspiring toward the values of human dignity. As the
horrors of worldwide war have receded, the perception and clarification of
a common interest between the contending orders has become more and
more difficult.
In consequence of this failure of the projected centralized structure
of decisionmaking, the larger community of humankind has been thrown
back, for making the difficult distinction between impermissible and permissible coercion and violence, upon Grotius' ancient ddoublement fonctionnel, in which the several states themselves make the necessary evaluations and undertake appropriate sanctioning measures. In such a context
it cannot be surprising that states commonly make the evaluations in
terms of their own special interests, including the interests of the public
order to which they adhere. It is not believed, however, that the great
bulk of humankind, taken as individuals, have abandoned their demand
to be free from the "scourge of war," or have lost the realistic expectation
that some stable, uniform administration of the distinction between impermissible and permissible coercion and violence is indispensable to
even minimum attainment of a law-governed global community. The
states of the world, and the whole of humankind as expressed through the
many media of world public opinion, do continue to challenge and evaluate the behavior of states by the criteria of Articles 2(4) and 51. The hope
would appear to remain that more centralized and more effective procedures for the administration of an indispensable policy can still be
achieved. In the light of such expectations and hope, it can scarcely be
said, with realism, that Articles 2(4) and 51 are dead and that humankind
is again without authoritative prohibition of major coercion and violence.24 At least for the proponents of a public order of human dignity,
the understanding remains that the application of major coercion and violence to the human person is fundamentally incompatible with basic

24. The question is raised by T. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? or: Changing Norms
Governing the Use of Force by States, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 809 (1970).
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human rights and that a global community that genuinely aspires toward
the values of human dignity must continue to seek to minimize major
coercion and violence as an instrument of change, or as an instrument
obstructing peaceful change.
A principal obstacle to the uniform application of Articles 2(4) and
51 has been in the insistence, from the beginning, by the Soviet Union
that "wars of liberation" are not subject to Article 2(4). This concept,
designed to facilitate totalitarian expansionism, is derived from an earlier
idiosyncratic distinction between "just" and "unjust" wars. The distinction reads:
(a) Just wars, wars that are not wars of conquest but wars of liberation, waged to defend the people from foreign attack and from attempts to enslave them, or to liberate the people from capitalist slavery, or, lastly, to liberate colonies and dependent countries from the
yoke of imperialism; and
(b) Unjust wars, wars of conquest, 25waged to conquer and enslave foreign countries and foreign nations.
In more modern formulation the concept and its justification are thus
stated by Professor Tunkin:
Modern international law also provides for the right of colonial peoples and dependent countries to use armed force against metropolies
interfering with efforts of the peoples of corresponding countries or
territories to realize their right to self-determination. Such use of
armed force is also a justified form of self-defence. While in a general
form that proposition follows from the United Nations Charter itself,
it finds more concrete expression in numerous international documents, including the Geneva agreements of 1954 concerning Indochina, and numerous resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, especially in the Declaration on Principles of International
Law of 1970.2'
This alleged exception to Article 2(4) has, as is well known, been employed by the Soviets to justify interventions in many countries in Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
In supplement to this alleged exception from Article 2(4) of "wars of
liberation," the Soviets have in relatively recent times sought to establish
an allied exception known as the "Brezhnev Doctrine." This doctrine is
designed to justify Soviet intervention in states already "socialist" to preclude their choice to become other than socialist. In its most authoritative
statement, this doctrine reads:
There is no doubt that the peoples of the socialist countries and the
Communist Parties have and must have freedom to determine their

25. History of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks), Short Course 167-168 (Commission
of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B) ed. 1939), as quoted in McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 10, at 186.
26. G.

TUNKIN,

LAW AND FORCE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

85 (1983).
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country's path of development. However, any decision of theirs must
damage neither socialism in their own country nor the fundamental
interests of the other socialist countries nor the worldwide workers'
movement, which is waging a struggle for socialism. This means that
every Communist Party is responsible not only to its own people but
also to all the socialist countries and to the entire Communist movement. Whoever forgets this in placing sole emphasis on the autonomy
and independence of Communist Parties lapses into one-sidedness,
shirking his internationalist obligations.27
The statement adds:
Each Communist Party is free in applying the principles of MarxismLeninism and socialism in its own country, but it cannot deviate from
these principles (if, of course, it remains a Communist Party). In concrete terms this means primarily that every Communist Party cannot
fail to take into account in its activities such a decisive fact of our
time as the struggle between the two antithetical social systems capitalism and socialism.28
The violence with which this doctrine has been, and is being, applied in
Eastern Europe and elsewhere needs no new description. The totality of
these claims for exception from Article 2(4), through both wars of liberation and the Brezhnev Doctrine that the Soviet Union asserts is aptly
summarized by Professor Michael Reisman:
The Soviet claim was and continues to be that, the U.N. Charter notwithstanding, the Soviet Union maintains the right to support those
struggling against existing governments if their struggle is consistent
with historical laws, of which the Soviet government is the exclusively
authorized interpreter. If the groups succeed, the Soviet Union has
the additional right and obligation to make sure that their members
and constituents do not change their minds in the future. A scholar of
no less stature than Professor Tunkin has sanctified the doctrine as a
jus cogens2 9
Incredibly enough, the International Court of Justice in the recent
Nicaragua case would appear, perhaps maladroitly, to have conferred its
authority upon "wars of liberation." 0 At one point in its opinion, the

27. Kovalev, Sovereignty and the International Obligations of Socialist Countries,
Pravda, September 26, 1968, quoted in McDoUGAL & REISMAN, supra note 4, at 176.

28. Id. See also Rostow, Law and the Use of Force by States: The Brezhnev Doctrine,
209 (1981).
29. Reisman, Old Wine in New Bottles: The Reagan and Brezhnev Doctrines in Contemporary InternationalLaw and Practice, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 171, 188 (1988).
A possible change in Soviet attitudes toward both "wars of liberation" and the
Brezhnev Doctrine is indicated in M. Gorbachev, Reality and Safeguards for a Secure
World, Sept. 17, 1987, U.N. Doc. A/42/574, S/194143 (Sept. 18, 1987). Unhappily, there
would appear to be some dissension in the ranks. See Gorbachev Deputy Criticizes Policy,
New York Times, Aug. 7, 1988, at 11, col. 1. Even Mr. Gorbachev himself sometimes wavers.
See Dissenters Stay Silent, The Times (London), July 15, 1988, at 6, col. 6. The changes
under way would appear to be in the direction of greatly improved world public order.
30. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
7
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Court in piety, as excessive as impossible, declares its complete neutrality
between contending systems of world public order. It writes:
The finding of the United States Congress also expressed the view
that the Nicaraguan Government has taken "significant steps towards
establishing a totalitarian Communist dictatorship." However the regime in Nicaragua be defined, adherence by a State to any particular
doctrine does not constitute a violation of customary international
law; to hold otherwise would make nonsense of the fundamental principle of State sovereignty, on which the whole of international law
rests, and the freedom of choice of the political, social, economic and
cultural systems of a State. Consequently, Nicaragua's domestic policy
options, even assuming that they correspond to the description given
of them by the Congress finding, cannot justify on the legal plane the
various actions of the Respondent complained of. The Court cannot
contemplate the creation of a new rule opening up a right of intervention by one State against another on the ground that the latter has
opted for some particular ideology or political system. 3'
Yet in its holding the Court finds in the acknowledged hostilities of Nicaragua against El Salvador no "armed attack" against El Salvador or even
threat of "armed attack" against El Salvador or any other state; hence, it
denies the United States the right to participate in the collective defence
of El Salvador and legitimizes the factual intervention by Nicaragua. As
Judge Schwebel writes, in dissent, this was in substance to honor "wars of
liberation." 2 Judge Schwebel, finding the errors of the Court conspicuous, writes:
The Court appears to reason this way. Efforts by State A (however
insidious, sustained, substantial and effective), to overthrow the government of State B, if they are not or do not amount to an armed
attack upon State B, give rise to no right of self-defence by State B,
and hence, to no right of State C to join State B in measures of collective self-defence. State B, the victim State, is entitled to take countermeasures against State A, of a dimension the Court does not specify.
But State C is not thereby justified in taking counter-measures
against State A which involve the use of force. 3
He adds confirmation of his interpretation by noting a negative inference
from an earlier reference by the Court to "wars of decolonization," a kind
of war not involved in the case. Thus, while professing not to be able to
create a double standard, by its decision the Court in fact creates a
double standard in favor of an expansive totalitarianism.3 4 The question
before the Court was not whether Nicaragua's choice of a public order
was "a violation of customary international law," but whether Nicaragua's
attacks upon its neighbors were in accord with conventional and custom-

(Nicar.
31.
32.
33.
34.

v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 14.
Id., para. 263.
Dissenting Opinion, para. 174-81.
Id., para. 175.
Id., para. 178, referring to paragraph 206 of the Judgment of the Court.
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ary international law.35
The decision and opinion of the International Court of Justice in the
Nicaragua case, most unhappily, raises grave questions about the capabilities of a judicial body, under the contemporary circumstances of contending world public orders, to make rational decisions in the common
interest about the regulation of major coercion and violence. At the jurisdictional phase of the case,"6 the Court held, contrary to all prior law,
that it had jurisdiction over a state that had not consented to such jurisdiction, and in favor of a state that had no standing to sue except by the
most factitious creation of the Court. At the merits phase, the Court
demonstrated that it had few capabilities for discovering or recognizing
the facts relevant to rational decision, and even less capabilities for evaluating such facts by the criteria that much of the world regards as expressed in the United Nations Charter and customary international law.37
Hersch Lauterpacht could have been right in his famous insistence that
in the abstract no dispute between human beings is inherently non-justiciable.3 8 His conclusion can, however, have little relevance to a struggle
between contending world public orders in which all common interest,
beyond bare. human survival, seems at times to have disappeared. 39
It should be no cause for wonder, in an infectious deterioration of
policies and procedures for the regulation of major coercion and violence,
that the United States, as a principal proponent of a public order of
human dignity, should begin in measure, for self-help, to adopt policies

35. My criticism of the Court is both of its holding that an actual "armed attack" by
Nicaragua upon El Salvador was necessary before the United States could come to the aid
of El Salvador and of its finding that what Nicaragua was doing did not amount to an
armed attack upon El Salvador. In the light of this holding and this finding, it does not
matter that the Court did not explicitly state that it regarded "wars of liberation" as lawful;
by its decision it honored such an expansionist war in fact.
36. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 1984 I.C.J. 392.
It should perhaps be noted that the writer was of counsel to the United States Government at this phase of the case.
37. See Norton, The Nicaragua Case: Political Questions before the International
Court of Justice, 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 459 (1987); J. MOORE, THE SECRET WAR IN CENTRAL
AMERICA (1987); R. TURNER, NICARAGUA V. UNITED STATES: A LOOK AT THE FACTS (1987).
The decision is discussed, in varying terms of approval and disapproval, in a sequence
of comments in Appraisals of the ICJ's Decision: Nicaragua v. United States (Merits), 81
AM. J. INT'L L. 77 (1987). A particularly perceptive comment is that of J. Hargrove, The
NicaraguaJudgment and the Future of the Law of Force and Self-Defense, 81 AM. J. INT'L
L. 135 (1987).
See also H. Almond, Jr., The Military Activities Case: New Perspectives on the International Court of Justice and Global Public Order, 21 INT'L LAW. 195 (1987); Macdonald,
The NicaraguanCase: New Answers to Old Questions, 1986 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 127; Turner,
Peace and the World Court: A Comment on the ParamilitaryActivities Case, 20 VAND. J.
TRANSN'L

L. 53 (1987).

38. H. LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (1933).
39. McDougal & Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of
Public Order, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1959).
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and procedures parallel to those employed by the Soviet Union. Through
the Monroe Doctrine and participation in the Organization of American
States the United States has long of course sought to preclude outside
states from acquiring territorial power in the Western hemisphere. More
recently, Presidents as diverse in general perspective as Kennedy and
Johnson have made pronouncements, in content comparable to the later
Brezhnev Doctrine, designed to justify interventions against totalitarian
expansion into this hemisphere. 0 Even the House of Representatives
joined in support of these pronouncements. It resolved that:
(1) any [international communist] subversive domination or threat of
it violates the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, and of collective security as set forth in the acts and resolutions heretofore adopted by
the American Republics; and
(2) in any such situation any one or more of the high contracting parties to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance may, in the
exercise of individual or collective self-defense, which could go so far
as resort to armed force, and in accordance with the declarations and
principles above stated, take steps to forestall or combat intervention,
domination, control and colonization of whatever form, by the subversive forces known as international communism and its agencies in the
Western hemisphere."
In contemporary times Presidents Carter and Reagan have extended
comparable doctrines to the Persian Gulf and Saudi Arabia.
Another important obstacle to the rational, uniform application of
Articles 2(4) and 51 derives from the attempt, as illustrated by the International Court of Justice in the Nicaraguacase, to cut down the reach of
the historic right of self-defense."3 It is not always recognized that in the
global community Articles 2(4) and 51 are as wholly complementary as
are the prohibition of violence and the permission of self-defense in mature national communities. Some state officials and scholars have taken
the position that Article 51 imposes upon states a higher degree of necessity than that of customary international law and requires states to await
the inception of actual armed attack, without option to respond to realistic expectations of imminent attack. This interpretation of Article 51 is
based upon an allegedly literal interpretation of the words "armed attack" regarded as an isolated component of the article. It may be noted,
however, that such interpretation introduces the words "only if" into the
Article and is contrary to all the important canons for the interpretation
of international agreements." The negotiating record indicates that the
framers of the Charter sought only, by introducing the words "armed at40. The various pronouncements of United States officials are summarized in Reisman,
supra note 29.
41. As quoted in Reisman, supra note 29, at 177.
42. Rostow, supra note 19; 0. Schachter, In Defense of InternationalRules on the Use
of Force, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 113 (1986).
43. This position is fully developed in McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 10, at 217,
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tack," to immunize regional security arrangements, and especially the Inter-American system envisioned by the Act of Chapullepec, from the jurisdiction of the Security Council. There was no expressed intent to
forbid response to threat of imminent attack. The most relevant Committee Report reads: "The use of arms in legitimate self-defense remains admitted and unimpaired."" The principle of interpretation by the subsequent conduct of states obviously can give little comfort to those who
urge new limitations. Most importantly, the principle of effectiveness in
interpretation by major purposes makes the asserted limitation of selfdefense to the actual inception of armed attack an absurdity. In an age of
increasingly awesome instruments of destruction and highly sophisticated
coercion by instruments other than the military, the state that awaits
armed attack, can expect only quick transition to oblivion. It defies not
merely major purposes, but even common sense, to think that a prescription in effect imposing suicide could either create the expectation, indispensable to law, of its enforcement, or that it could be enforced.
It may be recalled that the United Nations Charter makes the protection of human rights coordinate with, if not inclusive of, its prohibition
of unauthorized coercion and violence. It is presently being greatly debated among scholars and others in what degree the core provisions about
human rights are, like the provision for self-defense in Article 51, completely complementary with Article 2(4).4 5 Most observers agree that the
long enjoyed practice of humanitarian intervention, for the protection of
a state's nationals and sometimes others, has not been outlawed by Article 2(4). It would thwart reason to hold that a constitutional Charter so
greatly emphasizing human rights should be interpreted to abolish an historic remedy so effective in the protection of human rights, a remedy
which does not in fact threaten territorial integrity and political
independence.
The more intense contemporary controversy centers most directly
upon whether it is lawful for one state to interfere (engage or assist in
coercion and violence) in the internal affairs of another state for a range
of objectives. Unhappily, the discussion is carried on in terms, such as
"intervention," "counter-intervention," "civil war," "self-determination,"
"spheres of influence," "reprisals,". "retaliations," and so on, which make
so ambiguous a reference to both facts and legal policies that it is often
difficult to know what is being asserted. One suggestion appears to be

44. McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 10, at 236.
45. See, inter alia, Reisman, Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Charter
Article 2(4), 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 642 (1984); The Use of Force in Contemporary International
Law, 78 PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 74 (1984); Criteriafor the Lawful Use of Force in International Law, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 279 (1985); The Emperor Has No Clothes: Article 2(4)
and the Use of Force in Contemporary InternationalLaw, ch. 1 in UNITED NATIONS FOR A
BETTER WORLD (J. Saxena and others, eds. 1986) 3; Schachter, The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 645 (1984); The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82
MICH. L. REV. 1620 (1984); InternationalLaw in Theory and Practice, 178 RECUEIL DES
CoURS, 1982-V, ch. VII, VIII; Cutler, The Right to Intervene, 64 FOREIGN AFF. 96 (1985).

DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 18:1

that the self-determination of states is the paramount policy of contemporary international law and that the proponents of human dignity may
intervene in other states to protect or promote self-determination, even as
totalitarian states do in promotion of totalitarian public order. In response other commentators, not always taking a position upon the Soviet
claims, insist that such intervention would be in clear violation of the
allegedly literal and neutral words of Article 2(4). A counter-response is
that the proponents of human dignity may lawfully intervene after, but
not before, expansive totalitarians have intervened in a state. In such
controversy it is sometimes forgotten that what is involved in all instances is the application of the larger community's fundamental policy,
as embodied in Articles 2(4) and 51, against change by coercion and violence and that the objectives of a state, whether for expansion or conservation, are among the most important features of the factual context for
evaluating the lawfulness or unlawfulness of a state's action.
It has long been urged that the rational application of Articles 2(4)
and 51, in clarification of common interest, requires in every instance of
challenged coercion and violence, not mere logical derivation from allegedly autonomous (policy neutral) rules, but rather a careful, configurative
examination and appraisal of the many relevant features of the larger
context of the coercion and violence.4 In an earlier statement, noting that
the relevant features of the context in any instance of challenged coercion
and violence were many and complex, we summarized:
Even the most modest suggestion must include the varying characteristics of the participants, and of their allies and affiliates; the distribution of perspectives of attack and defense, expansion and conservation, deliberateness and coincidence, inclusivity and exclusivity,
consequentiality and inconsequentiality; the locus of events, as within
a single community or transcending different communities, and the
geographic range of the impacts of events; the timing of events, and
their continuity or discontinuity; the differential distribution of the
bases of effective power; the variety and characteristics of the different strategies - diplomatic, ideological, economic, and military employed; and the various outcomes in intensity and magnitude
achieved, of the fact, and expectation, of coercion and destruction of
values.47

46. This position is believed to be established in McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note
10, ch. 3.
47. McDougal, Foreword to J. MOORE, LAW AND THE INDO-CHINA WAR (1972).
For example, in relevant prescription the customary right to use force in self-defense is
limited by the criterion of necessity to defend against an imminent, or exercised, use of
force against the territorial integrity of a state or its political independence, and by the
requirement of proportionality of the action taken in self-defense. Thus, the action defended against has to be appraised in its entire context: the participants have to be determined, their objectives (e.g., whether they are expansionist or conservative in nature), the
situation of decision, the bases of power behind the activities, the strategies employed, and
their immediate outcomes in intensities of coercion. If the activities complained of would
lead a disinterested third party to reasonably conclude that use of the military instrument is
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It is no revolutionary idea, alien to the common interest that must be
effected by all law, that the kind of public order demanded by a state be
taken into account in appraising the lawfulness of its acts of coercion and
violence. In endorsing this idea, more than twenty-five years ago, Florentino Feliciano and I wrote:
Lest the contrary impression arise by default, it may be made clear
that, in contrast with the quoted Soviet doctrine, we make no proposal for incorporation of a double or multiple standard in the conception of permissible coercion. The policy we recommend is, on the contrary, that of demand for effective universality, for the uniform
application to all participants of a basic policy that excludes the acquisition or expansion of values by coercion and violence. In urging
the explicit examination of the fundamental public order perspectives
of participants, in particular their definitions of the legitimate purposes of coercion, the hope is precisely that decision-makers may
thereby escape the double standard which in specific interpretations
may be created against those who do not accept as permissible the use
of coercion for expansion. We think of the interest to be clarified, the
demand for change by noncoercive and nonviolent procedures only, as
a general community interest, as the long-term interest of all individual states, and recognize that there must be a promise of reciprocity
from states who reject totalitarian conceptions of world order."8
What the proponents of a public order of human dignity cannot accept is that a double standard be established that discriminates in favor
of expansive totalitarianism.
VIII.

THE CONDITIONS AFFECTING ACHIEVEMENT OF BASIC GOALS

By considering the conditions that have affected past failures in humankind's achievement of a stable minimum public order, an observer
may be able to feed back to the clarification of goals, enhance uhderstanding of past trends, and prepare for the projection of probable futures and a more rational choice among policy options. The conditions
that have affected past failures are commonly described, at high level abstraction, in terms, first, of the contemporary anarchy of multitudinous
states, exhibiting both a most uneconomic relation of peoples to resources
and immense differences in effective power, and secondly, of the continuing struggles between contending systems of world public order, expres-

urgently required to protect the target country's territorial integrity and political independence, then the target country may employ force in a reasonably proportionate response the proportionality of the defensive action, again, being determined through comprehensive
contextual analysis.
Such a contextual examination of the events in the Nicaragua case would reveal the
Soviet Union and Cuba as participants along with the Sandinistas and would note the expansionist nature of their objectives. For an outline of the necessary examination and appraisal in a comparable case, see M. McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and SelfDefense, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 597 (1963).
48. McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 10, at 187 n.156.

DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 18:1

sing diametrically opposed conceptions of the relation of the individual
human being to the state. To make this high level description of overriding conditions meaningful, however, it must be given operational indices
in terms of a maze of interacting predispositional and environmental variables.4 9 The predispositional variables are the subjectivities of individual
human beings, including their demands for values, their identifications
with others, and their expectations about the context of interaction; these
relevant subjectivities may be organized by employment of the maximization postulate, that individuals adopt one response rather than another
when they expect to be better off in terms of all their values by the response chosen. The environmental variables are the features of the larger
community context, which both condition and constrain predispositions.
These environmental variables may economically be described in terms of
population, resources, institutions, and outcomes in value shaping and
sharing. A most convenient way of achieving comprehensive description
of any community process, it may be recalled, is in terms of individual
human beings, with varying patterns of demand, identification and expectation, employing resources, through institutional practices, for maximization of value outcomes.
It has already been noted that a most important variable in the contemporary global process of effective power is what is commonly referred
to as "the rising, common demands" of peoples for greater participation
in the shaping and sharing of all the basic values of human dignity. Different peoples, conditioned by differing cultural traditions and modes of
social organization, may of course pursue and achieve the same basic values through different modalities and nuances in institutional practice.
Unhappily, in a world of contending public orders and immense contrasts
in development, peoples nurtured in differing parochial communities may
tend to express special, rather than common, interests. Unable to clarify
and'agree upon common interests, peoples often become preoccupied with
short-term, immediate payoffs rather than long-term consequences. It is
possible that as the respect revolution accelerates, people's demands for
new participation in the different value processes will become more realistic in recognition of the need for reciprocity and common interest. The
universalizing demands of individuals for greater participation in all value
processes can be expected to continue to affect all effective and authoritative decision.
The identifications upon behalf of which demands for values are asserted today range from the whole of humankind to small parochial
groups. The earliest parochial identifications with the family and the
tribe were broken, in part, by the advent of cities, facilitating the later
identifications with larger states. In more recent times, the "nation-state"
has been the symbol about which individuals could organize their collec-

49. These variables are outlined and described in some detail in McDOUGAL,
supra note 2, at ch. 1.
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tive identifications, and most states have of course sought to inhibit more
inclusive identifications that might limit their power. It would appear,
however, that the potentialities for individuals to acquire and sustain
more inclusive identifications, at least for the promotion of minimum order, are strengthening. The increasing tempo of interaction in all value
processes around the globe, facilitated by modern communication and
transportation, allows an individual not merely to change geographic location, but also to change "place" through identifications with many different functional groups. Individuals who participate in a vast global network of territorial and functional activities may be able better to identify
with a common humanity and to demand its common interest.
The expectations of the peoples of the world about the conditions
that affect minimum public order and their individual security, the expectations that in turn affect all effective and authoritative decision, vary
tremendously in comprehensiveness and realism. The greatest contemporary failure in realism is in the lack of appreciation of the comprehensiveness and depth of the interdependences, affecting both minimum and optimum order, of all peoples everywhere with regard to the shaping and
sharing of all values. No less importantly, in a world in which the giant
powers continuously balance weapons capable of instantaneous global destruction, most peoples, elite and rank and file alike, are obsessed by a
pervasive expectation of violence that affects all choices among alternatives in value shaping and sharing. Fortunately, the spread of new techniques of communication and modern education make it possible for individuals everywhere to acquire a new realism about the conditions, not
merely of continued existence, but of improved public order. As the network or interaction and the perception of interdependence expand, more
and more peoples may come to perceive that the assertion of special interest, against common interest, is not compatible with survival. Some of
the more important environmental variables that characterize the contemporary global community process, affecting all public order, may be
indicated in the following tabular, if somewhat anecdotal, form:"
1. Security
Continuing confrontations of the major powers, with rising expectations of violence. Threats of nuclear destruction and of chemical and
biological warfare. The acquisition of contemporary instruments of
destruction by smaller powers. The rise and spread of private violence
and terrorism.
2. Population
The accelerating rate of increase in population growth. The uneven
distribution of peoples in relation to resources and increasing barriers
to migration.

50. This presentation is adapted from McDougal, InternationalLaw and the Future,
50 Miss. L. J. 259 (1979).
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3. Resources
The spoilation, pollution, and exhaustion of resources at an accelerating rate. Increasing violation of physical and engineering unities in the
use of resources. The growing monopolization of sharable resources,
with restraint upon scientific inquiry about resources. The promise
and threat of both deliberate and accidental climate and weather
modification. The- continuing diversion of important resources to destructive purposes.
4. Institutions
The antiquated nation-state structures, with their disregard of physical, engineering, and utilization unities. The continuing weakness of
international governmental organizations. The lack of development of
functional transnational associations devoted to values other than
power and wealth. The relative immunization of wealth and other private associations from transnational authority.
5. Particular Value Processes Within Global Community Process
(1) Power
The retreat of democracy and rise of totalitarianism within many different communities. The increasing centralization, concentration, and
bureaucratization of power even within nominally democratic communities. The increasing monopolization of the effective bases of power
within different communities.
(2) Wealth
The continued prevalence of individual poverty. Unequal distribution
of wealth both within and across community lines. Inadequate regulation of transnational monetary units. Governmental interferences with
private trade. Arbitrary seizures and confiscations of property rights.
Irrational allocations of resources and unequal development. Continuing cycles of depression and inflation.
(3) Respect
Widespread denials of individual freedom of choice about social roles.
Increasing individual differentiations and group hatreds upon grounds
(race, sex, religion, language, national origin) irrelevant to individual
capabilities and contributions. Massive encroachments upon individual autonomy and privacy through modern technology and increasing
governmental bureaucratization.
(4) Well-Being (Health)
Continuing high mortality rate and low life expectancy in many parts
of the world. Increasing threats of famine, epidemics, and disease. Indiscriminate mass killings in armed conflict and other interactions.
Unexplained disappearances. The globalization of the practice of torture as a deliberate instrument of policy.
(5) Enlightenment
Continuing high sates of illiteracy and differential access to information in many communities. Deliberate fabrications and disseminations
of misinformation. Wholesale indoctrinations and brainwashings. The
withholding and suppression of the information necessary to independent appraisals of policy.
(6) Skill
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The unequal distribution of skills in modern technology and the rapid
obsolescence of skills by changes in technology. The brain drain from
the developing countries to the developed. Restrictions upon the freedoms of skill groups to organize and to function.
(7) Affection (Loyalties)
The requisition of loyalties in the name of the state and the undermining of more universal loyalties. Severe restrictions upon freedom
of association. Governmental frustration of congenial personal relations and employment of social ostracism as sanctions.
(8) Rectitude
Denials of freedom to worship and choose secular criteria of responsibility. The politicization of rectitude. Restrictions upon association for
religious purposes and intolerance and persecution of religious minorities. The rise of messianic religious fundamentalism.
The intense interdependences among all the predispositional and environmental conditions make it possible to effect changes in the larger
global community process, including movement toward a more stable
minimum public order, by making changes in, and managing, the various
particular conditions.
IX.

POSSIBLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

Law is interested in the past and the present in aid of inventing and
making the future. Even in relation to a problem as difficult as that of
establishing and maintaining a stable minimum world public order, the
projection of possible futures, when inspired and disciplined by knowledge of past trends in achievement and their conditioning factors, may
serve to stimulate creativity in the invention and evaluation of improved
alternatives in decision. One procedure for inquiry about the future, invented by the late Harold Lasswell some fifty years ago, is that of deliberately formulating provisional maps of "developmental constructs" of future possibilities that range through a broad spectrum from the most
optimistic to the most pessimistic. 1 When this method of inquiry is applied to the problem of minimum world public order, the contrast in rival
constructs is stark.
The most optimistic construct projects increasing progress toward a
wider and more responsible sharing of power and a greater production
and wider sharing in all the values of human dignity among the peoples
of the world. This construct builds upon various assumptions about
predispositional and environmental variables and their interaction. It
projects, thus, that the widespread demands of peoples for a greater and
more rewarding participation in all value processes will not diminish, but
will rather intensify, that the contemporary and largely parochial identifi-

51. H. LASSWELL,

WORLD POLITICS AND

PERSONAL INSECURITY (1935);

THE WORLD

REVOLUTION OF OUR TIME: A FRAMEWORK FOR BASIC POLICY RESEARCH (1951). See also Eulau, H. D. Lasswell's Developmental Analysis, XI W. POL. Q. 229 (1958); W. ASCHER, FORECASTING: AN APPRAISAL FOR POLICY-MAKERS AND PLANNERS (1978).
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cations of peoples may, despite recurrent phases of fragmentation, expand toward recognition, not merely of common humanity, but of shared
community, and that peoples will achieve increasingly realistic perception
of, and expectations about, their indissoluble interdependences in relation
to the shaping and sharing of all values. This construct, considering environmental variables, projects assumptions that the accelerating rate of
population growth can be controlled, that the resource-environment of
the world can be protected from exhaustion and spoilation, that science
and science-based technology can create vast new resources, and that
more economic governmental and value-functional institutions can be
created, and so on.
The most pessimistic construct regards the direction of history as reversing itself and moving toward an aggregate of militarized and garrisoned communities, controlled from the center and modelled on the
prison. This trend could culminate in an all comprehensive, single totalitarian state, with a system of public order that, when finally entrenched,
organizes the global community into a vast hierarchical pattern under the
rule of a self-perpetuating military caste. This construct builds upon the
assumptions, among predispositional variables, that the peoples of the
world will not be able to clarify their genuine common interests, but will
rather pursue short-term special and exclusive advantages, that the identifications of peoples will remain territorially bound and parochial, rather
than extending to a common humanity, and that peoples' expectations
will in general remain diffuse, truncated, and unrealistic, and include, in
particular, an anticipation that violence will be so high and pervasive as
to provide a chronic justification for the continuing military mobilization
of humankind. The assumptions made in this construct about environmental variables are of course largely the opposite of those that sustain
the optimistic construct.
Whatever mid-abstraction constructs may be drawn between these
two extremes, most observers today agree that contemporary world public
order is undergoing transformations of unprecedented magnitude and
scope and that such change is likely to continue at an accelerating rate.
Happily, it is not necessary to regard any particular developmental construct as inevitable in outcome. The future may, in ways about which we
do not yet know, be inevitable, but statements about the future, made in
light of present knowledge, cannot fathom the inevitable and may be accorded differing degrees of probability, subject to change. It is this indeterminacy of the future that presents the proponents of a world public
order of human dignity with the opportunity, as well as the desperate
necessity, to refashion the global constitutive process of authoritative decision in modalities better designed to secure both minimum public order
and other community demanded values.
X.

ALTERNATIVES FOR AN IMPROVED WORLD PUBLIC ORDER

It may aid understanding of the need for a comprehensive approach
to recall the intimate interrelations within the global community process
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(interrelations emphasized in our opening paragraphs about the larger
context) of effective power, the constitutive process of authoritative decision, and the public order achieved in the protection of demanded values.
It is the global process of effective power that establishes and maintains,
as one of its components, the global constitutive process and, hence, identifies the basic policies to be sought in authoritative decision. It is the
global constitutive process that establishes and maintains the larger community's most minimum order, in the sense of prohibiting and regulating
major coercion and violence, and aspired optimum order, in the sense of
promoting the greatest production and widest sharing of all demanded
values, and it is upon this existing, contemporary constitutive process
that observers and decision makers who would promote peace, whether
conceived in a minimum or optimum terms, must eventually focus their
recommendations for change and improvement. Yet, through a grip of
converse determination, effective power in the global community may be
based upon participation in any and all the value processes other than
power (wealth, enlightenment, respect, well-being, skill, rectitude, loyalty), and the kind of constitutive process the larger community of humankind can achieve is highly dependent upon the kind of public order it
can establish in relation to all values. In consequence of all these intense
interdependences in effective and authoritative decision and in choices in
particular value processes, movement toward (or away from) both minimum order and optimum order in global community process may be affected, and managed, by decisions and choices about any feature of the
larger community process.
The task of highest priority, for all who are genuinely committed to
the goal values of a world public order of human dignity, would accordingly, appear to be that of creating in the peoples of the world the perspectives necessary for accelerated movement toward a more effective
global constitutive process of authoritative decision. It has already been
indicated that it is in the conflicting, confused, and disoriented perspectives of peoples - as manifested in exorbitant demands for special,
rather than common, interests; in syndromes of parochial, exclusive identifications; and in chronically unrealistic expectations about the larger
context - and not the inexorable requirements of technologically malleable environmental variables, that perpetuate the existing conditions of
contending world orders and appalling threat to the whole of humankind.
The optimalization postulate (that individuals act within their capabilities to maximize their values), and the many historic successes of law
as an instrument for the clarification of common interest, would suggest
that by appropriate modifications in perspectives the peoples of the world
can be encouraged to move toward both the establishment of more effective decision process and the making of more rational specific decisions
about public order values. It is hardly a novel thought that the factors culture, class, interest, personality, and crisis - which importantly condition peoples' perspectives can be modified to foster constructive rather
than destructive perspectives. The distinctive perspectives that must be
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created in promotion of a more viable global constitutive process include,
as indicated above, a trilogy of demands, identifications and expectations.
The demands that require strengthening are those that insist upon the
greater production and wider sharing of all human dignity values and
which emphasize the protection of common rather than special interests.
The identifications that require enhancement are those that most nearly
embrace the whole of humankind and achieve increasing pluralistic expression in both territorial and functional groupings. The relevant expectations must include the recognition that all peoples, everywhere, are irrevocably interdependent for securing all values, even survival, and that
all peoples, without exception, have more to gain and less to lose, for
themselves and all with whom they identify, by the establishment and
maintenance of a secure global minimum order, rather than by exercise of
unilateral coercion and violence. The task for proponents of a world public order of human dignity is, in particular, that of establishing credible
expectations that they do genuinely accept the basic policy of minimum
order, that coercion and violence are not to be used for change, or to obstruct peaceful change, and that they are willing reciprocally to accord
the benefits of this policy even to those who do not share their vision of
world order. The contemporary technology of communication and collaboration, fortunately, makes possible the widespread generation and communication of these relevant perspectives.
There are of course multitudinous modalities in institution and policy that might be employed, if appropriate perspectives could be created
in the peoples of the world, to improve the existing global constitutive
process of authoritative decision toward a more secure, free, and abundant world public order.52 For centuries philosophers, clerics and kings
have proffered plans for perpetual peace, and contemporary proposals
abound for various forms of world government and lesser modifications of
prevailing institutions and practices. The difficulty with the proposals envisaging grandiose transformations in existing structures and practices is
that they seldom consider the means necessary to translate the vast
changes they propose into reality. The difficulty with the more modest
proposals is that they are fragmented and anecdotal in form, dealing with
isolated features of rule or procedure or structure, and are not put forward in appropriate relation to the processes of effective power and authoritative decision which they are designed to affect. What is urgently
needed, in more rational approach, is the creation of competent agencies,
both public and private, for undertaking a systematic canvass of every

52. For an introduction to the literature, see B. FERENCZ, A COMMON SENSE GUIDE TO
(1985); B. FERENCZ, THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY ISSUES, COMMON SECURITY: A BLUEPRINT FOR SURVIVAL (1982); R. FALK, THE END OF
WORLD ORDER (1983); McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 10, ch. 4; J. MIKUS, BEYOND DETERRENCE: FROM POWER POLITICS TO WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1988); S. MENDLOVITZ, ON THE
CREATION OF A JUST WORLD ORDER: PREFERRED WORLDS FOR THE 1990's (1975); J. PERKINS,
THE PRUDENT PEACE (1981); Falk, A New Paradigmfor International Legal Studies: Prospects and Proposals,84 YALE L. J. 969 (1975).
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feature of effective power, constitutive process, and public order decision
to ascertain a wide range of possible improvements and to establish priorities among potential improvements in terms of relation to human dignity values, temporal need and acceptability, economy, and
effectiveness."
It is most unlikely, so long as the contention between rival systems of
world public order intensifies, that the major states of the world can be
persuaded to take important steps by agreement toward the greater collectivization and centralization of the existing global constitutive process.
It is too difficult to clarify a common interest between a public order
dedicated to expansion by major coercion and violence and those who regard change by peaceful procedures only as indispensable to any law and
stable public order. The most that the proponents of a world public order
of human dignity may now be able to do would appear to be to achieve
and promote enlightenment about the conditions of minimum order, the
potentialities of an optimum world public order, and the policies and
measures that might, through appropriate interpretations of existing
agreements and the uniformities of customary law, gradually move humankind toward the necessary changes in global constitutive process.
Such a stance may be criticized as mere incrementalism, in a situation of
desperate need, but it could be made an incrementalism guided by a clear
vision of basic goals and a realistic understanding of the conditions of
their achievement.
In the absence of comprehensive and detailed studies, it is difficult to
offer definitive illustration of the changes in policies and measures that
might transform the existing global constitutive process into a more effective instrument of minimum and optimum order. It may be remembered
that the existing, most comprehensive process includes all the decisions
that identify authoritative decision-makers, project the basic policies of
the larger community, establish appropriate structures in aid of decision,
allocate bases of power for sanctioning purposes, prescribe procedures for
the making of particular decisions, and secure the performance of all the
different types of decision functions (intelligence, promotion, prescription, invocation, application, termination, appraisal) that are necessary to
the making and application of community policy. The significance of any
change or improvement in a particular feature of this process must of
course depend at any given time upon both the configuration of all other
features of the process and impacts from protected features of value
processes other than power. It may be possible, however, to make highly
impressionistic, even cryptic, suggestions of the kinds of policies and measures that could, in appropriate context, point in the direction of a more
secure, free, and abundant world public order.
We proceed phase by phase through the existing global constitutive

53. It could have been in recognition of this need that the United States Institute of
Peace was established.
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process.
A.

Participationin Decision Making

Seek a more genuinely representative and responsible balancing of
power through the creation of more rational intergovernmental regional
organizations.
Encourage the creation of political parties, pressure groups, and private associations dedicated to all values for participation in transnational
activities.
Recognize the importance of the individual human being, as ultimate
actor in all organizations, through provision of increasing access to all authoritative arenas.
B.

Perspectives: Basic General Community Policies

Reinforce commitment to minimum order, that no change be effected
by coercion and violence, by explicit recognition of the complementarity
of Articles 2(4) and 51 of the United Nations Charter, emphasizing a
broad conception of self-defense.
Interpret Article 2(4) of the Charter to prohibit "wars of liberation."
Interpret Article 51 of the Charter to authorize states to take measures in self-defense when attack is imminent, without awaiting the fact
of armed attack.
Reinforce commitment to optimum order by consolidating the emergence of a global bill of human rights through appropriate interpretation
of the Charter, the major covenants, national decisions, and customary
behavior.
C.

Arenas: Structures of Authority
1.

Establishment

Balance structures of authority in geographic range between centralized and decentralized, and integrate in a way to take into account the
intensity of impacts within different geographic areas.
Expand the scope and authority of the executive within international
governmental organizations.
Staff parliamentary bodies more effectively in aid of intelligence and
appraisal functions for the better clarification of policies.
Multiply occasional conferences for employment of the diplomatic instrument in the clarification and projection of policies.
Provide panels of skilled experts for the voluntary adjudication (mediation, conciliation, arbitration) of disputes. With modern technology,
these panels could be moved quickly about the world for sessions in convenient locations.
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2.

Access

In promoting policies of openness and responsibility, aggrieved, individuals and groups might be allowed to represent themselves or to be represented by others (including institutionalized omsbudsmen) in a wide
range of structures of authority.
Compulsory jurisdiction for adjudication might be increased with respect to matters not involving state security.
D. Bases of Power
The promotion of minimum and optimum order might be enhanced
by a more pluralistic distribution of both authority and effective control.
1. Authority
Insofar as compatible with the genuine security interests of states,
reject claims of "political questions" and "domestic jurisdictions" that
immunize activities from legal evaluation.
For the protection of inclusive interests, accord inclusive institutions
a more ample competence with respect to the intelligence, promotion, appraisal, and invocation functions; with respect to the prescription, application, and termination functions, accord a broad competence on matters
that do not endanger the security of states.
Allocate to the separate states the competence necessary to protect
their exclusive interests, and settle conflicts between states by the criteria
of reasonableness as determined through a disciplined, systematic examination of the features of the larger context that affects interests.
2.

Control

Through coalition, alliance, and regionalization, seek a more rational
organization of the control of the resource bases of the earth-space
community.
By agreement and unilateral action, reduce the resources being devoted to armaments and military purposes.
Expand multiple networks of transnational associations, governmental and private, to increase the greater production and wider sharing of all
the values that affect power, as well as the quality of life.
Encourage educational institutions to increase their inquiries about
the conditions, policies, and alternatives necessary to an improved world
public order.
Employ the technology of modern communication to promote a
world public opinion that demands and sustains a public order of human
dignity.
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Strategies: Authoritative Procedures

Seek an appropriate integration in support of public order of all
strategies (diplomatic, ideological, economic, and military), with a strong
emphasis upon persuasion rather than coercion.
In revival of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, collectivize
and centralize such coercion as may be necessary and proportionate to
the maintenance of public order.
Enhance the diplomatic instrument by minimizing the employment
of special majorities and vetoes, other than in relation to matters affecting the security of states, and by rationalizing the law of international
agreements.
Maintain free transnational channels of communication for more effective employment of the ideological instrument.
Employ the economic instrument to improve the channels of trade,
financial assistance, and development in the greater production and wider
distribution of goods and services.
In performance of decision functions, employ the best available scientific procedures in exploration of facts and potential policies, and make
findings as dependable, contextual, and creative as possible.
In prescriptive and applicative decision, final characterization of
facts and policies should be made deliberate, rational in relation to goals,
and non-provocative, employing contextual analysis in evaluation and
choice of alternatives.
F.

Outcomes in ParticularTypes of Decisions

The culminating outcomes of constitutive process include both the
establishment and maintenance of the process itself and a continuous
flow of particular decisions affecting all public order values.
1. The Intelligence Function
(gathering,
decision)

processing,

and

disseminating

information

relevant

to

Accord international governmental organizations the resources necessary to increase their role in inquiry and communication about the goals,
trends, conditioning factors, possible futures, and alternatives relevant to
improved minimum and optimum order.
2.

The Promotion Function

(taking initiatives and mobilizing opinion toward prescription of community policies)
Encourage, by according appropriate access to authority and other
resources, a tremendous expansion of pressure groups and private associations dedicated to mobilizing the predispositions necessary to an im-
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proved world public order.
3.

The Prescribing Function

(projection of community
controlling)

policy

that

is both

authoritative

and

Recognize the increasing role of international governmental organization in creating and communicating expectations about future decisions.
Weight voting in international governmental organization and special
conferences in ways to secure higher conformity with genuine democracy
and responsibility.
Establish distinctive specialized institutions, manned by scholars and
experts rather than by representatives of governments, for the clarification and recommendation of policies upon important particular problems.
Improve facilities and policies for the making of multilateral agrebments for the projection of authoritative general community policy.
Recognize the dominating importance of uniformities in state decision and practice in creating expectations about the requirements of future decision.
Understand the interlocked, cumulative impact of communication
from all sources in creating expectations about future decision.
4.

The Invoking Function

(provisional characterization
prescriptions)

of

events

in

terms

of

community

Aggrieved participants in global community process might be afforded opportunities in appropriate arenas to make timely, non-provocative initiations of the application function to redress putative wrongs.
A specialized invocation competence might be accorded the Secretary-General of the United Nations or established omsbudsmen.
5.

The Applying Function

(authoritative characterization of events in terms of community prescription and management of sanctioning measures to secure conformity) 4
Encourage the resolution of controversies by the parties themselves
through diplomacy, mediation, and conciliation.
Maintain panels for third-party adjudication when participants consent. Create specialized, perhaps mobile, panels for particular problems.
Within national constitutive processes, establish unequivocally that

54. The paper in this symposium by Professor Bilder offers examples of alternatives
that might be considered for improvement of the application function. Bilder, International
Third Party Dispute Settlement, 17 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 471 (1989).
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international law is the law of the land, to be applied by all branches of
government; reduce to minimum effect all doctrines of governmental immunity, act of state, political questions, and so on.
Whatever the arena of application, emphasize the importance of procedures for inquiry that both employ a contextual examination of facts in
relation to major community goals and principles for the interpretation of
prescriptions that emphasize such major goals in all factual contexts.
6.

The Terminating Function

(putting an end to prescriptions and arrangements
prescriptions)

effected under

Establish specialized agencies for reviewing existing prescriptions
and arrangements, identifying the obsolete or obsolescent, and recommending measures for ameliorating the destructive costs of necessary
change.
7.

The Appraising Function

(evaluating decision process in terms of achievement of basic community
goals and ascribing responsibility)
Establish specialized agencies, insulated from immediate pressures of
threat or inducement, for the continuous appraisal of successes and failures in the management of authoritative decision and for the recommendation of decision process and decisions better designed for the realization of major goals.
A comprehensive inquiry would of course add exploration of the impacts of the protected features of the larger community's various value
processes upon the establishment and maintenance of constitutive
process.
An appropriate concluding note of restrained optimism may perhaps
be that voiced by my late colleague, Harold Lasswell, in closing his book
on The Future of Political Science:
It is impossible to contemplate the present status of man without perceiving the cosmic roles that he and other advanced forms of life may
eventually play. We are, perhaps, introducing self-awareness into cosmic process. With awareness of self comes deliberate formation and
pursuit of value goals. For tens of thousands of years, man was accustomed to living in relatively local environments and to cooperating on
a parochial scale. Today we are on the verge of exploring a habitat far
less circumscribed than earth. The need for a worldwide system of
public order - a comprehensive plan of cooperation - is fearfully
urgent. From the interplay of the study and practice of cooperation
we may eventually move more wisely, if not more rapidly, toward fulfilling the as-yet-mysterious potentialities of the cosmic process.55

55. H.

LASSWELL, THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
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Genocide, State and Self
Louis RENP, BERES*

I
Even in a century that can best be described as the Age of Atrocity,
few people have suffered so terribly as the victims of genocide. Enduring
all that murders and torments, these victims have been identified by their
fellow humans as dark phantoms of subhumanity, suited only for degradation and slaughter. What is more, those who are not directly involved
in the killing and dying witness the daily operations of automated extermination with indifference. Not surprisingly, the appalling silence of good
people is absolutely vital to those who carry out crimes against humanity.
Why? How has an entire species, miscarried from the start, scandalized its own creation? Are we all the potential murderers of those who
live beside us? For as long as we can recall, the corpse has been in fashion. Today, at the close of the twentieth century, whole nations of corpses
are the rage. And this is true despite the codification of anti-genocide
rules under international law.'
* Professor of Political Science and International Law, Purdue University. B.A., 1967,
Queens College of New York; Ph.D., 1971, Princeton University.
1. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
opened for signature December 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force January 12,
1951) [hereinafter "Genocide Convention"]. The Genocide Convention was submitted to the
Senate by President Harry S. Truman in June, 1949. On February 19, 1986, the Senate
consented to ratification with the reservation that legislation be passed that conforms U.S.
law to the precise terms of the Treaty. This enabling legislation was approved by Congress
in October, 1988, and signed by President Reagan on November 4, 1988. This legislation
amends the U.S. Criminal Code to make genocide a Federal offense. It also sets a maximum
penalty of life imprisonment when death results from a criminal act defined by the law.
This follows the practice of implementing legislation already well-established with respect
to crimes of "terrorism." See also Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-473, § 139, ch. XX, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984). This act implements the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation. See also Act to Implement the Convention on
Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, and for other purposes,
Pub. L. No. 91-449, 84 Stat. 921 (1970); Anti-Hijacking Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-366, 88
Stat. 409 (1974); Act for the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, Pub. L. 94-467, 90 Stat. 1997 (1976); Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material Implementation Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-351, 96 Stat. 1663 (1982);
Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States, Pub. L.
92-539, 86 Stat. 1070 (1972); National Emergencies Act, Pub. L. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976)
(as amended); Federal Income Tax Forgiveness for U.S. Military and Civilian Employees
Killed Overseas, Pub. L. 98-259, 98 Stat. 142 (1984); Pub. L. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037 (1985);
Continuing Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. 99-591, §§ 301-02, 100 Stat. 3341
(1986). For full texts of these legislative acts, see CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE FOR THE
COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 100TH CONG., 1ST SESS., INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: A COM-
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Why? The answer has several levels, several layers of meaning. At
one level, the one most familiar to political scientists and legal scholars,
the problem lies in the changing embrace of Realpolitik in world affairs.
Representing a transformation of the traditional political "realism" of
Thucydides, Thrasymachus and Machiavelli, this deification of the state
has reduced individuals to unfathomable specks of insignificance. In such
a world, one wherein the state is the ultimate value, myriad executions
are heralded as expressions of the sacred.
To prevent genocide, states must first be shorn of their sacredness.
Yet before this can happen, individuals must first discover alternative
sources of belonging and reassurance. In the final analysis, as this paper
will attempt to demonstrate, the underlying problem of genocide, the
level of meaning most important to genuine understanding, is not the deification of the state per se, but rather the continuing incapacity of persons to draw meaning within themselves. The problem is the universal
and sinister power of the herd in human affairs; a power now applied by
the state, but at any time applicable by other herds.
At its heart, the problem of genocide is one of individuals. Ever fearful of drawing meaning from their own inwardness, human beings draw
closer and closer to the herd. Sometimes it is the Class. Sometimes the
Tribe. Sometimes the Church. Sometimes the Race. Sometimes the State.
Whatever the claims of the moment, the herd spawns hatreds and excesses that make genocide possible. Fostering an incessant refrain of "us"
versus "them," it prevents each person from becoming fully human and
encourages each person to celebrate the death of "outsiders."
Today the dominant herd, the one that threatens repeated genocides,
is the state. The individual in world politics who supports the omnivorous
appetites of the state does so out of fear. He does not want to be alone;
on the outside. To this end he may find the existence of domestic "parasites" and "foreign enemies" absolutely necessary. Small matter that the
victim population, wherever it may exist, is constructed of flesh and blood
itself. Since the individual has chosen to renounce personhood at the outset, he is impervious to reason, responding only to the strong emotional
advantages of "belonging."
Each of us contains the possibility of becoming fully human. A possibility that would reduce false loyalties to the state and prevent genocide.
However, only by nurturing this possibility can we achieve personhood.
The task is to discover the way back to ourselves. Otherwise, we fly only
with the ideals of the herd, with a life of conformance and fear that
makes defilement normal. Understood in terms of the contemporary prevention of genocide, this means an obligation to renounce the idolatry of
belligerent nationalism in favor of private accomplishment.
Where shall we begin? First, we will consider the attempt by modern
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international law to control the corrosive effects of Realpolitik. Thereafter, we will examine the political requirements of a more dignified and
tolerable world order. Finally, we will explore the essential initiatives of
individual persons. Initiatives that can be ignored only at the expense of
endless and singular infamy.
II
Today there exists a well-established regime for the protection of all
human rights.2 This regime is comprised of peremptory norms, rules that
endow all human beings with a basic measure of dignity and that permit
no derogation by states. These internationally protected human rights
can be grouped into three broad categories:
- first, the right to be free from governmental violations of the integrity of the person - violations such as torture; cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; arbitrary arrest or imprisonment;
denial of fair public trial; and invasion of the home;
- second, the right to the fulfillment of vital needs such as food, shelter, health care and education; and
- third, the right to enjoy civil and political liberties, including freedom of speech, press, religion and assembly; the right to participate in
government; the right to travel freely within and outside one's own
country; the right to be free from discrimination based on race or sex.'
Taken together with other important covenants, treaties and declarations, which together comprise the human rights regime, the Genocide
Convention represents the end of the idea of absolute sovereignty concerning non-intervention when human rights are in grievous jeopardy."
The Charter of the United Nations, a multilateral, law-making treaty,
stipulates in its Preamble and several articles that human rights are protected by international law. In the Preamble, the peoples of the United
Nations reaffirm their faith "in fundamental human rights, in the dignity
and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women
and of nations large and small" and their determination "to promote so-

2. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, § III, 3 U.N. GAOR
(Resolutions, Pt. 1) at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature March 7, 1966, 660
U.N.T.S. 195, 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966); International Covenant on Economic, and Social and
Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 6 I.L.M. 368 (1977).
3. See

DEPARTMENT OF STATE FOR THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 97TH CONG.,

1ST SESS., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES

(G.P.O. 1981).

4. Genocide Convention, supra note 1, art. I. The Genocide Convention proscribes conduct that is juristically distinct from other forms of prohibited wartime killing (i.e., killing
involving acts constituting crimes of war and crimes against humanity). Although crimes
against humanity are linked to wartime actions, the crime of genocide can be committed in
peacetime or during a war. According to Article I of the Genocide Convention: "The contracting parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of
war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish."
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cial progress and better standards of life in larger freedom."
In light of these codified expressions of the international law of
human rights, it is abundantly clear that individual states can no longer
claim sovereign immunity from responsibility for gross mistreatment of
their own citizens.' Notwithstanding Article 2 (7) of the U.N. Charter,
which reaffirms certain areas of "domestic jurisdiction," each state is now
clearly obligated to uphold basic human rights. Even the failure to ratify
specific treaties or conventions does not confer immunity from responsibility, since all states are bound by the law of the Charter and by the
customs and general principles of law from which such agreements
derive.'
The international regime on human rights also establishes, beyond
any reasonable doubt, the continuing validity of natural law7 as the overriding basis of international law. This establishment flows directly from
the judgments at Nuremberg.' While the indictments of the Nuremberg

5. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the International Terrorism, 28 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 28) at 1, U.N. Doc. A/9028 (1973). International law also authorizes individuals
within certain states to resort to force as insurgents as a permissible means to secure human
rights. Although specially-constituted UN committees and the U.N. General Assembly have
repeatedly condemned acts of international terrorism, they exempt those activities that derive from "the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of all peoples under
colonial and racist regimes and other forms of alien domination and uphold the legitimacy
of their struggle, in particular the struggle of national liberation movements, in accordance
with the purposes and principles of the Charter and the relevant resolutions of the organs of
the United Nations." See also Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), 20 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975), 13 I.L.M. 710 (1974); Declarationon
Principles of InternationalLaw Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among
States, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (no. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970). See also Cristescu, The Right to Self-Determination:Historical and Current Development on the Basis of United Nations Instruments, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub. 2/404/Rev. 1
(1981) (this is a comprehensive and authoritative inventory of sources of international law
concerning the right to use force on behalf of self-determination).
6. The rationale for this claim is grounded in the understanding (codified at Article 38
of the Statutes of the International Court of Justice) that there are multiple sources of
international law and in the associated principle (codified at the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, Article 53) that peremptory or jus cogens norms are overriding and permit
no derogation. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, T.S. No. 993 (entered into force for the United States, Oct. 24, 1945); see also Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, First and
Second Sessions, Mar. 26 - May 24, 1968 and April 9 - May 22, 1969, opened for signature
May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF./39/27, at 289 (1969), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
7. The idea of natural law is based upon the acceptance of certain principles of right
and justice that prevail because of their own intrinsic merit. Eternal and immutable, they
are external to all acts of human will and interpenetrate all human reason. This idea and its
attendant tradition of human civility runs almost continuously from Mosaic Law and the
ancient Greeks and Romans to the present day.
8. See INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRIALS, LONDON 1945 (report of Robert
H. Jackson, United States Representative to the Conference, 1949). The judgment of the
International Military Tribunal of October 1, 1946 rested upon the four Allied Powers'
London Agreement of August 8, 1945, to which was annexed a Charter establishing the Tribunal. Nineteen other states subsequently acceded to the Agreement. See also 15 UNITED
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Tribunal were cast in terms of existing positive law (i.e., law enacted by
states), the actual decisions of the Tribunal unambiguously reject the
proposition that the validity of international law depends upon its "positiveness" (i.e., its explicit and detailed codification). The words used by
the Tribunal ("So far from it being unjust to punish him, it would be
unjust if his wrongs were allowed to go unpunished") derive from the
principle: nullum crimen sine poena (no crime without a punishment).
This principle, of course, is a flat contradiction of the central idea that
underlies "positive jurisprudence" or law as command of a sovereign.9
From the point of view of the United States, the Nuremberg obligations are, in a sense, doubly binding. This is the case because these obligations represent not only current normative obligations of international
law, but also the higher law obligations engendered by the American political tradition.10 By its codification of the principle that fundamental

for
an analysis of defense pleas of "superior orders" in various war crimes trials. For German
war crimes trials after the First World War, including the case of Dithmar and Boldt
(Llandovery Castle Case), see 16 AM. J. INT'L L. 674, 708 (1922).
9. The central idea of legal positivism is that true law is not a set of norms existing
naturally and awaiting discovery, but rather those norms by which states have explicitly
consented to be bound. In international law, those norms are codified in treaties or fall
within the bounds of sources identified in the Statute of the International Court of Justice,
supra note 6, at art. 38.
10. Since justice, according to the Founding Fathers, must bind all human society, the
rights articulated by the Declaration of Independence cannot be reserved only to Americans.
To deny these rights to others would be illogical and self-contradictory, since it would undermine the permanent and universal law of nature from which the Declaration derives.
This understanding was represented by Thomas Paine, who affirmed:
The Independence of America, considered merely as a separation from England, would have been a matter of but little importance, had it not been accompanied by a Revolution in the principles and practices of Governments.
She made a stand, not for herself only, but for the world, and looked beyond
the advantages herself could receive.
T. PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN, 151 (Everyman ed. 1915).
Where it is understood as resistance to despotism, insurgency has also been defended as
permissible in the Bible and in the writings of ancient and medieval classics. Such defense,
for example, can be found in Aristotle's Politics, Plutarch's Lives and Cicero's De Officiis.
Indeed, in view of the long-standing support for various forms of insurgency in multiple
sources of positive and natural law, it is reasonable to argue that a peremptory norm of
general international law (a jus cogens norm) has emerged on this matter. According to
Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, "[A] peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of
states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character."
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27
(1969), 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969). Even a treaty that might seek to criminalize forms of
insurgency protected by this peremptory norm would be invalid. According to Article 53 of
the Vienna Convention, "A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a
peremptory norm of general international law." Id. The concept is extended to newly emerging peremptory norms by Article 64 of the Convention: "If a new peremptory norm of general international law emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and terminates." Id. at art. 64.
NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 155-88,
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human rights are not an internal question for each state, but an imperious postulate of the international community, the Nuremberg obligations
represent a point of perfect convergence between the law of nations and
the jurisprudential/ethical foundations of the American republic.
In a very real sense, worldwide unconcern for legal protection of
human rights (including, ultimately, genocide) grew out of the post-Westphalian system of world politics - a system that sanctified untrammeled
competition between sovereign states and that identified national loyalty
as the overriding human obligation. With these developments, unfettered
nationalism and state-centrism became the dominant characteristics of
international relations and the resultant world order came to subordinate
all moral and ethical sensibilities to the idea of unlimited sovereignty.
Such subordination was more than a little ironic, since even Jean Bodin,
who advanced the idea of sovereignty as one free of any external control
or internal division, recognized the limits imposed by divine law and natural law.
III
There now exists a regime of binding international agreements that
places worldwide human welfare above the particularistic interests of individual states or elites, but what can this regime be expected to accomplish? Granted, there are now explicit and codified rules of international
law that pertain to genocide, but what can be done about their effective
enforcement? Indeed, doesn't a consideration of post-World War II history reveal many instances of genocide and genocide-like crimes?' Where

11. There has been no interruption of genocide. Greedy for executions, several states
continue to slay segments of their own populations without fear of foreign interference. This
can happen because those states that are not directly involved are driven, above all else, by
the imperatives of geopolitics. Eager to preserve alignments that allegedly improve national
influence, these "innocent" states inevitably subordinate considerations of individual dignity
to the presumed requirements of power.
Left unchecked, the legacy of this corrosive calculus can only be an endless reservoir of
sub-humanity, extraneous to every purpose save loathing and ritual slaughter. In Cambodia,
over one million people were murdered by Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge during the period
1975-79. In Paraguay, the Ache Indians, a peaceful and primitive tribe that has lived for
centuries in the jungles of South America, have been meticulously exterminated by the
Stroessner government and its Nazi war criminal advisors. In Tibet, the forces of the Peoples Republic of China have engaged in killing that threatens the extinction of the Tibetans
as a national and religious group. In South Africa, the sustained barbarism of the white
minority apartheid regime against the majority black population constitutes an arguable
case of genocide.
Although the Pretoria regime does not seek annihilation of the black majority, several
of its particular crimes against this population are proscribed by Article II of the U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. By its forcible transfer of more than three million blacks to desolate "homelands", the apartheid system hopes
to institutionalize nothing less than cost-effective slavery. Furthermore, by its failure to oppose "separate development" with more than "constructive engagement," the Reagan administration countenanced not merely violations of civil rights, but crimes against
humanity.
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was international law?
To answer these questions, one must first recall that international
law is a distinctive and unique system of law. This is the case because it
is decentralized rather than centralized; because it exists within a social
setting (i.e., the world political system) that lacks government. It follows
that in the absence of central authoritative institutions for the making,
interpretation and enforcement of law, these juridical processes evolve
upon individual states. It is, then, the responsibility of individual states,
acting alone or in collaboration with other states, to make international
law "work" with respect to genocide and genocide-like crimes.
How can this be done? In terms of the law of the Charter, it is essential that states continue to reject the Article 2 (7)12 claim to "domestic
jurisdiction" whenever gross outrages against human rights are involved.
Of course, the tension between the doctrines of "domestic jurisdiction"
and "international concern" is typically determined by judgments of national self-interest, but it would surely be in the long-term interest of all
states to oppose forcefully all crimes against humanity. As Vattel observed correctly in the Preface to his The Law of Nations in 1758:
But we know too well from sad experience how little regard those who
are at the head of affairs pay to rights when they conflict with some
plan by which they hope to profit. They adopt a line of policy which is
often false, because often unjust; and the majority of them think that
they have done enough in having mastered that. Nevertheless it can
be said of states, what has long been recognized as true of individuals,
that the wisest and the safest policy is one that is founded upon
justice.13
With this observation, Vattel echoes Cicero's contention that "No
one who has not strictest regard for justice can administer public affairs
to advantage." But how are we to move from assessmqnt to action, from
prescription to policy? Where, exactly, is the normative juncture between
the theory of human rights as pragmatic practice and the operationalization of that theory?
Under the terms of Article 56 of the Charter, member states are
urged to "take joint and separate action in cooperation with the organization" to promote human rights. Reinforced by an abundant body of ancillary prescriptions, this obligation stipulates that the legal community of
humankind must allow, indeed require, "humanitarian intervention" by

12. According to Article 2(7) of the Charter,
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations
to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement
under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
U.N.

CHARTER

13. E. DE
phasis added).

art. 2, para. 7.
VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS

12a (C.G. Fenwick trans., 1st ed. 1916) (em-
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individual states in certain circumstances. Of course, such intervention
must not be used as a pretext for aggression and it must conform to settled legal norms governing the use of force, especially the principles of
discrimination, military necessity and proportionality.4 Understood in
terms of the long-standing distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in
bello, this means that even where the "justness" of humanitarian intervention is clearly established, the means used in that intervention must
not be unlimited. The lawfulness of a cause does not in itself legitimize
the use of certain forms of violence.
As for the legality of humanitarian intervention, it has been well-established for a long time. Although it has been strongly reinforced by the
post-Nuremberg human rights regime, we may find support for the doctrine in Grotius' seventeenth-century classic, The Law of War and
Peace.15 Here, the idea is advanced and defended that states may interfere within the territorial sphere of validity of other states to protect innocent persons from their own rulers, an idea nurtured and sustained by
the natural law origins of international law.
While the theory of international law still oscillates between an individualist conception of the state and a universalist conception of humanity, the post World War II regime of treaties, conventions and declarations concerning human rights is necessarily founded upon a broad
doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Indeed, it is the very purpose of
this regime to legitimize an "allocation of competencies" that favors the
natural rights of humankind over any particularistic interests of state.
Since violations of essential human rights are now undeniably within the
ambit of global responsibility, the subjectivism of state primacy has been
unambiguously subordinated to the enduring primacy of international
justice. In place of the Hegelian concept of the state as an autonomous,
irreducible center of authority (because it is an ideal that is the perfect
manifestation of Mind), there is now in force a greatly expanded version
of the idea of "international concern."'"

14. The idea of proportionality is contained in the Mosaic Lex Talionis, since it
prescribes that an injury should be requited reciprocally, but certainly not with a greater
injury. As Aristotle understood the Lex Talionis, it was a law of justice, not of hatred - one
eye, not two, for an eye; one tooth, no more, for a tooth.
15. The idea expressed at Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, supra note 6, that scholarly writings (of which Grotius' classic is an instance) are a
proper source of international law may have its roots in the following Jewish tradition that a fellowship of scholars is entrusted with legal interpretations. This idea diverges from
the Jewish tradition in that Jewish scholars, rather than being actual sources of legal norms,
were always bound by the Talmudic imperative, "Whatever a competent scholar will yet
derive from the Law, that was already given to Moses on Mount Sinai." (JERUSALEM MEGILLAH IV) Yet, even this divergence may not be as far-reaching as first supposed, since one
view of the norm-making character of scholarly writings on international law is that these
writings are never more than exegeses of overriding natural law and that their contributions
to the development of international law are always contingent upon being in harmony with
reason or "true law."
16. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 7. In contrast to the principle of "domestic jurisdiction"
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Within the current system of international law, therefore, external
decision-makers are authorized to intercede in certain matters that might
at one time have been regarded as internal to a particular state. While, at
certain times in the past, even gross violations of human rights were defended by appeal to "domestic jurisdiction," today's demands for exclusive competence must be grounded in far more than an interest in avoiding "intervention." This trend in authoritative decision-making toward an
expansion of the doctrine of "international concern" has been clarified by
Lauterpacht's definition of intervention:
Intervention is a technical term of, on the whole, unequivocal connotation. It signifies dictatorial interference in the sense of action
amounting to a denial of the independence of the State. It implies a
peremptory demand - for positive conduct or abstention - a demand which, if not complied with, involves a threat of or recourse to
compulsion, though not necessarily physical compulsion, in some
form. 1
We can see, therefore, that intervention is not always impermissible,
and that - indeed - any assessment of its lawfulness must always be
contingent upon intent. Applying Lauterpacht's standard, it follows that
where there is no interest in exerting "dictatorial interference," but simply an overriding commitment to the protection of human rights, the act
of intervening may represent the proper enforcement of pertinent legal
norms. This concept of intervention greatly transforms the exaggerated
emphasis on "domestic jurisdiction" that has been associated improperly
with individual national interpretations of Article 2 (7) of the Charter
and, earlier, with Article 15 (8) of the Covenant of the League of Nations."' By offering a major distinction between the idea of self-serving

(codified in the preceding articles), which recognizes a reserved domain within which a state
can act at its own discretion, "international concern" recognizes limits on this domain compelled by matters of absolutely overriding importance. These matters pertain to a variety of
peremptory norms of international law, especially those involving restraint in the use of
armed force and respect for guaranteed minimum standards of human rights. For example,
notwithstanding the traditionally expressed prerogatives of sovereignty, a state no longer
has the right to claim itself the sole judge in matters involving repression and/or torture of
individuals within its jurisdiction or the use of armed force against a neighboring state.
These are matters of "international concern."
17. See H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 167 (1950).
18. An example of abusing the domestic jurisdiction principle of the Charter can be
found in certain state reactions to Chinese genocide against Tibet in the 1950s. During this
period, according to a report issued by the International Commission of Jurists (The Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law) in 1959, the Chinese killed tens of thousands of
Tibetans; deported thousands of Tibetan children; killed Buddhist monks and lamas on a
very large scale; and subjected religious leaders and public officials to forced labor, arbitrary
arrest and torture. The evidence pointed to "a systematic design to eradicate the separate
national, cultural and religious life of Tibet." These facts notwithstanding, the East European socialist states (with the exception of Yugoslavia) acted as a solid bloc in defense of
China, arguing that Tibet was an integral part of the People's Republic and that consideration of the question of Tibet by the U.N. General Assembly constituted an intervention in
China's domestic affairs. For more on this matter, see L. KUPER, THE PREVENTION OF GENO-
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interference by one state in the internal affairs of another state and the
notion of the general global community's inclusive application of law to
the protection of human dignity, it significantly advances the goal of a
just world order. Although this test is hardly free of ambiguity, it does
clarify that the choice between "international concern" and "domestic jurisdiction" is not grounded in unalterable conditions of fact, but rather in
constantly changing circumstances that permit a continuing adjustment
of competencies. It follows that whenever particular events create significant violations of human rights, the general global community is entitled
to internationalize jurisdiction and to authorize appropriate forms of decision and action.
Ironically, the United Nations, which is responsible for most of the
post-Nuremberg codification of the international law of human rights, has
sometimes been associated with increased limits on the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. These limits, of course, flow from the greatly reduced justification for the use of force in the Charter system of international law, especially the broad prohibition contained in Article 2 (4).1"
Yet, while it cannot be denied that humanitarian intervention might be
used as a pretext for naked aggression, it is also incontestable that a tooliteral interpretation of 2 (4) would summarily destroy the entire corpus
of normative protection for human rights - a corpus that is coequal with
"peace" as the central objective of the Charter. Moreover, in view of the
important nexus between peace and human rights, a nexus in which the
former is very much dependent upon widespread respect for human dignity, a too-literal interpretation of 2 (4) might well impair the prospects
for long-term security.
It must be widely understood that the Charter does not prohibit all
uses of force and that certain uses are clearly permissible in pursuit of
basic human rights. Notwithstanding its attempt to bring greater centralization to legal processes in world politics, the Charter system has not
impaired the long-standing right of individual states to act on behalf of
the international legal order. In the continuing absence of effective central authoritative processes for decision and enforcement, the legal community of humankind must continue to allow, indeed, must continue to
require, humanitarian intervention by individual states.
As we have seen, humanitarian intervention is one way of giving effect to the enforcement of anti-genocide norms in international law. Another way involves the use of courts, domestic and international. Under
Article V of the Genocide Convention, signatory states are required to
enact "the necessary legislation to give effect to" the Convention. Article
VI of the Convention further provides that trials for its violation be con-
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158-159 (1985).

19. According to Article 2(4), "All Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."
U.N. CHARTER, supra note 12, at art. 2, para. 4.
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ducted "by a competent tribunal of the state in the territory of which the
act was committed, or by any such international penal tribunal as may
have jurisdiction."
Here, of course, there are some special problems. First, the International Court of Justice at the Hague has no penal or criminal jurisdiction.
It does, however, have jurisdiction over disputes concerning the interpretation and application of a number of specialized human rights conventions.2" In exercising its jurisdiction, however, the ICJ must still confront
significant difficulties in bringing recalcitrant states into contentious proceedings. There is still no way to effectively ensure the attendance of defendant states before the Court. Although many states have acceded to
the Optional Clause of the Statute of the ICJ (Article 36, Paragraph 2),
these accessions are watered down by many attached reservations and by
geopolitical concerns of the moment.
Second, courts of the states where acts in violation of the Genocide
Convention have been committed are hardly likely to conduct proceedings against their own national officials (excluding, or course, the possibility of courts established following a coup d'etat or revolution). What is
needed, therefore, is an expansion and refinement of the practice of states
after World War II, a practice by states that had been occupied during
the war, of seeking extradition of criminals and of trying them in their
21
own national courts.
In the future, there need be no war or occupation to justify the use of
domestic courts to punish crimes of genocide. There is nothing novel
about such a suggestion since a principal purpose of the Genocide Convention lies in its explicit applicability to non-wartime actions. Limits
upon actions against enemy nationals are as old as the laws of war or
international law. But the laws of war do not cover a government's actions against its own nationals. It is, therefore, primarily in the area of
domestic atrocities that the Genocide Convention seeks to expand preexisting international penal law.

20. Genocide Convention, supra note 1, at art. 9; Supplementary Convention on the
Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery,
Dec. 6, 1967, art. 10, 18 U.T.S. 3201, T.I.A.S. No. 6418; Convention on the Political Rights
of Women, Mar. 31, 1953, art. 9, 193 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees, Jul. 28, 1951, art. 38, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
21. Apart from the prosecution of war criminals, there have been only two trials under
the Genocide Convention by competent tribunals of the states wherein the crimes were committed: (1) in Equatorial Guinea, the tyrant Macis had been slaughtering his subjects and
pillaging his country for a number of years. He was ultimately overthrown, found guilty of a
number of crimes, including genocide, and executed. (In a report on the trial, however, the
legal officer of the International Commission of Jurists concluded that Macis had been
wrongfully convicted of genocide); and (2) in Kampuchea, when the Khmer Rouge were
overthrown by the Vietnamese, the successor government instituted criminal proceedings
against the former Prime Minister, Pol Pot, and the deputy prime minister on charges of
genocide. The accused were found guilty of the crime in absentia by a people's revolutionary tribunal. Pol Pot, of course, is still free. For more on these cases, see L. KUPER, THE
PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE (1985).

DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 18:1

Going beyond Article VI of the Genocide Convention, which holds to
the theory of "concurrent jurisdiction" (jurisdiction based on the site of
the alleged offense and on the nationality of the offender), any state may
22
now claim jurisdiction when the crime involved is a species of genocide.
There is already ample precedent for such a rule in international law, a
precedent based upon the long-standing treatment of common enemies of
mankind (hostes humazi generis) or international outlaws as within the
scope of universal jurisdiction.23
In terms of the broad issue of using domestic courts to uphold inter22. Genocide Convention, supra note 1, at art. 1. In addition to the territorial principle
and the nationality principle, there are three other traditionally recognized bases of jurisdiction under international law: the protective principle, determining jurisdiction by reference
to the national interest injured by the offense; the universality principle, determining jurisdiction by reference to the custody of the person committing the offense; and the passive
personality principle, determining jurisdiction by reference to the nationality of the person
injured by the offense. The Genocide Convention itself, however, does not stipulate universal jurisdiction. See also Demjanjuk v. Petrovisky, 776 F.2d 571, 582-83 (6th cir. 1985), reprinted in, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CRIMES 286 (Bassiouni ed. 1986). In this recent
case supporting the principle of universal jurisdiction in matters concerning genocide, a U.S.
Court of Appeals ruled for the extradition to Israel of accused Nazi war criminal John
Demjanjuk even though the crimes charged were committed against persons who were not
citizens of Israel and the state of Israel did not exist at the time the heinous crimes were
committed. In the words of the court: "When proceeding on that jurisdictional premise
neither the nationality of the accused or the victim(s), nor the location of the crime is significant. The underlying assumption is that the crimes are offenses against the law of the nations or against humanity, and that the prosecuting nation is acting for all nations." See
also Blumenthal, Nazi Whitewash in 1940's Charged, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1985, at A5, col.
1. Recent U.S. alacrity in extraditing Nazi war criminals to other countries for prosecution
belies America's protection of such criminals for geopolitical purposes. Substantial evidence
now indicates that U.S. intelligence officials concealed the Nazi records of hundreds of former enemy scientists to bring them into this country after World War II. The documents
disclosed reveal that many American authorities knew that the entering criminals were "ardent Nazis" implicated in atrocities. Specifically, between 1945 and 1955, some 800 former
enemy rocket experts and other specialists were brought into the U.S. under an American
intelligence program first called "Overcast," then "Project Paperclip."
23. See INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 21, at 284-285. The principle of
universality is founded upon the presumption of solidarity between states in the fight
against crimes. See also II GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI Ac PACIS, ch. 20 (1913); I VATTEL, LE
DROIT DES GENS, ch. 19 (1916). See also Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 49, 6
U.T.S. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 50, 6
U.T.S. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 129, 6 U.T.S. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 146, 6 U.T.S.
3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365. The case for universal jurisdiction (which is strengthened wherever
extradition is difficult or impossible to obtain) is also built into the four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, which unambiguously impose upon the high contracting parties the
obligation to punish certain grave breaches of their rules, regardless of where the infraction
was committed or the nationality of the authors of the crimes. See generally I BASSIOUNI,
INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION IN U.S. LAW AND PRACTICE, ch. 6 (1982); RESTATEMENT OF THE
LAW: THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, §§ 402-04, 443 (Tentative Draft
No. 5, 1961).
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national law, the example of the United States may be of particular interest.2 Since its founding, the United States has reserved the right to enforce international law within its own courts. Article I, Section 8, Clause
10 of the American Constitution confers on Congress the power "to define
and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses
against the law of nations." Pursuant to this Constitutional prerogative,
the first Congress, in 1789, passed the Alien Tort Statute.25 This statute
authorizes United States Federal Courts to hear those civil claims by
aliens alleging acts committed "in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States" when the alleged wrongdoers can be found in
the United States. At that time, of course, the particular target of this
legislation was piracy on the high seas.
Over the years, United States federal courts have rarely invoked the
"law of nations," and then only in such cases where the acts in question
had already been proscribed by treaties or conventions. In 1979, a case
seeking damages for foreign acts of torture was filed in the federal courts.
In a complaint filed jointly with his daughter, Dolly, Dr. Joel Filartiga, a
well-known Paraguayan physician and artist and an opponent of President Alfredo Stroessner's repressive regime, alleged that members of that
regime's police force had tortured and murdered his son, Joelito. On June
30, 1980, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that since an
international consensus condemning torture had crystallized, torture violates the "law of nations" for purposes of the Alien Tort Statute. Therefore, United States courts have jurisdiction under the statute to hear civil
suits by the victims of foreign torture, if the alleged international outlaws
are found in the United States.2 With this in mind, it would be enormously useful - in reference to the control of genocide and genocide-like
crimes - if the United States were to expand its commitment to identify

24. Another case is that of Israel. Recognizing that genociders are common enemies of
mankind and that no authoritative central institutions exist to apprehend such outlaws or
to judge them as a penal tribunal, Israel sought to uphold the anti-genocide norms of international law in its trial of Adolf Eichmann, a Nazi functionary of German or Austrian nationality. Indicted under Israel's Nazi Collaborators Punishment Law, Eichmann was convicted and executed after the judgment was confirmed by the Supreme Court of Israel on
appeal in 1962. Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (Israel Dist. Ct. Jerusalem 1961), aff'd 36 I.L.R. 277 (Israel Supreme Court 1962).
25. See Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982) (originally enacted as part of
the first Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77).
26. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). There is an ironic dichotomy in
U.S. law here. In Filartigav. Pena-Irala,the Second Circuit held that 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (The
Alien Tort Claims Act) provides a basis for aliens to bring actions in U.S. federal courts for
torts committed in violation of the law of nations. Yet, a district court's holding in another
recent case, Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F.Supp. 1421 (C.D. Cal. 1985), means that U.S. citizens lack the private right to sue for violations of the law of nations. Thus, U.S. federal
courts appear to have jurisdiction to hear the claims of aliens more readily than they do the
claims of U.S. citizens. In Handel v. Artukovic, plaintiffs, U.S. citizens, brought a class action seeking compensatory and punitive damages against defendant for his alleged involvement in the deprivations of life and property suffered by Jews in occupied Yugoslavia during World War II.
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and punish such transgressions within its own court structure and if other
states were prepared to take parallel judicial measures.2 7
IV
We all know, however, that the presumed requirements of Realpolitik invariably take precedence over those of international law. It follows
that before the progressive codification of anti-genocide norms can be
paralleled by the widespread refinement and expansion of pertinent enforcement measures, individual states must come to believe that international legal steps to prevent and punish genocide and genocide-like
crimes are always in their own best interests.2 Drawing upon the Thomistic idea of law as a positive force for directing humankind to its
proper goals (an idea that is itself derived from Aristotle's conception of
the natural development of the state from social impulses), we need to
seek ways of aligning the anti-genocide dictates of the law of nations with
effective strategies of implementation - i.e., strategies based on expanded patterns of humanitarian intervention, transnational judicial settlement, and domestic court involvement.
To accomplish this objective, primary attention must be directed to-

27. For more on the role of domestic courts in the interpretation and enforcement of
international law, see Kratochwil, The Role of Domestic Courts as Agencies of the International Legal Order, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 236-63 (1985).
28. And this, in turn, requires that individuals within states use their own domestic
courts for supporting the anti-genocide norms of international law. In this connection, U.S.
citizens can participate in nonviolent protests of current foreign policies and can defend
such permissible acts of civil resistance in U.S. courts on the basis of international law.
International law is already a part of U.S. domestic law. According to Article VI of the U.S.
Constitution: "All treaties made...under the authority of the United States shall be the
" It follows that even those who would deny the binding qualsupreme law of the land ..
ity of general international law on U.S. foreign policy must acknowledge the specific obligations that have been incorporated into domestic law. These obligations flow not only from
Article VI (the so-called Supremacy Clause) but also from the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in The Paquete Habana, 189 U.S. 453 (1900), which brought customary international
law into U.S. domestic law. Further, in United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937) and
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942), the U.S. Supreme Court held that other types of
international agreements concluded by the U.S. Government that have not received the formal advice and consent of the Senate are nonetheless protected by the Supremacy Clause.
Two criminal cases that have recently produced a major breakthrough in U.S. courts are
People v. Jarka, No. 002170, slip op. (Cir. Ct. Lake County, Ill. 1985) and Chicago v.
Streeter, No. 85-108644, slip op. (Cir. Ct. Cook County, Ill. 1985). Here the defendants were
acquitted by invoking the traditional common law defense known as "necessity." This defense, which erases criminal liability for conduct that would otherwise be an offense (if the
accused was without blame in creating the situation and reasonably believed such conduct
was necessary to avoid a public or private injury greater than that which might reasonably
result from his/her own conduct) has broad applicability concerning genocide and genocidelike crimes. Because of the Jarka and Streeter acquittals, attorneys representing individuals
who engage in acts of nonviolent civil resistance against elements of U.S. foreign policy may
invoke these cases as appropriate precedents for defense. For an up-to-date and authoritative study of guidelines for defending civil resistance protesters under principles of international law, see F. A. BOYLE, DEFENDING CIVIL RESISTANCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (1987).
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ward harmonizing these strategies with the self-interested behavior of
states. Here, it must be understood that the existence of even a far-reaching human rights regime is not enough. Before this regime can make productive claims on the community of states, the members of this community will need to calculate that such compliance is in their respective
interests. As David Hume once noted, it is the "common sense of interest" that "mutually expressed and . ..known to both ... produces a
suitable resolution and behavior."29 Ultimately, this sort of calculation
will depend, in turn, on the creation of a new world order system - a
planetary network of obligations stressing cooperative global concerns
over adversary relationships. The centerpiece of this-new world order system must be the understanding that all states and all peoples form one
essential body and one true community.
Before the realism of anti-genocide ideals can prevail in global society, the major states in that society must learn to escape from the confines of a Darwinian context for choosing policy options - a context
wherein major world powers view virtually all of their options within the
limited parameters of bipolar competition and antagonism. Under the aegis of present perspectives, these states have been willing to abide virtually any evil amongst their allies in the overriding commitment to geopolitical advantage. Vitalized by their misconceived intuitions of
Realpolitik, the leaders of the major world powers have abandoned their
states to the instant, to induced cathartic crises that carry them away
from their ideals and their interests at the same time.
To eliminate these crises will not be easy. Indeed, the only real hope
for effective legal remedies concerning genocide lies in the replacement of
Darwinism with globalist thinking in world affairs. Such remedies cannot
be implemented where states feel themselves imprisoned by a recalcitrant
struggle for existence. The presumption of the bellum omnes contra
omnes in international society must first be renounced.
The task, then, is to make the separate states conscious of their imperative planetary identity. To succeed in this task will be very difficult.
But it need not be as fanciful as Realpolitikers would have us believe.
Before we assume that genocide is a permanent fixture of international
relations, we must understand that politics can change. And since law follows politics, the transformation of lethal forms of competition into new
archetypes for global society can give new and effective meaning to antigenocide norms.
The initiative must be taken by the superpowers. Before international law can prevent genocide and genocide-like crimes, the United
States and the Soviet Union will have to end their all-consuming and protracted enmity. As long as the present condition of bipolar antagonism
endures, each superpower will continue to accept the doctrine that might
makes right.

29. See D. HUME, A

TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE

(H. Aiken, ed., 1948).
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Driven by their intense rivalry, these states will overlook the antigenocide obligations of international law. Eager to preserve alignments
that allegedly improve national influence, the United States and the Soviet Union - as long as they defer to the primacy of the Cold War - will
subordinate considerations of human life and individual dignity to the
presumed requirements of power. In a manner reminiscent of the Holocaust, which was permitted to happen only because Nazi intent fused
with Allied "priorities," today's genocides can take place because good
states have more pressing concerns.3"
Consider America. The problem comes back to individuals. Before
America can liberate itself from the confines of endless competition with
a despised adversary, Americans themselves will have to change. Before
the United States can begin to "care" about genocide in other lands,
Americans will have to re-make a society that remains consecrated to
what Hannah Arendt called "thoughtlessness."
There are other features of contemporary American society that
make genocide possible elsewhere. We Americans suffer not only from a
widespread unwillingness to think. We also display a far-reaching incapacity to feel. 31 We are largely creatures of "unfeeling." The passive, af-

30. An example is the U.S. failure to act decisively against apartheid. Significantly,
apartheid is linked with genocide in the International Convention on the Suppression and
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, and several efforts have been undertaken to make
the practice of apartheid punishable under the terms of the Genocide Convention. Moreover, in the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes
and Crimes Against Humanity, November 11, 1970, 754 U.N.T.S. 73, "inhuman acts resulting from the policy of apartheid" are qualified as "crimes against humanity." And in various U.N. documents, apartheid is associated with both genocide and crimes against humanity. See, e.g., General Assembly Resolutions 2545, XXIV, December 11, 1969; and 2438,
XXIII, December 19, 1968. See also International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, entered into force, July 18, 1976, G.A. Res. 3068, 28
U.N. G.A.O.R., Supp. (No 30), U.N. Doc A/9030 (1974); International Convention of the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, entered into force, Jan. 4, 1969, G.A.
Res. 2160A, 20 U.N. G.A.O.R., Supp. (No. 14) U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966).
31. Indeed, our very definitions of pathological behavior omit the most terrible crimes
of unfeeling, including genocide. Using the extant definitions accepted in psychology and
psychiatry, it is not necessarily pathological behavior to take part in mass murder or genocide. Thus, Eichmann and other major Nazi functionaries in the Holocaust were repeatedly
described as "completely sane." What this suggests, inter alia, is the triumph of the absurd,
a world in which mass killers may be "normal" but where legions of harmless people who
suffer mild neuroses and anxieties are characterized as "emotionally disturbed" or "mentally
ill." For an exploration of this situation, which reveals just how far-reaching the absence of
responsibility to others has become in contemporary life, see Charny, Genocide and Mass
Destruction: Doing Harm to Others as a Missing Dimension in Psychopathology,49 PSYCHIATRY: INTERPERSONAL AND BIOLOGICAL PROCESSES 144, No. 2. (1986). Significantly, the
perfectly "sane" genociders have often been able to transfer responsibility to others, and
even to rationalize the transference in terms of legal and ethical obligations. In response to
questioning at his trial in Jerusalem, Eichmann always maintained that he had not only
obeyed orders (at times identifying blind obedience as the "obedience of corpses," or
Kadavergehorsam),but he had also obeyed the law. Moreover, he insisted that he had lived
his entire life according to the moral precepts of the philosopher Kant. In Kant's philoso-
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fectless anti-hero we encounter in fiction is a mirror-image of a real social
situation, a creature of routine who is not deliberately self-destructive,
just "prudent"; not intentionally cruel, just "dissociated."
Although it is true that we enjoy, as Americans, a high degree of conventional political freedoms, it is also true that we are (in an even larger
sense) captives. Bought off by the promises of participation and production, we have exchanged our capacity to act as individuals for the "security" of centrally directed automata. Enveloped by the comforting fog of
''representative government," we have become unwilling to question.
The danger was already foreseen by Tocqueville, who understood
that democracy can produce its own forms of tyranny. Tocqueville envisioned a benignly operating polity that "hinders, restrains, enervates,
stifles and stultifies" by imposing "a network of petty complicated rules."
Encouraging the citizen to pursue "petty and banal pleasures," and "to
exist in and for himself," democratic "equality" has set the stage for isolation and passivity.
Much of our freedom is an illusion. Indeed, we contribute to our unfreedom as individuals because we don't recognize the extent of our captivity. As Rousseau writes in Emile: "There is no subjugation so perfect
as that which keeps the appearance of freedom, for in that way one captures volition itself."
This brings us to the core of the problem. Bereft of volition, we are
almost reflexively obedient, ever-ready to defer. Captivated by the delusion of potency and autonomy, we have surrendered to impotence and
passionless automatism. Overwhelmed by a burlesque chorus of national
cheerleaders, we seek shelter in the herd.
The ironies abound. Our capitulation to an all-consuming anti-Sovietism has been made possible by the guarantees of a democratic society.
At the same time, these guarantees need not be the source of our debility
as a people and as a nation. Taken as a starting point for a challenge to
current foreign policies - a point for which they were originally intended
- they could contribute to our personal and collective liberation and
thus to our intolerance of genocide.
But a renewed awareness of political freedom is not enough. We must
first understand that the "rewards" of compliance are unsatisfactory; that
they are erected upon the deception that self-worth flows freely from personal wealth and unceasing consumption. Such an understanding is already underway, animated by wave after wave of dissatisfaction with the
trappings of "success."
There is no shortage of documentation of this phenomenon. The sociologists have constructed entire libraries of doctoral theses on the topic.
But a more engaging comment has been offered by the novelist Walker
Percy. In a literary career that spans his publication of the novel The

phy, the source of law was practical reason; for Eichmann it was the will of the Fuhrer.
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Moviegoer in 1961 through the publication of his second work of nonfiction, Lost in the Cosmos: The Last Self-Help Book in 1983, Percy's chief
concern has been with "the dislocation of man in the modern age." Struck
by the sense of ennui and meaninglessness that shadows lives nestled by
affluence, Percy tells one interviewer:
The thing that fascinates me is the fact that men can be well-off,
judging by their own criteria, with all their needs satisfied, goals
achieved, et cetera, yet as time goes on, life is almost unbearable.
Amazing!
But it is not really "amazing." In the late twentieth century world of
America, metaphysic is replaced by myth. Deprived of anything remotely
resembling an authentic creed, Americans seek solace in silence. Yet, in
trading off their freedom to disobey for an expanding array of consumer
goods, they inevitably discover unhappiness. It is not that they recognize
the idea fixe of anti-Sovietism as a lie (because they have never really
been interested in foreign affairs as such) but that their reward for "going
along" is not what it was cut out to be.
The connections between an overriding interest in commercial profit
and the practice of genocide is already a matter of historical record. 2
Consider the following bids returned, in Nazi Germany, for the construction of gas chambers:
1. A. Tops and Sons, Erfurt, manufacturers of heating equipment:
"We acknowledge receipt of your order for five triple furnaces, including two electric elevators for raising the corpses and one emergency
elevator ... "
2. Vidier Works, Berlin: "For putting the bodies into the furnace, we
suggest simply a metal fork moving on cylinders . ..."
3. C.H. Kori: "We guarantee the effectiveness of the cremation ovens,
as well as their durability, the use of the best material and our faultless workmanship."33
Despite the balloons and bravado of "a new patriotism," the spectacle of America today is one of nihilism. Not daring to look our crimes in
the face, we have surrendered to an unprecedented form of gluttony, an
insatiable craving for more and more that produces nothing in the way of
satisfaction. Desperate to demonstrate our principles and our power, we
succeed only in buttressing injustice and in abdicating our influence. Be-

32. These connections, in turn, are reinforced by the deliberate bewitchment of language. In the lexicon of the Third Reich, such words as "extermination," "liquidation" and
"killing" rarely surfaced. Rather, the goal was "final solution" (Endlosung), and the prescribed methods involved "evacuation" (Aussiedlung); "special treatment" (Sonderbehandlung) and "resettlement" (Umsiedlung). Indeed, all communications regarding "final solution" were subject to a strict "language rule" (Sprachregelung)which was itself a perversion
of language.
33. Shapiro, "A Search for Conscience," PhiladelphiaJewish Exponent, March 29,
1968, noted in CHARNY, How CAN WE COMMIT THE UNTHINKABLE? GENOCIDE: THE HUMAN
CANCER 185 (1982).
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reft of an authentic vital energy, we have turned from the possibilities of
wisdom and genuine understanding to a desolate panorama of superstition and unconcern.
For most Americans, the invitum of the present lies not in the vacant
intuitions of their leaders (for this has always been manifest for anyone
who cares to notice) but in the disappointing exchange of "things" for
silence. In an era where there can be no meaningful differentiation between the boardrooms of our major corporations and the backrooms of
organized crime, it is not that we expect honesty, but that we feel cheated
by the bargain we have struck. Sickened when we hear our leaders brandish cosmic principles of "freedom" and "democracy" with evangelical
fervor, it is not because we have ever taken such mendacities of language
seriously, but because there has been no felt compensation for our
dishonor.
The barbarians are not all outside the gates. They are also within.
They are ourselves. We remain ready to coexist with genocide unless we
learn to rebel. 4 This rebellion, however, must not be directed against our
political order directly (the ordinary meaning of rebellion), but against
the underlying oppression of a stultifying society.
The herd takes little offense when members of certain other herds
are turned into a corpse. The remedy for this tragedy can never be found
entirely within the domains of interstate relations or jurisprudence. It can
be found only in diminishing the claims of the herd.
The state, of course, is an instance of the herd, a sacred instance. To
prevent genocide, the murderous demands of the state must yield to the
requirements of personhood. However, these demands can never be suppressed through the dead world of ordinary politics. This can be achieved
only through the creation and recreation of Self.
The task is to migrate from the Kingdom of the State to the Kingdom of the Self. But in this movement one must also want to live in the
second kingdom. This is the most difficult part of the needed migration
because the Kingdom of the State has immense attractions. The risks of

34. A good example of such coexistence is Cambodia. When the Vietnam War began to
spill over into neutral Cambodia, Prince Norodom Sihanouk - who brought his country
independence from France in 1954 - was overthrown by a right-wing military faction
headed by Lon Nol. That was in March of 1970. A little more than five years later, on April
17, 1975, the victorious rebels known as Khmer Rouge entered Phnom Penh, and began a
four-year rule of murder and genocide in which almost two million Cambodians were executed or starved to death. The terrible story is already a familiar one, especially to those of
us who recall the vivid scenes from the movie "The Killing Fields" or who remember that it
was heavy American bombing that first helped bring Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge to
power. Enduring all that maddens and torments, Cambodia lived in the thickening shadow
of meaningless death until the Christmas of 1978, when Vietnam invaded with a force of
120,000 men and installed its own client government. Today, Vietnam has withdrawn its
troops from Cambodia, and Sihanouk (who officially boycotted the Cambodian peace talks
in Bogor, Indonesia) has expressed fear of a return to power by the Khmer Rouge. Indeed,
says Sihanouk, "Another holocaust is becoming inevitable."
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living within this kingdom become apparent only when the possibilities of
migration no longer exist.
In the end, the problem of genocide is a problem of individuals.
states can exploit the genocidal aspects of Realpolitik because these aspects satisfy the needs of normal human beings. In treating others as foul
or pestilential, these people affirm at the same time that they belong to
an elite. There are no special requirements for membership in this elite,
save membership in a dominant group of the state, but this seems to do
nothing to undermine the benefits of "belonging." It is difficult to overestimate the importance of the herd - the emotional advantages of belonging to the state - in explaining genocide.
It follows from all this that before we can extricate ourselves from
the most lethal expressions of Realpolitik, individual human beings will
need to discover alternative (to jingoism) and more authentic sources of
reassurance. But this is easier said than done. The journey from the herd
to personhood begins in myth and ends in doubt. For this journey to succeed, the individual traveler must learn to substitute a system of uncertainties for what he has always believed - to learn to tolerate and encourage doubt as a replacement for the comforting woes of statism.
Induced to live against the grain of our civilization, he must become not
only conscious of his singularity, but satisfied with it. Separated from the
herd, he must become aware of the forces that undermine it, forces that
offer him a last remaining chance for resisting complicity in genocide.
We may turn to Kierkegaard for guidance. Recognizing the "crowd"
as "untruth," he warns of the dangers that lurk in submission to
multitudes:
A crowd in its very concept is the untruth, by reason of the fact that it
renders the individual completely impenitent and irresponsible, or at
least weakens his sense of responsibility by reducing it to a fraction..
. . For "crowd" is an abstraction and has no hands: but each individual has ordinarily two hands ....
The task, then, is for each individual to become a person. Rejecting
the idolatry of militaristic nationalism, each man and woman must learn
to understand the lethal encroachments of the state. Recognizing in most
of their leadership elites an incapacity to surmount collective misfortune
(war as well as genocide), each person must strive to produce his/her own
private expression of progress. "From becoming an individual no one,"
says Kierkegaard, "is excluded, except he who excludes himself by becoming a crowd."
We have seen that to fulfill the expectations of a new global society
- one that would erect effective barriers around the crime of genocide initiatives must be taken within states. Current national leaders can
never be expected to undertake the essential changes on their own.
Rather, these changes can come only from informed (actualized) publics
throughout the world.
If all of this sounds grandly unpolitical, it is because politics as usual
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cannot prevent genocide. If it all sounds hopelessly idealistic, it must be
recognized that nothing could be more fanciful than relying upon the
power of modern international law or upon the dynamics of geopolitics.
Before we assume that genocide is a permanent fixture of contemporary
international relations, we must understand that politics can change. And
since law follows politics, the transformation of lethal forms of inter-state
competition into new archetypes for global society can give new and effective meaning to anti-genocide norms.35

35. Such transformation could also give new and effective meaning to norms intended
to control another major category of crimes in international law - the category concerned
with terrorism. In this connection, these norms are already codified in a number of major
treaties and conventions. See especially Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, adopted by
the U.N. General Assembly, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532, reprinted in
13 I.L.M. 43 (1974) (entered into force for the United States, Feb. 20, 1977); Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, April 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500
U.N.T.S. 95 (entered into force for the United States, Dec. 13, 1972); Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft ("Tokyo Convention"), September 14, 1963, 704 U.N.T.S. 219, 20 U.S.T. 2941 (entered into force for the United States
on December 4, 1969); Convention For the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft
("Hague Convention"), December 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641 (entered into force for the
United States on Oct. 14, 1971); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of Civil Aviation ("Montreal Convention"), September 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564
(entered into force for the United States on Jan. 26, 1973); Internation Convention Against
the Taking of Hostages of December 17, 1979, G.A. Res. 34/146, 34 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.
46) at 245, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979) (entered into force on June 3, 1983) (entered into force
for the United States on December 7, 1984); European Convention on the Suppression of
Terrorism, January 27, 1977, E.T.S. 90 (entered into force on August 4, 1978). On December
9, 1985, the U.N. General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution condemning all acts
of terrorism as "criminal." Never before had the General Assembly adopted such a comprehensive resolution on this question. Yet, the issue of particular acts that actually constitute
terrorism was left largely unaddressed, except for acts such as hijacking, hostage-taking and
attacks on internationally protected persons that were criminalized by previous custom and
conventions. See UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION ON TERRORISM OF DECEMBER 9, 1985, G.A.
Res. 40/61, 40 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No 53) at 301, U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (1985).

International Human Rights And Family
Planning: A Modest Proposal
BARBARA STARK*
INTRODUCTION

This paper proposes that the U.S. begin to take a more positive role
in advancing international human rights by reaffirming its historic commitment to international family planning efforts. Specifically, I suggest
that we rescind the Mexico City Policy ("MCP"),1 repeal the Helms
Amendment' and explicitly apply internationally accepted human rights
norms to our population program. While the repudiation of the MCP and
the Helms Amendment suggests a return to an earlier era in family planning, the focus on the human rights implications represents a substantial
departure from our former policy. This reflects both the growing international sensitivity to human rights since the inception of that policy in the
early seventies, and our own reevaluation of the "population problem" in
the early eighties.3 Unlike Swift's scathing satire, this truly is a "modest
proposal." I do not suggest that complex family planning problems can be
solved by the availability of contraception, including abortion.4 But un* Visiting Assistant Professor and Coordinator, Legal Writing Program, Rutgers Law
School. B.A., Cornell University, 1973; J.D., New York University, 1976; L.L.M., Columbia
Law School, 1989.
1. The MCP terminated all U.S. aid to family planning services engaging in abortion
related activities or speech. See infra text accompanying notes 18-27.
2. 22 U.S.C. § 2151b(f)(1)(2)(Supp. V 1982). The Helms Amendment prohibits direct
funding of abortion through nongovermental organizations. See infra text accompanying
notes 14-15.
3. In the World Bank's 1984 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 155, a distinction is made
between "family planning programs [which] provide information and services to help people
achieve their own fertility objectives" and "population policy [which] involves explicit demographic goals." In this paper, unless otherwise specified, "population policy" and "family
planning services" both refer to programs providing aid and services to individuals. Since a
discussion of policy regarding aggregate fertility is beyond the scope of this paper, there is
no need for separate terms here.
In any case, as suggested at text accompanying notes 104-11, infra, family planning
policy affects population, albeit indirectly. This is not a simple issue. As Donald Strauss,
former chair of Planned Parenthood Federation of America has observed, commenting on
the Chinese government's efforts to reduce its population growth rate and resultant disregard of human rights: "One of the dilemmas of our times is to equate the near and poignant
human rights of individuals now alive with the distant and difficult to imagine rights of
those still to be born." N.Y. Times, May 11, 1989, letter to the editor by D. Strauss, at A28,
col.6.
4. Rather, I agree with John Ratcliffe, who has argued that " ...
overpopulation and
underdevelopment . . . can most effectively be resolved through a combination of widespread social advancement and availability of the full range of birth control methods.." Ratcliffe, The Reagan Population Policy: An Error of the Third Kind, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
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less such contraception is available, it is difficult to even begin to address
these issues.5
The utilization of human rights standards in this context is concededly problematic. What are the human rights that would be promoted?
Are these rights recognized by the U.S.? What, if anything, is gained by
analyzing family planning issues in terms of human rights, rather than as
questions of public policy? I will argue that a rights analysis is essential
here for three basic reasons.' First, a clear focus on rights should help us
avoid the rights violations that have marred family planning programs in
the past. Second, the grave global problems of reproductive choice demand a principled, universal approach. Third, it is important that these
issues are understood in terms of rights because the exercise of rights as
such by Third World women, who are most affected by U.S. family planning policy, may help them to begin to address other aspects of their oppression.7 The experience of exercising rights itself contributes to empowerment.' Family planning is a natural place to start because it involves
issues central to the Third World woman's daily life.
This paper is divided into three parts. In the first part, I briefly describe the current U.S. position, its origins and consequences. In the second part, I suggest that U.S. family planning support be structured and
evaluated in accordance with widely accepted international human rights
norms and pertinent domestic constitutional standards. From this, I derive a "hybrid" rights formulation linking international notions of affirmative rights with the American idea of reproductive choice as a fundamental right. In the last part, I analyze the possible impact of the hybrid

POL. 267, 298 (1987).
5. See Farley & Tokarski, Legal Restrictions on the Distributionof Contraceptives in
the Developing Nations: Some Suggestions for Determining Prioritiesand Estimating Impact of Change, 6 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 415, 418 (1974-75) (significant numbers of
people in developing countries have decided to limit family size but cannot do so because
contraceptives are either physically or economically unavailable to them); R. REPETTO,
WORLD

ENOUGH
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FOR

RESOURCE

MANAGEMENT

43

(1986)(most households in Third World countries where birth and death rates are high do
not have access to family planning services); Johnson-Acsadi, The Scale of the Problem, 15
PEOPLE 3 (1988) ("Among 22 developing countries, from 13-51% of women aged 15-49 reported having had an unwanted pregnancy or live birth in the two years before the survey
took place ....
").
6. See generally Symposium: The Civil Liberties and Human Rights Implications of
United States InternationalPopulation Policy, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1 (1987);
Rights of Choice in Matters Relating to Human Reproduction: Part I of a Symposium on
Law and Population, 6 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 273 (1974-75).
7. See generally G. LERNER, THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY, 233-35 (1986) (comparing
the terms "oppression" and "subordination" of women).
8. See Lefort, Politics and Human Rights, in POLITICAL FORMS IN MODERN SOCIETY

(M.I.T. 1986) (arguing that awareness and assertion of rights as rights are a crucial part of a
trans- formative political process). Third World women are among the most oppressed people on earth. See Hosken, Toward a Definition of Women's Human Rights, 3 HUM. RTS. Q.
1, 2 (1981).
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formulation on some specific human rights.' These include the rights to
reproductive choice, equality, health and an "adequate" standard of
living.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND

U.S. Support for InternationalFamily Planning

A brief history background of U.S. participation in international population planning efforts may be useful in evaluating the political feasibility of the proposal for a revised U.S. role.1" Even the most perfunctory
review shows not only that until very recently the U.S. actively supported
international family planning, but that dramatic shifts in policy in this
area have been - and can be - implemented in a relatively short period
of time.
The U.S. has supported international family planning services for
more than twenty-five years. In 1961, AID (Agency for International Development) was established to coordinate U.S economic and humanitarian aid programs. 1 In 1967, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 was
amended by the passage of Title X. This authorized broad population
planning support, including the construction of family planning clinics
and funding for research programs. AID funding was increased from $4.4
million to $34.8 million.1 2
In 1973 the U.S. shifted the emphasis of its foreign aid program from
large to small scale projects. Family planning was a keystone of this "New
Directions" strategy, reflecting the general consensus among policymakers
that Third World countries "could not effectively address pressing social
and economic problems until modern methods of contraception were introduced on a mass scale."1 "
In the same year, the senate passed the Helms Amendment to the
Foreign Assistance Act." The Helms Amendment prohibits direct funding of abortion through nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs") 5 As a
practical matter, such direct funding had never comprised a significant
proportion of AID and was easily channeled elsewhere. Thus, the direct
impact of the Helms Amendment on international population programs

9. Cf. Price-Cohen, InternationalFora for the Vindication of Human Rights Violated
by the U.S. InternationalPopulation Policy, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.& POL. 241, 248 (1987)
(noting the analytic problems of demonstrating that existing policies violate human rights).
10. For a comprehensive discussion of the history of the program, see Fox, American
Population Policy Abroad: The Mexico City Abortion Funding Restrictions, 18 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 609, 611 (1986).
11. Fox, supra note 10, at 611.
12. Id. at 614.
13. Id. at 611.
14. 22 U.S.C. § 2151b(f)(1)(2) (Supp. V 1982).
15. The constitutionality of the Helms Amendment has generally been conceded. Comment, InternationalFamily Planning, 8 Hous. J. INT'L L. 155, 170 (1985) [hereinafter
"Houston Comment"].
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was not great. Support for other forms of family planning remained high.
The U.S. had supported the International Planned Parenthood Federation ("IPPF") since 1968 and U.S. contributions constituted almost
25% of the IPPF's budget for 1984.6 In 1986, the U.S. was the largest
single contributor to U.N. sponsored family planning programs. 7 AID
was the single greatest source of funding for overseas family planning.
B.

The Mexico City Policy ("MCP")

In August, 1984, the U.N. Population Conference in Mexico City was
convened to reevaluate the World Population Plan of Action adopted in
1974.1 The Reagan administration viewed the Mexico City Conference as
an opportunity to demonstrate its vehement opposition to abortion to the
world, as well as its right wing constituency. 9 Promulgation of the MCP
unequivocally showed that undermining support for international family
planning had become a high priority of the Administration." The MCP
effectively extended the application of the Helms Amendment far beyond
that which had been contemplated by the Senate. This was accomplished
by the imposition of two additional conditions. First, foreign recipients
were forbidden to engage in any abortion related activities or speech. Second, they were prohibited from doing so regardless of the funding source
2
of such activities. '
This policy has had profound consequences for both the population
planning NGOs and those they serve.22 As Sharon Camp points out, the
MCP jeopardized over 120 family planning projects worth almost $23 million annually." The maneuvers required to remain eligible for funds dis-

16. Camp, The Impact of the Mexico City Policy on Women and Health Care in Developing Countries, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 35, 37 (1987).
17. DKT Memorial Fund Ltd. v. Agency for Int'l Dev., No. 88-5243 (D. Cal. Oct. 10,
1989) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
18. Fox, supra note 10, at 628. For a description of the World Population Conference in
Bucharest in 1974, see B. HARTMANN, REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND WRONGS: THE GLOBAL
POLITICS OF POPULATION CONTROL AND REPRODUCTIVE CHOICE 107-10 (1987).
19. See B. HARTMANN, supra note 18, at 123-25; see also Fox, supra note 10, at 633
(noting that the MCP was "met with hostility" from most [Third World] delegates). See
generally Cook & Dickens, InternationalDevelopments in Abortion Laws: 1977-78, AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 1305, 1310 (1988) ("The prevailing U.S. initiative [as
expressed in the MCP] runs counter to the evolving trend of
worldwide abortion reform.")
20. The MCP has been criticized as a cynical political capitulation to the efforts of an
activist minority, including substantial support from organized religion. See B. HARTMANN,
supra note 18, at 244. For an incisive analysis of the role of the Catholic church in the
formulation of family planning policy, see Benshoof, The Establishment Clause and Government-Funded Natural Family Planning Programs: Is the Constitution Dancing to a
New Rhythm? 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1 (1987).
21. U.S. Population Policy as Announced in Mexico City, 1984: A Background Statement Prepared by the ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project 3 [hereinafter "ACLU
Statement"].
22. Id.
23. Camp, supra note 16, at 50. IPPF/WHR received a $27 million extension of a
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rupted the population establishment. IPPF, for example, initially took a
unified approach, refusing to require its 117 member associations to stop
all abortion activities. In 1985, however, the Western Hemisphere Region
section of IPPF agreed to AID's restrictions, thus undermining Planned
Parenthood Federation of America's efforts to reverse them.2
According to the Population Crisis Committee ("PCC"), which undertook a study of the effects of the MCP in 1987, most of the agencies
questioned were not yet operating under the anti-abortion restrictions.
Those organizations which had implemented the MCP standards reported that they had: (1) incurred substantial increases in administrative
costs (in connection with monitoring their subgrantees);(2) avoided certain countries and categories of foreign organization;(3) phased out research on the consequences of illegal abortions;(4) disassociated themselves from medical research that might be considered abortionrelated;(5) were generally "chilled" in their provision of services, and (6)
inadvertently violated the MCP.25 As Camp observes:
In the end, however, the most pervasive and devastating effect of the
policy will be felt by women in developing nations who rely on the
integrity of the health professionals funded by the U.S. government.
By depriving those women of all information about the availability
and advisability of abortion, the [MCP] inevitably will prevent women
from obtaining medically necessary abortions and will cause women to
bear children at great risks to their physical health."2
As this capsule history suggests, the risks and uncertainties to which
the vagaries of our political system subject recipient states and NGOs is a
very real problem. By its nature, the success of family planning depends
on continuity.2 7 Just as the community must be able to rely on the programs, they in turn must be able to count on their funding sources. This
is an important reason for protecting such decisions from executive caprice. As I will argue in the next part of this article, one way to do so may
be by giving such aid the status of rights.
C.

"Overpopulation" or underdevelopment?

While deploring the anti-abortion focus of the MCP, Betsy Hartmann has observed that it raised important questions about the underlying premises of the Western population establishment. Moreover, it reflected a new recognition of the critical role of development in population
programs.

Matching Grant from AID. 1987 ANNUAL REPORT IPPF/WHR 13.
24. B. HARTMANN, supra note 18, at 114.
25. Camp, supra note 16, at 41-48.
26. Id. at 50.
27. Farley & Tokarski, supra note 5, at 439. See Crossette, Why India is Still Failing
to Stop Its Population Surge, N.Y. Times, July 9, 1989, § 4, at 2, col 1 (Indian experts
attribute large families, in part, to "a dearth of sustained information and follow-up
services.").
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There are basically two views of population growth. One, as epitomized by the World Bank's Report on Population 1984,28 may be referred
to as the "population explosion" view.29 Its adherents argue that overpopulation, resulting in intense competition for scarce resources, is a primary cause of poverty and starvation. They believe that the sheer number of human beings and the rate at which they are reproducing amounts
to a global crisis.
The other view, which I will call the "development view," considers
the high fertility rate that leads to burgeoning population more a symptom than a cause of poverty. As Hartmann explains, having many children is sensible and rational in an agrarian society dependent on child
labor. Moreover, the lack of pensions or social security programs means
that children are the only insurance for a couple's old age. High infant
mortality makes it necessary to have many children in order to be sure
that some will survive to adulthood. Finally, from the development view,
the issue of the demand on global resources by an expanding Third World
population is specious since we in the West still consume far more than
they do, by any logical measure, because our per capita consumption is so
high. 0 Thus, the argument continues, "population explosion" is the racist, elitist rallying cry of a West in fear of being overrun by dark
hordes." Population control, according to proponents of the development
view, requires both freely available family planning services and a more
equitable distribution of wealth. Compelling statistics demonstrate that
the correlation between lowered fertility and development depends more
on the equitable distribution of resources than the GNP per capita.2
Where individual families benefit economically from development, they
are apt to have fewer children.
The drafters of the MCP, while rejecting the economic analysis of the
development view, denied that population growth presents a significant
problem. Even if growth were undesirable, they argued, the correlation
between increased industrialization and declining birthrate" indicates
that the best way to deal with it is through economic development. The
Reagan administration concluded that a vigorous free market economy
was the best way to stimulate development, which it assumed would lead
to lower birth rates. Even if this is so, as the World Bank has tersely
observed, "many developing countries cannot afford to wait for fertility to

28. Houston Comment, supra note 15, at 156. See, e.g., Ratcliffe, supra note 4, at 267
n.1.
29. See P. EHRLICH, THE POPULATION BOMB (1968).
30. OUR COMMON FUTURE: WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND

DEVELOPMENT 95 (1987) [hereinafter "Our Common Future"]. Close to 25% of the world's
inhabitants consume less than five percent of the world's output; a similar percentage in the
industrialized countries consume more than two-thirds. See R. REPETTO, supra note 5, at 42.
31. See B. HARTMANN, supra note 18, at 95-98 (discussing the confluence of the eugenics and birth control movements).
32. Id. at 273; Our Common Future, supra note 30, at 106.
33. Houston Comment, supra note 15, at 172.
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decline spontaneously"

4

in response to projected economic development.

Both the development and the population explosion views may have
human rights repercussions. To the extent the population explosion analysis is used to justify the abrogation of the individual's reproductive
choice on the grounds of national necessity, it violates a human rights
approach to family planning. To the extent that the development approach incorporates the neo-Malthusian view that population is self-regulating, through high mortality or natural family planning, it too becomes
a mechanism for curtailing reproductive choice.
II. STANDARDS

Both the affirmative economic, social and cultural rights set forth in
the international instruments and the fundamental privacy rights assured
by the U.S. constitution are necessary to solve the problems of population
policy. Neither approach is sufficient in itself in the international family
planning context. Indeed, as I will show in this section, their inadequacies
complement each other. This suggests the need for a "hybrid" formulation, a selective blend of the two rights traditions, in which the affirmative rights of the international instruments are qualified by the American
notion of fundamental privacy rights, which they simultaneously expand.
In developing this synthesis, this part of the paper attempts to provide a
workable example of the constructive interplay of American and international conceptions of rights.
A.

InternationalInstruments

There are .at least two basic reasons for considering questions of international family planning in terms of human rights, as these rights have
been interpreted in the international human rights instruments. First, by
utilizing these terms, we place these issues squarely in the context of internationally accepted norms. This clarifies and narrows the debate. Second, by recognizing the rights consequences of these policy decisions, we
acknowledge and articulate the constitutive principles to which law, policy and even presidents must conform. If the U.S. is serious about human
rights, and expects to be taken seriously by the rest of the world, we must
consider the human rights implications of our policies. The following international treaties provide widely accepted and clearly articulated standards pertinent here: the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights ( "Civil Covenant"), the International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights ("Economic Covenant") and the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (
"Women's Convention"). 5

34. Id. at 162.
35. G.A. Res. 180 (XXXIV 1979), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 33 (1980), adopted by the
General Assembly on Dec. 18, 1979, entered into force on Sept. 3, 1981. See generally Cook,
The International Right of Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex - A. Bibliography, 14
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We should adopt the norms established in these instruments as
guidelines for the formulation of American international family planning
policy for several reasons.3 6 First, they provide an invaluable indication of
the priorities and values held by most of the international community,37
including the high priority given economic rights in the Third World. By
demonstrating our commitment to these globally accepted principles,3 8 we

show good faith and thereby enhance our credibility. Other states would
probably be more receptive to our criticism if we were more open to
theirs. 9 Thus, we should adhere to these norms, unless they clearly conflict with our own principles,"0 because they express a global consensus
against which the rest of the world will judge our actions."'
Second, Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
imposes a special obligation with respect to treaties we have signed: "A
state is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and
purpose of a treaty [which] . . . it has signed.

. .

until it shall have made

its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty. . . ,,,2
The Economic and Civil Covenants as well as the Women's Convention were
among those signed by President Carter.43
J. INT'L L. 161 (1989); Byrnes, The 'Other' Human Rights Treaty Body: The Work of
the Committee on the Elimination of DiscriminationAgainst Women, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 1
(1989); Heller, International Convention on Women's Rights: Bringing About Ratification
in the United States, 9 WHITTIER L. REV. 431 (1987).
36. See supra text accompanying notes 95-98 (applicable norms under the Civil Covenant, and notes 111-12 (applicable norms under the Economic Covenant infra). Cf. Coliver
& Newman, Using InternationalHuman Rights Law to Influence Population Policy: Resort to Courts or Congress?, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 53, 84 (1987) (discussing the
derivation of "judicially manageable standards" from international law in this context).
37. See generally L. HENKIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY (1978); J. NICKELS, MAKING
YALE

SENSE OF HUMAN

RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE UNIVERSAL

DECLARATION

OF

(1987). But cf. Galey, International Enforcement of Women's Rights, 6
HUM. RTS. Q. 463 (1984) (problems of enforcement of women's rights, and prospects for
improvement).
38. See generally Sohn, The New InternationalLaw: Protectionof the Rights of Individuals Rather Than States, 32 AM. U.L. REV. 1 (1982).
39. "We should not give the impression that we are mainly interested in enforcing
human rights elsewhere while avoiding any change in our own law or practice." SENATE
HUMAN RIGHTS

COMM. ON FOREIGN REL., HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES, SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT, S.

REP.

No. 381-14.2, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 88 (1979) [hereinafter "Senate Hearings"] (Prepared
Statement of Professor Oscar Schachter). But cf. Schachter, International Law Implications of U.S. Human Rights Policies, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63, 73 (1978) (General right of
censure should not be limited to those states which are parties to the international rights
instruments).
40. Cf. infra text accompanying notes 71-78 (discussing the abortion of female fetuses).
41. See generally, HENKIN, PUGH, SCHACHTER & SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 981-83 (1987) [hereinafter "InternationalLaw"]; Humphrey, The Implementation of InternationalHuman Rights Law, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 31 (1978).
42. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, art. 18, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF. 39/27 at 17 (1969) (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679, 686
(1969); accord 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

§ 312, at 173 (1987) [hereinafter "Third Restatement"].
43. President Carter Signs Covenants on Human Rights, DEP'T. ST.

STATES,

BULL.,

Oct. 31,
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The right to abortion, however, is conspicuous by its absence from
the international instruments."" As Joan Fitzpatrick Hartman has pointed
out:
None of the human rights instruments contain an explicit right of personal choice for women seeking to terminate their pregnancies. In the
only international case directly confronting access to abortion as a privacy right, the European Commission on Human Rights did not find a
choice of pregnancy termination within the right to privacy and family protection under the European Convention. 6
The failure of these instruments to recognize a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy may be attributed to several factors, including the
prevalence of patriarchy46 and the political influence of religions such as
fundamental Islam 7 and Catholicism, which are opposed to abortion.
Under local law, for example, abortion is illegal or permitted only where
the woman's life is at stake in most of the Muslim countries of Asia, twothirds of the Latin American countries and much of Africa. 48 As I will
explain in the next section, the extent to which local laws conflict with
rights well established in our jurisprudence, like a woman's right to
choose whether or not to terminate a pregnancy, should be considered by
the U.S. in allocating assistance.
B.

Domestic Standards

The right to use contraception, including abortion, is predicated on
privacy rights which have been found to be fundamental by the U.S. Su-

1977, at 586; Message from the President to the Senate transmitting the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (Nov. 12, 1980).
44. One of the most creative approaches to this void has been devised by Coliver &
Newman, who note that the cited instruments set forth general principles - including the
right to health and the right of women to attain access to family planning - which may
impose a duty on governments, as a matter of customary international law, to refrain from
defunding NGOs when doing so is likely to "seriously threaten the health of a significant
number of people," Coliver & Newman, supra note 36, at 68-70. They concede, however,
that, "Several instruments recognize interests that compete with a mother's interest in free
choice," id. at 67 (citing American Convention on Human Rights, art. IV, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36,
at 1, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. L/V/II.23, doc. 21 rev. 6 (1979), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673
(1970); art. 18 of the Civil Covenant.
45. See Hartman, The Impact of the Reagan Administration's International Population Policy on Human Rights Relating to Health and the Family, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 169, 177 (1987) (citing Bruggemann and Scheuten v. Federal Republic of Germany, 10
EUR. COMM'N H.R. 100 (1978)).
46. See generally Eisler, Human Rights: Toward an Integrated Theory for Action, 9
HUM. RTS. Q. 287 (1987) (historical overview of human rights and women's rights movements, urging a unified approach).
47. See generally An-Na'im, The Rights of Women and InternationalLaw in the Muslim Context, 9 WHITTIER L. REV. 491 (1987).
48. B. HARTMANN, supra note 18, at 245 (citing C. TIETZE, INDUCED ABORTION: A WORLD
REVIEW, 1983. Indeed, if reproductive choice had been explicitly assured in the covenants, it
is questionable whether they would have been as widely ratified in the Third World. At the
very least, reservations probably would have been taken with respect to that right.
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preme Court. In Griswold v. Connecticut,49 the Supreme Court invalidated a state law that criminalized the use of contraceptives for married
persons. In Eisenstadt v. Baird,50 the protection was extended to single
persons: "If the right of privacy means anything it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted government intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child."61 In Roe v. Wade, 52 the Court expressly
found that the privacy right was "broad enough to encompass a woman's
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." 3 In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services," the Supreme Court declined to overrule
Roe, holding that the state could refuse to allow the use of facilities for
abortions as long as it "places no obstacle - absolute or otherwise - in
the pregnant woman's path to an abortion.)5 5 As Justice Blackmun notes
in his dissent, the Court does not make a "single, even incremental,
change in the law of abortion . . ... 5 Rather, the Webster Court simply
persists in the fallacious distinction between a government imposed "obstacle" and indigency, for which the government is not responsible, but
which may effectively preclude abortion.
While I agree with Justice Blackmun that the pluralility "obscures
the portent" of the decision, and that Webster is likely to have dire consequences at home,5" the decision does not detract from the analysis here.
Rather, I am concerned with precisely those obstacles decried by the
Webster court; i.e., obstacles "placed in the path of women seeking abortions" by government. In the context of international family planning, I
urge that the U.S. both avoid creating such obstacles and carefully consider those erected by recipient states.
The other element of the hybrid proposal, i.e., an affirmative economic obligation, is found not in domestic law, but in the international
instruments discussed above. The U.S has never found any constitutional
obligation on the part of the state to provide contraception or to fund
abortions. In Harris v. McRae,5" the Supreme Court held that there was
no constitutional entitlement to medicaid funding for abortions even if
poor women could not otherwise obtain them. Although a compelling ar-

49. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
50. Eisenstatd v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
51. Id. at 453.
52. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 155 (1973).
53. Id. at 153.
54. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 106 L.Ed. 2d 410 (1989); See generally
Greenhouse, Supreme Court, 5-4, Narrowing Roe v. Wade, Upholds Sharp State Limits on
Abortions, N.Y. Times, July 4, 1989, at 1, col. 6.
55. Webster, 106 L.Ed. 2d at 429, citing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977).
56. Webster, 106 L.Ed. 2d, at 448 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
57. "I fear for the future. I fear for the liberty and equality of the millions of women
who have lived and come of age in the 16 years since Roe was decided. I fear for the integrity of, and public esteem for, this Court." Id. at 449.
58. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
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gument may be made that McRae represents a fundamental restriction of
the right to choose an abortion, on its own terms it is less about limiting
the right to choose than it is about the Supreme Court's refusal to recognize affirmative economic rights:
To translate the limitation on governmental power implicit in the Due
Process Clause into an affirmative funding obligation would require
Congress to subsidize the medically necessary abortion of an indigent
woman even if Congress had not enacted a Medicaid program to subsidize other medically necessary services. Nothing in the Due Process
Clause supports such an extraordinary result. Whether freedom of
choice that is constitutionally protected warrants federal subsidization
is a question for Congress to answer, not a matter of constitutional
entitlement. 9
The Supreme Court has consistently refused to accord any economic
rights constitutional status.8 Thus, it is not surprising that the courts
have for the most part rejected the argument that the MCP violates the
U.S. constitution. 1 If the affirmative economic rights established in the
international instruments are recognized and applied in the context of
U.S. international family planning programs, however, abortion may well
be an entitlement" 2- at least in those countries where a woman may
choose to terminate her pregnancy without state interference.
C.

A Hybrid Formulation
1. Towards a Constructive Synthesis

The international instruments do not recognize women's fundamental right to choose whether or not to terminate pregnancy, a right firmly
established under the U.S. constitution." The U.S. constitution, on the

59. Id. at 318.
60. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). As Henkin has observed, our emergence
in the twentieth century as what some characterize as a welfare state has been accomplished
despite the constitution, rather than because of it. L. HENKIN, supra note 37, at 128.
61. See, e.g., Coliver & Newman, supra note 36, at 77-83; Planned Parenthood Fed'n v.
Agency for Int'l Dev., 670 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), rev'd on these grounds, aff'd on
other grounds, 838 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1988) (on remand, oral argument was scheduled for
July 21, 1989, on defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted); telephone interview with Roger Evans, Esq., counsel for plaintiff on June
9, 1989. See also DKT Memorial Fund v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 630 F. Supp. 238 (D.D.C.
1986), 810 F.2d 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd and remanded 691 F. Supp. 394 (D.D.C. 1987).
62. This would probably not be an absolute right under any of the international conventions, which take a pragmatic approach to economic rights. Under Art. 2.1 of the Economic Covenant, for example, a state is required "to take steps ... to the maximum of its
available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights
recognized in the present Covenant." In any case, for purposes of this paper I am assuming
voluntary U.S. accession to international norms, rather than the imposition of any enforceable duty against the U.S. But cf. Senate Hearings, supra note 39, at 91 (statement of Professor Louis Sohn, explaining that this language is "obligatory... [creating] a legal duty to
take such steps, and this duty needs to be fulfilled in good faith").
63. But see, e.g., Greenhouse, Battle Over; Now, a War: Three New Cases Will Put
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other hand, fails to address the economic, social, and cultural circumstances which may well render the enjoyment of that right nugatory.
Thus, I suggest a "hybrid" approach to international family planning,
combining the affirmative rights described in the international covenants
with the fundamental right to reproductive choice guaranteed under the
U.S. constitution. Under such a hybrid rights formulation, U.S. funded
family planning programs would treat reproductive choice, including
abortion, as a fundamental right and would also recognize the affirmative
economic, social and cultural rights of the individual program
participants.64
This is not the same obligation that the U.S. would assume by adhering to the international covenants. While ratification of the covenants
might give rise to an inchoate right to development under Art. 2(1) of the
Economic Covenant,65 it would not necessarily require us to further the
affirmative rights of citizens of other countries. Under the conventions,
affirmative rights are to be provided by the individuals' own state. In addressing those rights, the U.S. would be contributing to the state's efforts
to further the rights of its own people.66
U.S. recognition of reproductive choice and affirmative rights means
that the U.S. would not only refrain from imposing any constraints on
family planning program participants which would interfere with their
enjoyment of such rights, but also that the U.S. would evaluate family
planning programs in terms of their rights consequences. A rights analysis
would provide the basic framework in which the U.S. operated and assessed its family planning programs, subject to the pre-existing law of the
local state.6

Supreme Court on a Collision Course with Roe v. Wade, N.Y. Times, July 5, 1989 at 1, col.
4; Fein, "The Court is Ready to Overturn 'Roe'

",

See id. at A21, col.1; c[ Gross, Goaded by

Ruling, Groups Plot State-by-State Plan to Keep Abortion Rights, see id. at A17, col. 1.
64. This would encourage, although it would not assure, the "extraordinary result" contemplated by the McRae Court; i.e., an "affirmative funding obligation" with regard to abortion notwithstanding the absence of specific legislation. See generally HALBERSTAM &
DEFEIS,

WOMEN'S

LEGAL

RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL

COVENANTS,

AN

ALTERNATIVE

TO ERA?

(1987) (comparing women's rights under U.S. law with women's rights under the international covenants).
65. See SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 331- 32 (1985); DRAFT
DECLARATION ON THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT,

U.N. Doc. A/40/277 (1985).

66. The vast majority of Third World U.N. member states have adhered to the cove-

nants. See supra note 41, at 994. Even if the recipient state had not adhered to the covenants, however, under this proposal the U.S. would refer to the standards established in
those instruments because of the global acceptance of these standards (see infra text accompanying notes 37-41) and because of their concrete importance to the Third World, especially Third World women. (See infra text accompanying notes 95-128.).

67. For tables showing circumstances under which abortion is permitted worldwide, see
"Regional Developmemts in Abortion Laws: 1967-1988" (chart referencing countries that
have changed abortion law since 1968, available from IPPF); C. TIETZE & S.K. HENSHAW,
INDUCED ABORTION: A WORLD VIEW (6th ed. 1986); Cook & Dickens, supra note 19, at 1306307 (chart showing "Legislative Developments in Indications for Abortion: 1977-1988")
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U.S. recognition of these rights would not, of course, affect their status under local law. If local law imposed intolerable constraints on rights,
however, the program could be terminated. It is beyond the scope of this
paper to define "tolerable" rights parameters, which would probably have
to be determined on a fact-specific, case by case basis. Local law punishing parents for having more than one child, for example, would probably
be fatal to a program under a hybrid rights framework, as would the distribution of contraceptives posing a significant health risk. A strong argument could be made that a local bar on abortion would similarly so contravene basic rights as to mandate defunding by the U.S.."' This
contention would probably not prevail, however, in view of the historic
U.S. support of family planning programs which have not included abortion and the practical consequences of terminating such programs.
There is no constitutional impediment to the synthesis urged, no
constitutional proscription against a more expansive construction of the
right to choose. Indeed, thirteen states currently pay for abortions with
state Medicaid funds."9 The adoption of affirmative economic rights,
while resisted as a matter of constitutional jurisprudence, may be palatable in the limited context of international family planning for several
reasons.7 0 First, the political considerations underlying Congress' decision
not to fund abortions at home may no longer be applicable abroad. 71 Public policy justifications for supporting family planning programs, including those offering abortion, may be more compelling in an international
than in a domestic context. It may be particularly crucial for a woman to
have the option of terminating her pregnancy where access to effective
forms of contraception may be limited, where the health risks associated
with pregnancy and childbirth are great, and where the mother will almost invariably assume primary responsibility for the infant. 2 Abortion

68. Webster, 106 L.Ed. 2d 410 (affirming that Texas statute in Roe v. Wade criminalizing all abortions, except where women's life was at stake, was unconstitutional under the
Due Process Clause).
69. As of June 25, 1989, thirteen states paid for abortions without restrictions with
state Medicaid funds: Alaska, California,Connecticut, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts,
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Washington, West Virginia and Vermont.
Four additional states will pay for abortions in cases of rape, incest or to save the woman's
life. All of the remaining states will pay for abortions to save the woman's life. Where Abortion Laws Stand Now, State by State, N.Y. Times, June 25, 1989, at 20, col.4.
70. Affirmative economic rights are increasingly acceptable. As Professor Henkin has
noted, "[Is] it not the case that people today have recognized and ordained that it is among
the purposes of government to ensure every inhabitant - as of right, not by grace and
charity - [receives] the basic human needs (food, shelter, health care, education) when the
individual cannot provide them?" Henkin, The United States Constitution as Social Compact, 131 PROC. AM. PHIL. Soc'y 261 (1987).
71. See supra note 20. Indeed, Congress recently voted funds for rape and incest victims, although it was unable to override President Bush's veto. N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1989, at
Al. See also Wicker, A President'sBeholden, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1989, at A25, criticizing
President Bush's veto of renewal of aid to the U.N. Population Fund for family planning
services explicitly excluding abortion.
72. Cf. M. GLENDON, DIVORCE AND ABORTION IN WESTERN LAW 53-57 (1987) (describing
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funding in the Third World may further be warranted by intolerably high
infant and maternal mortality rates7" and widespread destitution contributing to human misery on a scale inconceivable in this country.7 '

This contextual approach to population issues finds support in Mary
Ann Glendon's comparative study of abortion in western Europe and the
U.S.. 75 In her book, Professor Glendon compares the abortion laws of
eighteen western European countries, the U.S. and Canada. She finds
that most countries permit abortion for "cause," such as serious danger to
76
the women's health, likelihood of serious disease or defect in the fetus,
or a "variety of circumstances which pose exceptional hardship for the
77
pregnant woman.
As Professor Glendon points out, these findings parallel American
public opinion polls over an extended period of time.7 s A recent poll again
shows that support for the woman's right to choose abortion depends on
the reason suggested for her decision. Eighty-seven percent of those
polled thought a woman should be able to obtain a legal abortion if her
health was seriously endangered by the pregnancy, while only twenty-six
percent thought abortion should be available if the pregnancy interfered
with work or education. 79 From a public policy perspective, Congress may
be more willing to finance family planning, including abortion, abroad
than at home because of the well-documented health risks associated with
repeated pregnancies among women in the Third World. Even when the
notion of entitlement was far less widely accepted than it is today, liberal
theorists argued that society had some duty to those who would be otherwise unable to survive."'

social services and financial support provided in Europe for mothers and infants); see also
L. NSIAH-JEFFERSON, Reproductive Laws, Women of Color and Low Income Women in REPRODUCTIVE LAWS FOR THE

1990's (S. Cohen & N. Taub eds. 1989).

73. Cook, U.S. Population Policy, Sex Discrimination and Principles of Equality
Under InternationalLaw 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 93 (1987) (quoting Dr. Hafdan Mahler's speech inwhich he noted that "[The developing] countries commonly have maternal
mortality rates 200 times higher than those of Europe and North America - the widest
disparity in all statistics of public health". Id. at 93).
74. I am assuming that the aggregate impact of these factors could be legitimately
taken into account by Congress for purposes of supporting family planning services; i.e.,
services that assist individual women in avoiding or terminating a pregnancy. This is not to
imply that such factors justify U.S. accession to foreign demographic goals.
75. M. GLENDON, supra note 72.
76. These are among what she characterizes as "hard grounds," which also include
pregnancy resulting from rape or incest. Id. at 14.
77. Professor Glendon calls these "soft grounds." Id. at 14.
78. Id. at 41.
79. Dionne, Poll on Abortion Finds the Nation is Sharply Divided, N.Y.Times, Apr.
26, 1989, at 1, col. 6.
80. See J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT: A CRITICAL EDITION WITH AN INTRO-

§ 43, at 189 (P. Laslitt ed. 1967); J.S. MILL, The Province
Book V, Chap. XI (1871), reprinted
AND ECONOMIC JUSTICE 178, 182 (1980). See also R. HOF-

DUCTION AND APPARATUS CRITICUS

of Government from
in

PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

HELD, PROPERTY, PROFITS

STADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION AND THE MEN WHO MADE IT

340 (1948) ("The
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2. Conflicts Between International and Domestic Norms
Under the U.S. Constitution, abortion may be elective until fetal viability. The state cannot inquire into the woman's motive for abortion. In
the Third World, however, the overwhelming preference for male children
raises the question of "discriminatory" abortion. In India and China, for
example, abortion has been used to select the sex of the infant.8 The
routine abortion of female fetuses arguably violates the Women's Convention, which requires party states to:
[T]ake all appropriate measures .

.

. [t]o modify the social and cul-

tural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving
the elimination of prejudices and customs and all other practices
which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of
either of the sexes. 82
There appears to be a conflict between the two standards.
In ratifying treaties, it is well settled that the U.S. shall not bind
itself with regard to provisions of dubious constitutionality.8 " While the
treaty may be ratified, the U.S. will typically take reservations with respect to such provisions.8 4 A similar approach could be adopted in determining which standard to apply here. One alternative would be to disregard the Women's Convention insofar as it conflicts with the right
articulated in Roe v. Wade. 85 Thus, abortions for purposes of sex selection
would not be challenged. After all, in the U.S. there is no legal proscription against such abortions. In the U.S., however, there is no widespread
female infanticide. Nor is the perception that girls are worth less than
boys so prevalent.8 8
Perhaps the value of the international standards can best be appreciated in addressing this kind of situation, which is basically without analog
in our society. Although Americans would presumably be offended by
abortion to choose the sex of the child, individual decisions to do so (as
opposed to legislative requirements) would probably not violate our Con87
stitution. Sex selection as a "'cleaner' method of female infanticide
New Deal established the principle that the entire community through the agency of the
federal government had some responsibility for mass welfare."); B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 267 (1980).
81. B. HARTMANN, supra note 15, at 247; see also McNamara, The Population Problem:
Time Bomb or Myth, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1107 (Summer 1984) (discussing abortion of female
fetuses in response to coercive birth control programs in China).
82. Art. 5(2), Women's Convention, supra note 35.
83. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 42, § 302, at 155; Reid v. Covert, 345 U.S. 1
(1957).
84. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 42, §§ 313-14, at 179-89.
85. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
86. This perception, of course, is not unknown in the West. See, e.g., G. Rubin, The
Traffic in Women: Notes on the 'PoliticalEconomy' of Sex in TOWARD AN ANTHROPOLOGY
OF WOMEN 160 (1975).
87. B. HARTMANN, supra note 18, at 248.
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may well be barred, on the other hand, by the above-cited provision of
the Women's Convention, which mandates the "elimination . . .of practices . . based on the idea . . of inferiority [of females]."" s The
Women's Convention provides a jurisprudential structure for our objections, enabling us to distinguish them from mere cultural bias and to
grapple with the issue in a principled manner. While it is beyond the
scope of this paper to attempt to resolve this dilemma,"' the problem illustrates the indispensability of international norms in the formulation of
international family planning policy.
III.

HUMAN RIGHTS ADVANCED

This part focuses on the possible impact of the hybrid formulation on
three significant human rights,9" first describing the right and then discussing the ways in which it would be affected by the approach described
in the preceding section. The three rights considered are: the right of reproductive choice for women; women's right to equality; and the right to
health and an adequate standard of living. The first right is grounded
most firmly in the U.S. constitution, the second is reflected in both U.S.
constitutional and international jurisprudence and the third is found only
in the international instruments. Analyzing these specific rights, accordingly, should enable us to consider the interplay of the domestic and international standards along a continuum, providing some perspective on
the extent to which the hybrid formulation would both further and compromise the two conceptions of rights. Ideally, by addressing the needs
and concerns of recipient states, family planning assistance could generate international goodwill as well as furthering the specific rights addressed. By fostering mutual respect between nations, such aid could contribute to an international environment more conducive to the exercise of
all human rights.9 This kind of productive relationship may be particularly difficult to cultivate in this context because of the clash between
Western and Third World views as to the position of women in society.2

88. Art. 5(a), Women's Convention, supra note 35.
89. One possible response might be to decline to fund genetic screening for sex, except
where justified by a suspected sex-linked defect. In China, for example, a procedure was
developed for determining the sex of the fetus at seven weeks. The procedure was discontinued after twenty-nine of the first thirty women who chose to have abortions aborted female
fetuses. Hartmann, supra note 18, at 247. Similarly problematic, information about the fetus' sex could be withhel.
90. For discussions of addditional rights which would be advanced by revocation of the
MCP, see Coliver & Newman, supra note 36, at 82 (right to receive and impart abortion
information); id. at 124 (discrimination against children). See generally Eisler, supra note
46.
91. See Eisler, supra note 46.
92. Indeed, this may become an imbroglio because of Third World distrust of Western
motives. During the 1970's, the population policy of the U.S. was decried by many states in
the Third World as "genocide." Ironically, some of the same Third World countries subsequently adopted even more stringent methods of population control. Moreover, American
renunciation of its family planning policy, as set forth in the MCP, was for the most part
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As suggested below, the generally higher status of women in the West9"
may be attributed in part to the degree of reproductive choice which they
already enjoy.
This part is divided into two sections. The first considers civil and
political rights and the second focuses on economic and social rights."'
A.

Civil and Political Rights
1. Reproductive choice

The first civil right furthered by the hybrid formulation would be the
right to reproductive choice. While this right is firmly established in
American jurisprudence, its place in international law is more ambiguous.
The Civil Covenant provides that: "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home,"" and,
"[e]veryone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.""0 Furthermore, "[t]he right of men and women of
marriageable age to marry and to found a family shall be recognized."97
There is neither a right to abortion nor a prohibition against it under
international law.98 But at least in those states which recognize a woman's
right to choose whether or not to terminate a pregnancy, it should not be
abrogated solely because a state lacks the resources to implement it if
U.S. family planning assistance is available.
In considering how this right would be affected by the hybrid formulation, I will address two questions. First, what difference does it make
whether reproductive choice is considered a right or a policy? Second,
assuming it is a right, whose right is it?
a.

Reproductive choice -

right or policy?

It is far more advantageous for women seeking to exercise reproductive choice if such choice is protected as a right, especially a "fundamental" right under the U.S. constitution, rather than provided as a matter of
public policy. First, state curtailment of a fundamental right is rigorously
scrutinized. Under the hybrid proposal here, this would mean that the

opposed by Third World delegates at the Mexico City conference. See supra note 19.

93. See infra text accompanying notes 89-95. See generally WOMEN
1975-1985: THE WOMEN'S DECADE (L. Iglitzion & R. Ross, 2d ed. 1986).

IN THE WORLD

94. This reflects the respective concerns of the Civil and the Economic Covenants, although the division is not precise here and other international instruments will also be
discussed.
95. Art. 17.1, accord Art. 16, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III
1948).
96. Art. 17.2, Civil Convention, supra note 35.
97. Art. 23.2, Civil Convention, supra note 35.
98. Coliver & Newman, supra note 36, at 83. But see notes 44-48, supra (citing, inter
alia, American Convention on Human Rights, Art. IV., 1. which provides in pertinent part,
"Every person has the right to have his life respected. This shall be protected by law and, in
general, from the moment of conception.").
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U.S. would be foreclosed from independently imposing any restraints on
the right unless it demonstrated a compelling interest in doing so, and
was unable to further that interest by less restrictive means. Restraints
imposed under local law that did not satisfy this standard99 would adversely affect the program's evaluation leading to reduced funding, contingent funding or actual termination.
U.S. supported family planning programs would accordingly stress
that enhancement of the recipient's own decision-making capacity is the
first priority of family planning efforts. This requires that the couple be
fully informed as to the options available and their possible consequences. The state's interest in population control is "trumped" by the
individual's right' 00 and cannot justify its abrogation. Under a rights analysis, accordingly, population control policies that infringe on the individual's right to reproductive choice could lead to the loss of U.S. support for
programs implementing such policies. This does not mean that local programs incorporating population goals would necessarily run afoul of the
U.S. constitution. But unless public welfare concerns were "compelling,"
and could not be advanced by any "less restrictive means," U.S. funding
could be withdrawn. 1° 1
In addition to program evaluation, recognition of reproductive choice
as a right makes it more secure. If abortion is merely considered a policy
preference, for example, women's access to abortion is likely to be contingent upon the changing priorities of external, usually male, decision-makers. Moreover, any derogation of reproductive choice legitimizes encroachment of the right. Abortion-based restrictions are likely to undermine a
far broader range of family planning programs, just as the Helms Amendment, although limited in terms of its initial impact, provided a basis for
the MCP's later sweeping attack against family planning. The Helms
Amendment should be repealed more because of its role in the erosion of
reproductive choice than because of its direct, relatively insignificant,
consequences. As Hartmann has observed, banning abortion is merely the
first step in the political agenda of the anti-family planning forces. 2
b.

Whose right is it?

Where the couple disagrees on reproductive choice, the final decision

99. See generally, And the Poor Get Sterilized, THE NATION, June 30, 1984, at 798-99;
Bishop, Officials Debate Asylum for Chinese Fleeing Abortion Policy, N.Y. Times, Apr. 3,
1989, at A13, col.1.
100. See generally R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978).
101. But cf. Webster, 106 L.Ed. 2d, at 437 (declining to "unnecessarily attempt[] to
elaborate the abstract differences between a fundamental right to abortion . . . a 'limited
fundamental constitutional right' . . . or a liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clause, which we believe it to be.") If abortion were held to involve merely a liberty interest,
the 'strict scrutiny test' set forth in the text would not apply.
102. See B. HARTMANN, supra note 18, at 244, 293. See generally Cook & Maine,
Spousal Veto Over Family Planning Services, 77 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, 339 (1987).

1989

HUMAN RIGHTS AND FAMILY PLANNING

must be the woman's since she is the one who will be pregnant and give
birth.'0 3 As Hartmann has noted, however, this is rarely feasible in the
Third World. The husband customarily controls the family's money and
land, expects sons from his wife, and is likely to regard with hostility any
innovation which reduces her dependence on him, particularly if it increases her sexual freedom - and his anxiety about her fidelity."0 4 Planning services that exclude the husband in order to encourage the wife's
independence simply leave the wife in the untenable position of convincing a suspicious husband of the benefits of birth control. Without support, from the program or her community, her efforts are likely to be
futile and she may even risk physical abuse.
Some family planning services have attempted to involve the husband in the process and to educate him as to the benefits of contraception, for the family as well as the wife. 10 5 Although reproductive choice is
the woman's right in theory, in practice she may not be able to exercise it
without the consent and cooperation of her spouse. There is no technical
violation of a rights' approach, however, as long as there is no legal impediment to the woman's exercise of the right. While it is unlikely that
the husband's domination will be significantly undermined merely by explaining to the couple that the right is generally the woman's, such explanations may contribute to a changing perception of women's roles. Recognizing that the right is ultimately the woman's has other practical
consequences; among them that no family planning program could require her to obtain spousal consent for contraception, including abortion,
even if social pressure compels her to do so.
2.

Reproductive choice as a prerequisite for equality and autonomy

It has been suggested that control over the body should be considered the first form of autonomy.1 0 6 Feminists have argued, moreover, that
in the reproductive context it is the necessary condition of all later forms.
As Elizabeth Moen notes, "[t]he control of fertility by women as individuals is necessary for full and equal opportunity in society."'10 7 The critical

103. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976) ("Clearly since the
State cannot regulate or proscribe abortion during the first stage . . . the State cannot delegate authority to any particular person, even the spouse, to prevent abortion during that
same period."). Dixon-Mueller, U.S. InternationalPopulation Policy and 'The Woman
Question,' 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 143, 167 (1987); see generally Symposium: Women
and InternationalHuman Rights, 3 HUM. RTS. Q. 1 (1981); Higgins, Conceptual Thinking
About the Individual in International Law, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 11 (1978). But cf.
Where Abortion Laws Stand Now, State by State, supra note 69 (Montana, Utah and Florida have laws requiring that husbands be notified).
104. See B. HARTMANN, supra note 18, at 48.
105. See, e.g., 1987 ANNUAL REPORT: IPPF/WHR 27-28 (describing contraception education program for Mexican men in "security institutions").
106. Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233 (1977).
107. Moen, Women's Rights and Reproductive Freedom, 3 HuM. RTS. Q. 53, 59 (1981);
accord L. GORDON, WOMAN'S BODY, WOMAN'S RIGHT: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL IN
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question here is whether reproductive choice empowers women where political, economic and social constraints not only remain in place, but are
so pervasive as to call into question even the possibility of "choice."' 0 s
Even under such circumstances, a modicum of reproductive choice
offers women the possibility of incremental change in their lives. Control
over reproductive capacity is essential, if not sufficient, not only for
equality but for any kind of transformation in women's role in the family
and society in the Third World.'0 9 The experience of controlling her own
fertility is directly and concretely empowering. Only if she can be free of
pregnancy, nursing, and infant care long enough to regain her strength
and consider her own needs, can a woman begin to question the political
and social forces that circumscribe her life."
B.

Social and Economic Rights
1.

Health

The Economic Covenant assures the right to health: "The States parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental
health." ' The Women's Convention is more specific:
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of health care in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, access to health care
services, including those related to family planning

. .

. "States Par-

ties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination
against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations
and in particular shall ensure, on a basis of equality of men and
women... (e) The same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the

number and spacing of their children and to have access to the information, education and means to enable them to exercise these
rights.""'
The availability of contraception can improve health in three impor-

394 (1976).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 92-93, 104.

AMERICA

109. "The question of reproductive choice ultimately goes far beyond the bounds of
family planning programs, involving women's role in the family and society at large. Control
over reproduction is predicated on women having greater control over their economic and
social lives and sharing power equally with men." B. HARTMANN, supra note 18, at 34.
110. Indeed, it has been suggested that this is precisely why reproductive choice has
been so adamantly opposed by those embracing and incorporating patriarchal norms, including the Catholic Church. See generally Rifkin, Toward a Theory of Law
and Patriarchy,3 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 83 (1980). See also Benshoof, supra note 20.
111. Art. 12.1, Economic Convention, supra note 35.
112. Art. 16.1; accord Universal Declaration,Art. 19. See Fraser, Women and International Law, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 171, 174 (1988) (noting that more reservations to the
Convention have been made on Art. 16 than on any other article and attributing this to
conflict between "strong cultural norms" and the article's mandate). See generally Byrnes,
supra note 35, at 51-56 (discussing problem of reservations to the Women's Convention).
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tant ways. First, it can decrease maternal mortality rates,' 3 because it
permits women to regain strength between pregnancies,"" to limit
pregnancies 1 '5 and to avoid particularly dangerous pregnancies." 6 Second,
it benefits infants, who have higher birth weights and receive better care
when there is longer spacing between children. As Dixon-Mueller has
pointed out, mortality rates for children between one and two years old
are as much as four times higher when there is another birth within eighteen months. 1 7 Third, contraception prevents death from illegal abortions. Illegal abortions in the Third World represent a leading cause of
death among women of childbearing age,"18 demonstrating the urgent
need for the repeal of the Helms Amendment and the MCP in order to
safeguard women's right to health." 9
The effect of family planning programs on health has not all been
positive, however."' Even where contraception is freely chosen, it may
have adverse effects on health. First, as our own experience has shown,
IUDs and birth control pills are not without significant health risks. Absent adequate education and support personnel, these risks are likely to
be compounded by ignorance as to proper use. Additional risks, including
abrupt termination of supplies, instruction, and follow-up care, may result from reliance on funding sources subject to political whim. As discussed above, family planning services require an ongoing commitment.
These ill-effects are not inevitable results of family planning. Rather,
they are problems resulting from poor administration or the inappropriate priorities of such programs. Health problems are especially prevalent
in programs giving demographic goals precedence over individual rights,
for example. Thus, the "failures" of family planning, from a health perspective, strengthen arguments for both an adequate level of funding and
the need for an emphasis on the human rights consequences of the ser-

113. Mortality rates in excess of 500 per 100,000 live births are common in the Third
World, compared to five to 30 per 100,000 in the west. B. HARTMANN, supra note 18, at 46;
see also Dixon-Mueller, supra note 103, at 115. See generally Cook, Reducing Maternal
Mortality: A Priorityfor Human Rights Law, in LEGAL ISSUES IN HUMAN REPRODUCTION 185
(1989).
114. See Cook & Dickens, International Developments in Abortion Laws: 1977-78,
AMER. J. PUB. HEALTH 1305, 1309 (1988) (noting that "epidemiological evidence shows that
sound child spacing assisted by availability of abortion contributed positively to reduction
of maternal . . . mortality.").
115. Dixon-Mueller, supra note 103, at 109.
116. Id. at 108.
117. Id. at 112-13. See also Cook & Dickens, supra note 114, at 1309.
118. Rosenfeld, Abortion: The Neglected Problem, 15 PEOPLE 4 (1988) (an estimated
30-40% of 500,000 pregnancy related deaths (150,000-200,000) are attributable to complications of illegal abortions; citing survey of 60 developing countries in late 1970's, estimating
70,000-100,000 maternal deaths annually from complications of abortion).
119. As many commentators have noted, women have abortions whether or not they are
legal. The difference is in the cost and the quality of care they receive. See, e.g., R. REPETTO,
supra note 5, at 50; B. HARTMANN, supra note 18, at 47; Rosenfeld, supra note 118.
120. For a detailed description of the ill-effects of contraception, and their abuses by
population planners in the Third World, see B. HARTMANN, supra note 18, at 176-207.
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vices provided.
2.

Adequate Standard of Living

In addition to health factors, the Economic Covenant assures a right
to an adequate standard of living: "The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living
for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing
.... ,,121
The Economic Covenant further recognizes "the fundamental
'
right of everyone to be free from hunger."122
While these provisions have
been used to support arguments for the redistribution of resources,12 it is
equally clear that under the Economic Covenant the economic consequences of a growing population1 24 must be taken into account.'2 5
As Camp has pointed out, the harm to family planning caused by the
MCP was not so much loss of support, but the loss of support by specific
countries that had spiraling populations. By rescinding those policies, accordingly, the U.S. would be able to reestablish family planning efforts in
countries such as India, which "adds more people to the world population
than any other country . . . more than all of sub-Saharan Africa
6
12

combined."'

While national fertility levels reflect aggregate decision-making about
population, individual reproductive choice has been shown to be a significant factor. Decisions about reproduction are a function of more than the
availability of contraception or abortion, of course,' 2 7 but the unavailability of birth control is often pre-emptive. Control over reproduction is one
of the major determinants of the individual family's standard of living.
Such control, accordingly, is necessary if the family is to provide a "life
with dignity" for its members. 2
CONCLUSION

By renouncing the MCP and repealing the Helms amendment, and

121. Art. 11.1, Economic Convention, supra note 35.
122. Art. 11.2, Economic Convention, supra note 35.
123. See generally Barry, Humanity and Justice in Global Perspective, in ETHICS, EcONOMICS AND THE LAW: NoMos XXIV (J. Chapman & J. Pennock eds. 1982).
124. While global population is steadily growing, the rate of population growth is no
longer increasing. Repetto, Population,Resource Pressures and Poverty, 131, 133, in THE
GLOBAL POSSIBLE: RESOURCES, DEVELOPMENT AND THE NEW CENTURY (R. Repetto ed. 1985).
This has not reassured proponents of the "population explosion" view. See, e.g., Gore, An
Ecological Kristallnacht. Listen, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1989, Op-Ed, § 4, at E27, col.1.
125. For an analysis of the relation between redistribution of resources and population
control, see Ratcliffe, supra note 4.
126. Camp, supra note 16, at 45.
127. See Ratcliffe, supra note 4, at 279.

128. Dominguez, Assessing Human Rights Conditions, in

ENFORCING GLOBAL HUMAN

(1979); see generally Nielsen, On the Need to Politicize PoliticalMorality: World
Hunger and Moral Obligation, in ETHICS, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: NoMos XXIV (J. Chapman & J. Pennock eds. 1982).
RIGHTS
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applying constitutional and internationally recognized human rights standards to its international family planning policy, the U.S. could substantially further international human rights. It would at least increase the
possibility of reproductive choice for women currently without options.
While such choice cannot assure equality, it is a prerequisite. Thus, revision of our family planning policy would potentially empower women. It
would promote the right to health recognized under the Economic Covenant, especially, but not exclusively, for women and children. It would
enable millions to take a critical first step toward an "adequate standard
of living." Finally, by demonstrating respect for the concerns and priorities of the rest of the world, particularly Third World women, adoption of
the family planning policy considered above would represent a fundamental and long overdue shift in the U.S. approach to international human
rights.

82

DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 18:1

This is the inaugural issue for a new section in the Denver Journal of
InternationalLaw & Policy. The International Capital Markets Section
will be a part of each issue of the Journal and will focus on international
capital markets and international securities issues. The Journal is
honored that Harold S. Bloomenthal will be advising the Section's Executive Committee.

INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL
MARKETS SECTION

The SEC And Internationalization Of
Capital Markets: Herein Of Regulation S
And Rule 144A
HAROLD

§1

S.

BLOOMENTHAL*

REGULATION S AND RELATED INITIATIVES

The Securities and Exchange Commission has made "achieving a
truly global market system" a top priority.1 The Commission's focus on
international securities markets led it to revisit a number of its own practices which may have impeded the efficiency of those markets.2 Commission policy in this area for over two decades was largely determined by
mid-level staff through the no action letter process. These policies failed
to take into account the increasing institutionalization of markets in general and international capital markets in particular. The overall effect of
such policies was to make it difficult and costly for U.S. institutional investors to purchase foreign securities. The extraterritorial application of
* Of Counsel, Holme, Roberts & Owen. B.S., Marshall University; J.D., Duke Law
School; J.S.D., Yale Law School. This atricle will appear as part of EMERGING TRENDS IN
SECURITIES LAW (1990 ed.)(Clark Boardman Co., Ltd.).
1. See press release relating to SEC, "Policy Statement on Regulation of International
Securities Markets" (November 14, 1988 Press Release).
2. The relevant releases are as follows: Securities Act Release No. 6838 [1989 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,426 (July 11,1989) reproposing Regulation S (hereinafter the "Reproposing Release"); Securities Act Release No. 6779 [1987-1988 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,242 (June 10, 1988), proposing Regulation S (hereinafter the "Proposing Release"); Securities Act Release No. 6839 [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,427 (July 11, 1989), reproposing Rule 144A (hereinafter the "Rule
144A Reproposing Release"); Securities Act Release No. 6806 [1988-89 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. Law Rep. (CCH) 84,335 (Oct. 25, 1988), proposing Rule 144A (hereinafter the
"Rule 144A Proposing Release"); Securities Exchange Act Release No. 27017 [1989 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,428 (July 11, 1989), adopting Rule 15a-6 relating to the
registration of foreign securities dealers (hereinafter the "Rule 15a-6 Release"); Securities
Act Release No. 6841 [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,432 (July 24,
1989), relating to multi-jurisdictional disclosure (hereinafter the "Multi-Jurisdictional Dis-

closure Release").
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the registration provisions of the Securities Act kept U.S. investors from
purchasing securities of foreign issuers distributed outside of the United
States. Foreign issuers for the most part were unwilling to offer their securities in the United States because of unwillingness (or inability) to
comply with SEC registration requirements and accounting principles
and fear of the potential "in terrorem" liabilities under Section 11 of the
Securities Act for false or misleading statements in a registration statement. U.S. institutional investors, increasingly interested in the global diversification of their portfolios, were forced to buy foreign securities, if at
all, in the secondary markets, often at premium prices above the original
offering price. The broker-dealer registration provisions under the Exchange Act 3 also made it difficult for foreign securities firms to transact
business in the secondary markets with prospective U.S. institutional
investors.
The new focus of an energized staff has resulted in a plethora of proposals and reproposals, some aspects of which are controversial and most
of which have not yet been adopted. The composition of the Commission
is in transition, and although the new Commission is likely to favor the
liberalization represented by the proposals, there may be additional delays and some changes as the new Commissioners familiarize themselves
with the proposals and the new Chairman assumes a leadership role. The
proposals include the following:
1. The centerpiece is proposed Regulation S regulating offshore distributions by U.S. and foreign issuers. Regulation S removes the threat of
the long reach of the Securities Act registration provisions from most offshore distributions of straight debt securities by foreign issuers and from
some offshore distributions of equity securities of foreign issuers, permitting U.S. investors to purchase them provided the transaction takes place
offshore and there is no directed selling effort in the United States.4 Regulation S also includes safe harbors for offshore distributions by U.S. issuers which liberalize the restrictions that the issuer was obligated to
adopt under the no-action letter policies to prevent flowback of the securities to the United States. Regulation S also allows U.S. institutions to
invest in any offshore offering by forming a non-U.S. subsidiary based
offshore for the specific purpose of purchasing such securities" or by giving a foreign investment adviser discretion to purchase such securities for
its account.'
2. Proposed Rule 144A is intended to provide an efficient, liquid market among large (portfolios with a cost basis of excess of $100 million)
institutional investors for securities issued in exempt offerings (including
Regulation S offshore distributions for this purpose as an exempt offer-

3.
4.
5.
6.

Securities
See §6[c]
See infra
See infra

Exchange Act, §15(a).
infra.
note 77.
note 85.
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ing). Rule 144A has broad implications for exempt offerings by U.S. issuers in the United States, but will also operate in tandem with Regulation
S in a number of important respects. The scenarios that will develop remain to be played out, but the opportunities are numerous including a
private tranche of a Regulation S offering being made concurrently in the
U.S. to qualified institutional investors. Although the private tranche will
have to find an appropriate exemption from Section 5, the sale of securities in a closed system open only to Rule 144A purchasers makes it likely
that such an exemption will be available. Rule 144A also enhances the
liquidity for privately placed securities (and, hence, the attractiveness of
the offering) and Rule 906 of Regulation S also provides an exit from the
private market assuming that the securities are traded in an organized
foreign securities market.' Rule 144A also provides liquidity (and an opportunity for qualified institutional investors to purchase) securities distributed offshore pursuant to Regulation S as the foreign purchaser could
resell such securities during the Regulation S restricted period to a qualified institutional investor in reliance on Rule 144A. The Commission concurrently proposed to amend Rule 144(d)(1) so as to permit successive
purchasers in a series of private transactions to tack the holding period of
their predecessors back to the first purchase from the issuer (or an affiliate of the issuer).
The National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) submitted a
proposal to the Commission under which it would operate PORTAL, a
screen based market limited to qualified institutional investors as defined
by Rule 144A for both initial private placements and subsequent trading
among qualified institutional investors.' The existence of such a market
could increase significantly the liquidity of securities traded and may reduce or eliminate discounts incurred in the secondary market for restricted securities. PORTAL could also serve as a policing device to assure compliance with Rule 144A and to police the exit of the security
from that market in compliance with applicable law. The promise of
PORTAL is a more efficient and liquid secondary market in privately
placed securities.' The American Stock Exchange is considering a similar
closed market, SITUS, which would be limited to securities of foreign is-

7. See §7[b] infra.
8. The NASD submitted a revised proposal to the Commission on November 3, 1989 for
approval of PORTAL, an acronym for Private Offerings, Resales and Trading through Automated Linkage. The proposal, if approved, will become Schedule I to the NASD By-Laws.
See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 27470, 54 Fed. Reg. 49164 (Nov. 29, 1989).
9. The NASD expects to have the system up and operating shortly after the adoption
of Rule 144A and its proposal is subject to the adoption of Rule 144A. The system can be
accessed only by qualified institutional investors (including securities dealers that qualify)
and by securities dealers acting as brokers that meet minimum capital requirements established by the NASD and register as participants with the NASD. Access to the primary
market will be by a personal computer and a modem; eventually, continuous access to the
secondary market will be provided for participants in the system. See Wall Street Letter,
Nov. 13, 1989, at 6 and Sept. 11, 1989, at 4. PORTAL is discussed further at §8[g].
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suers.'0 A screen based market for privately placed securities could revolutionize the manner and extent to which such securities are traded and
seems essential if Rule 144A is to live up to its promise.
3. The Commission proposed and adopted Rule 15a-6 providing a
very limited exemption from the broker-dealer registration provisions for
foreign broker-dealers transacting business with U.S. institutional investors. The Rule attempts to establish a territorial principle for the regulation of broker-dealers-broker-dealers confining their securities business
offshore do not have to register with the SEC, whereas those conducting
business in the United States do.11 If, however, a foreign dealer chooses to
conduct its U.S. business through a registered U.S. affiliate, as many of
them do, such registration does not extend to the activities of personnel
of their parent located outside of the United States. The parent would
have to register with the Commission in order to conduct business directly in the United States.1 2 In addition, a broker-dealer operating offshore, but soliciting transactions from U.S. investors in the United States
by phone or otherwise is subject to the broker-dealer registration provisions. Rule 15a-6 is a very limited conditional exemption from this general scheme. A foreign broker-dealer may furnish research reports to major U.S. institutional investors under limited and restricted
circumstances. The Rule also permits the direct solicitation of major and
other institutional investors provided the transaction is effected through
a registered U.S. dealer. 3 Such transactions, however, are subject to a
number of restrictions which include, for institutional investors that are
not in the major category, the participation of an associated person of a
U.S. registered dealer in all oral conversations with the institutional investor."' A major institutional investor is one that has total assets of $100
million or more. 6 The Rule also permits a foreign broker-dealer to effect
transactions with and solicit a registered broker or dealer, whether such
registered broker-dealer is acting as principal or as agent, or a bank acting as a broker-dealer." The restrictions and conditions of Rule 15a-6 are
so numerous and onerous it is unlikely that they will dramatically affect
the manner in which foreign broker-dealers sell securities to U.S. inves-

10. See Reproposing Release, supra note 2, at 80, 229 n. 42.
11. See Rule 15a-6 Release, supra note 2, at 80,237.
12. Id. As of 1987, there were 179 registered broker-dealers which were affiliated with
foreign broker-dealers or foreign banks. Id. at 80,233. Foreign broker-dealers avoid registering the parent, as in that event the parent would have to become a member of the National
Association of Securities Dealers and its personnel would have to meet the various requirements of the NASD for principals and registered representatives. The Commission, however,
raises no objection to personnel who are subject to the supervision of the registered U.S.
affiliate and have met the NASD (and/or other SRO) requirements from soliciting U.S.
transactions while based at the office of the parent if the transactions are executed by the
registered affiliate. Id. at 80,238.
13. Rule 15a-6(a)(2)-(4).
14. Rule 15a-6(a)(3)(iii)(B).
15. Rule 15a-6(4)
16. Rule 15a-6(a)(4).
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tors or the manner in which U.S. institutional investors access the market
for foreign securities. The Commission also issued a concept release which
envisions the ultimate acceptance of home country regulation of brokerdealers based on common standards which would permit securities dealers to operate cross-borders subject primarily to regulation of the home
state. 17 Such a proposal would require legislation and at the moment is
only a concept.
4. The Commission has also proposed rules and forms relating to offerings by certain Canadian issuers in the United States reflecting an understanding with the Ontario and Quebec securities commissioners who
have proposed counterpart procedures for U.S. issuers in their respective
provinces. The resulting regimen could become the prototype for multinational offerings involving other jurisdictions with advanced disclosure
systems. The civil liability provisions of the U.S. securities laws would
remain applicable. The Commission's proposed rules and forms include
the following:"
(a) A Form F-9 to be used by substantial Canadian issuers for offerings of investment grade non-convertible debt securities or non-convertible preferred stock. A substantial issuer eligible to use this form must
have a total common stock market capitalization of at least (CN) $180
million and a public float of (CN) $75 million. The issuer would prepare
disclosure documents in accordance with Canadian requirements and the
review of those documents would be by Canadian authorities which would
determine when the registration statement would become effective. A
wraparound of the Canadian prospectus together with exhibits and copies
of documents incorporated by reference would be filed as the Form F-9,
and which would be given a "no review" status in all but exceptional situations. A Form F-X would also be filed which would include a consent to
service of process, appointment of a U.S. person as agent for process, a
consent to service of an administrative subpoena, and an undertaking to
assist the SEC with administrative investigations. The disclosure documents used in the United States would be the Canadian disclosure documents which, however, would have to include statements warning that the
investment could have tax consequences in the issuer's jurisdiction, that
difficulties may be encountered in pursuing remedies for securities law
violations against persons and assets located outside the United States,
and that the financial statements were prepared in accordance with Canadian accounting standards.
(b) Form F-10 would be available for offerings by substantial issuers
of securities other than investment grade debt or preferred stock. A substantial issuer eligible to use this form, however, must have a common
stock market capitalization of at least (CN) $360 million and a public

17. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 27,018 [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 84,429 (July 11, 1989).
18. See Multi-Jurisdictional Disclosure Release, supra note 2.
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float of (CN) $75 million. The registration and disclosure procedures
would be the same as in a Form F-9 offering except there would have to
be a reconciliation of financial statements to U.S. GAAP which requires,
among other things, the segmental information and supplemental oil and
gas data specified by Regulation S-X.
(c) Form F-7 would be available for rights offerings by certain Canadian issuers provided U.S. residents held of record less than twenty percent of the class of stock to which the offering pertained. To be eligible to
use Form F-7, the Canadian issuer must have had a class of securities
listed on the Toronto or Montreal Stock Exchange for the immediately
preceding thirty-six months. The procedures would be substantially the
same as those outlined in connection with Form F-9.
(d) Form F-8 would be used to register exchange offers by a Canadian issuer for a Canadian target if less than twenty percent of the securities of the target class are held of record by residents of the United
States. To be eligible to use Form F-8, the Canadian issuer would have to
have a common stock market capitalization of not less than (CN) $75
million and have had a class of securities listed on the Toronto or the
Montreal Stock Exchange for the immediately preceding thirty-six
months. The Canadian issuer would file the offering materials required
under Canadian law with the SEC on Form F-8 accompanied by the
Form F-X and the registration statement would become effective on filing
with the Commission. Compliance with the tender offer regulations applicable in Canada would be deemed compliance with the Williams Act.
(e) The proposed regimen would also extend to tender offers for Canadian issuers which are Canadian reporting companies if less than
twenty percent of the target's securities for which the bid is made are
held of record by U.S. residents. In the case of a cash tender offer, the
appropriate Canadian offering materials would be filed with the SEC
under wraparound Schedules 14D1-F (for third party tender offers);
Schedule 13E-4F (for issuer tender offers), and Schedule 14D9-F (for the
target's response). Compliance with applicable Canadian requirements
would be deemed compliance with the Williams Act provided the foregoing forms are filed with the SEC to the extent applicable and provided
the tender offer is extended to all holders of the class of securities in the
United States.
Regulation S and Rule 144A together promise to significantly change
and liberalize offshore distributions and the access of U.S. institutional
investors to foreign securities. Proposed Regulation S suffers from a number of ambiguities, necessitating a careful scrutiny of the Proposing and
Reproposing Releases in an effort to clarify the nuances. Specifically,
Regulation S does not say, except by implication, that a foreign purchaser
who acquires the security sold in reliance on Regulation S can, after the
end of the restricted period, sell the security to a U.S. person or in the
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U.S. 9 The distinction between debt and equity securities is important in
a number of contexts under Regulation S, but the Regulation does not
make it clear whether convertible debentures are debt or equity securities, or both.20 Regulation S also fails to provide that debt securities of a
subsidiary guaranteed by a reporting company are to be treated as securities issued by a reporting company. The result will be to discourage the
use of subsidiaries for offshore financing. Proposed Rule 144A and proposed amendments to Rule 144(d)(1) impose discriminatory non-national
treatment in certain respects with respect to securities of non-reporting
foreign issuers. 1 Clarification is needed in other areas as well.
The foregoing comments should not detract from the major contribution the adoption of Regulation S and Rule 144A will make to international capital markets. There undoubtedly will be some modifications in
Regulation S and Rule 144A as adopted, reflecting the comments of the
commenters and the views of the new Commissioners. Hopefully, not too
much additional time will be spent attempting to fine tune the proposed
rules in an effort to get it right the first time. Experience under the Regulation and Rule will provide ample opportunity for problems to surface
which can be handled by amendments and/or interpretative releases,
much as in the case of Rule 144. The complexity of the area and transactions that will be governed by Regulation S and Rule 144A is such that it
is likely that the interpretative function will be an ongoing one for several
years as the market reacts with different types of securities and marketing mechanisms.
The impetus for Regulation S and Rule 144A may have been to improve the access of institutional investors to securities distributed offshore, but from the standpoint of a securities practitioner it has tremendous importance for issuers distributing securities outside of the United
States. The primary focus of this article is the application of the U.S.
securities laws to offshore distributions. A U.S. issuer distributing securities offshore must deal with securities regulation in the countries in which
it proposes to make the distribution; foreign securities regulation is discussed briefly, primarily to assure that it is not overlooked. The approach
of this Article beyond that is two-fold: First, it takes a linear and long
look in Part I at the regulatory scheme embraced in Regulation S and
Rule 144A, viewing it in broad outline. Secondly, in Part II, it takes a
cross-section look viewing separately the application of that scheme to
discrete offshore distributions, and hybrid offshore-onshore distributions.
§2

FOREIGN SECURITIES REGULATION

Securities regulation in some form now exists in many countries with

19. See §7[c] infra.
20. See §9 intra.
21. See §8[dI-[e] infra.
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free-market economies. In France,2 2 Japan,2" Italy,"' Australia,25 and
Mexico2" there are national commissions or bureaus which to a degree are
a counterpart of the SEC. In Canada, 7 there are provincial commissioners who function very much like state blue-sky commissioners in the
United States. Australia created a National Companies and Securities
Commission, but to avoid constitutional questions the federal government
adopted three principal laws relating to securities and corporations and
each of the Australian states then adopted laws identical to the federal
laws, administered in conjunction with the federal regulation.2" In 1989,
Australia adopted a Commonwealth Corporations Act creating the Australian Securities Commission which supplants the federal-state coordinated system of regulation with a federal system.2 9 In the United Kingdom, the Financial Services Act of 1986 established a unique blend of
securities regulation emphasizing the role of the Self-Regulatory Organizations, but supervised and monitored by the Securities and Investment
Board, which is a government agency in all but name and legal formalities." Hong Kong has a Securities Ordinance which establishes a Securities Commission, provides for a Securities Commissioner and an extensive
system of securities regulation 3 which is being replaced by a new scheme
because of its inability to cope with the October 1987 stock market col33
the Netherlands, 34
lapse.2 In other countries, including Germany,
Belgium,3 5 and Luxembourg,36 the stock exchanges are the principal

22. See G. Miller, Securities Regulation in France,in INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS
(H. Bloomenthal ed.) (hereinafter "ICMSR"), at ch. 7.
23. See M. Tatsuta, Securities Regulation in Japan, in ICMSR, at ch. 11.
24. See ICMSR, at 1-60.
25. See J.P. Hambrook, Securities Regulation in Australia, in ICMSR, at ch. 10.
26. See ICMSR, at 1-67.
27. See J. Cowan, Securities Regulation in Canada, in ICMSR, at ch. 4.
28. See Hambrook, supra note 4, at §10.01.
29. See 2 International Securities Regulation Rep. (BNA), at 2-3 (Nov. 8, 1989). The
Act is being challenged on constitutional grounds and the issue is expected to be resolved by
the High Court during early 1990. Id.
30. See H. Bloomenthal, United Kingdom-FinancialServices Act, in ICMSR, at ch.
6A.
31. See T. Rogers, Securities Regulation in Hong Kong, in ICMSR, at ch. 12.
32. See ICMSR, at 1-64.
33. See E. Rdhm, Securities Regulation in Germany, in ICMSR, at ch. 8C.
34. See J. Schaafsma, Securities Regulation in the Netherlands, in ICMSR, at ch. 8. In
February of 1989, the Securities Board of the Netherlands, a self-regulatory organization
modeled loosely after the scheme of regulation in effect in the United Kingdom, assumed
responsibility for supervising the stock exchanges, the over-the-counter market, and Dutch
laws impacting securities generally. The board has the power to advise, to adopt binding
interpretations and to persuade, but not the power to impose sanctions. See Raun, Start By
Dutch Watchdog, Fin. Times, February 1, 1989, at 33.
35. See E. Wymeersch, Securities Regulation in Belgium, in ICMSR, at ch. 8A. In
Belgium, an issuer publicly offering securities has to file a prospectus with the Banking
Commission. Id. at §8A.05.
36. See E. Wymeersch, Securities Regulation in Luxembourg, in ICMSR, at ch. 8B. In
Luxembourg, an issuer must register securities with the Institute Monetaire before securiAND SECURITIES REGULATION
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source of securities regulation, and in all countries with stock exchanges,
such exchanges play a role as a self-regulatory agency which often extends beyond that played by American stock exchanges.
To the extent securities regulation exist outside the United States,
emphasis is placed on disclosure in connection with public offerings, stock
exchange listings and annual and semi-annual reports to shareholders.3 '
There is also a significant consensus as to the need for regulation of investment companies,38 securities dealers,39 insider trading,' and, to a
lesser degree, takeovers." There is little regulation of proxy solicitation
outside the United States and Canada.2 There is obviously considerable
variation in the content of regulation and the means of enforcement with
only the United States placing considerable reliance on private remedies,
although the United Kingdom, in particular, has in place civil remedies
that might become the basis for effective enforcement through private actions.43 In the disclosure area, the European Economic Community has

ties can be offered publicly. Id.
37. See ICMSR, at §1.08[2]-[3]. In the European Community, the directives relating to
prospectus disclosure requirer ents (which are presently confined to securities to be listed
upon completion of a public ul'ering and to listing applications) will become all pervasive
under a directive relating to the distribution of a prospectus when transferable securities are
offered to the public. Directive No. 89/298, O.J. 1989 L124/8; Common Mkt Rep. (CCH)
1751. Member states must adopt conforming legislation by April 17, 1991.
38. See ICMSR at §1.09.
39. Id. at §1.04. The European Community is moving toward a single financial services
market by the end of 1992 based on the principle that an entity authorized to conduct
various aspects of the investment business in its home state can operate in any member
state. The basis for this scheme of regulation can be found in the proposed Second Banking
Coordination Directive, the proposed Investment Services Directive, and other related directives. See generally Buchan, EC Drafts Free Market Securities Directive, Fin. Times, Dec.

15, 1988. The Second Banking Directive proposed by the Commission in December of 1988
(O.J. 1988 C84/1; Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 95,028) was revised by the Commission in
April of 1989 (Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 195,113) and must be approved by the Council
and EC Parliament. The investment services proposal ((COM(88) 778); Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 95,028) also requires the approval of the Council and Parliament.
40. See ICMSR, at §1.08[5].
41. Id. at §1.0816]. Such regulation will become pervasive if the Thirteenth Company
Law Directive on Take-over and Other General Bids becomes effective. The Directive was
approved by the Commission (O.J. 1989 C64/8; Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 60,200) but
must complete the EC's legislative process.
42. Id. at §1.08[7].
43. The Financial Services Act ("FSA") provides that a purchaser of a security can
bring an action based on a false or misleading statement in a prospectus or listing particulars. FSA §§150, 166. The FSA also provides that any person injured as the result of a
violation by a member of any rule of a self-regulatory organization can bring a private action
against such member. FSA §62(2). The lack of a class action counterpart in the U.K. and
other countries probably plays a role in the reluctance of private parties to initiate litigation. The U.K. courts have been innovative in allowing master pleadings to facilitate actions
by multiple plaintiffs with similar claims, selecting lead cases to resolve issues common to
such claims, and providing for sharing of costs among multiple plaintiffs pending resolution
of the case and determination of who is to bear the costs. See Davies v. Eli Lilly & Co., 131
Sol. J. 807 (Q.B. 1987), 3 All E.R. 94 (C.A. 1987), 1 W.L.R. 1136 (1987).
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taken a number of steps and is considering others to establish minimum
and relatively uniform standards among the twelve nations that are members of the Community."
§3

OFFSHORE DISTRIBUTIONS AND RELEASE

4708

U.S. issuers raise substantial amounts of capital in the Eurocurrency
markets. 4 5 These issues are typically debt issues (occasionally convertible
debt) by well established comoanies undertaking financing through a subsidiary. The offerings are generally listed on an exchange (usually Luxembourg or London) which necessitates compliance with the appropriate
listing requirements, but otherwise are not regulated based on the widely
accepted "fiction" that they are exempt private placements."6 The offerings are typically syndicated, often with the international subsidiary of a
U.S. investment banking firm as the lead underwriter. A U.S.-type prospectus is typically used, although the securities are generally not registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Significant amounts
of monies have been raised outside the U.S. by less established issuers
generally in private placements, but in some instances through public offerings, particularly in the United Kingdom since the establishment of
the Unlisted Securities Market under the auspices of the International
47
(London) Stock Exchange.
The Securities and Exchange Commission adopted Release 4708 in
1964 to facilitate distributions made outside the United States by U.S.
issuers."8 The Commission in Release 4708 announced that it would take
no action for failure to register under the Securities Act securities offered
outside the United States exclusively to foreign nationals so long as "the
distribution is to be effected in a manner which will result in the securities coming to rest abroad."49 For over twenty-five years, distributions
were made outside the United States in reliance on Release No. 4708.
Various techniques were employed to provide assurance that the securities were sold only to non-nationals of the United States and were not
redistributed in the United States. The principal arrangement used in
connection with the sale of Eurobonds was to lock them up for 90 days by
agreements among the underwriters and dealers not to offer or sell the
securities to U.S. nationals; the issuance of a global certificate for the en-

44. See ICMSR, at §1.01[2], §1.0813], §1.09[2].
45. During 1988, Eurobond issues aggregated $180.9 billion of which $72.1 billion was
denominated in dollars. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (int. ed.), Feb., 1989, at 125-30. These were
not all by U.S. issuers, although a significant part represented offerings by U.S. issuers. See
ICMSR, at §1.02[3].
46. On Eurobond issues generally, see A. Pergam, EurocurrencyFinancing, in ICMSR,
at ch. 9.
47. Fourteen U.S. issuers went public on the Unlisted Securities Market in 1986. See
Low Costs Attract, Fin. Times, Jan. 20, 1987.
48. Registration of Foreign Offerings by Domestic Issuers, Securities Act Release No.
4708, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1361-1363 (July 9, 1964).
49. Id. at 2124.
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tire issue, the purchasers receiving only an interim receipt that could be
exchanged at the end of 90 days for a certificate. To receive such certificate, the purchaser has to certify that he is not a national of the United
States and has not purchased the securities for a national of the United
States.6 The Commission excluded distributions made in Canada from
Release 4708. It was commonplace, therefore, in connection with
Eurobond issues, to extend the lock-up provisions to sales made in North
America or to North American purchasers."
Although the lock-up procedures relating to non-convertible debt securities were well established, it was less certain as to what the staff
would deem appropriate in connection with an offshore distribution of
equity securities, including convertible debt, particularly as to the status
of the securities after the expiration of the lock-up period. In 1985, the
staff issued a no-action letter which clarified and liberalized the procedures relating to a distribution outside the United States of equity securities.5 2 The procedures included (1) an undertaking by the underwriter not
to offer the shares in the United States or Canada or to North American
persons for twelve months following completion of the offering; (2) a conspicuous statement on the cover page of the prospectus that (a) the securities were not registered under the Securities Act, (b) could not be offered
or sold in North America or to North American persons during such
twelve-month period, and (c) then only (i) pursuant to an exemption
from registration, or (ii) if registered, or (iii) if sold on the Stock Exchange in London; (3) a restriction on transfer for twelve months to
North American persons; (4) a legend on the stock certificates issued in
connection with the offering and during the restricted period reflecting
the conditions; and (5) prior to any transfer purchaser had to certify that
he agreed to such conditions and was not a North American person or
acquiring the shares for any such person. InfraRed represented a liberalization of prior staff positions in that it accepted sales on a foreign stock
exchange after the expiration of the restricted period as an appropriate
alternative for reselling the securities acquired in the distribution.
§4

DISTRIBUTIONS PURSUANT

To

REGULATION S-INTRODUCTION

In June of 1988, almost twenty-four years after the issuance of Release 4708, the SEC revisited Release 4708 and proposed to replace it
with Regulation S.5" In July of 1989, Regulation S was reproposed with a

50. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 21, 1985).
51. The Proposing Release relating to Regulation S makes it clear, whether or not Regulation S is adopted, that the Commission has abandoned the qualification made in Release
4708 that the Release was not applicable to distributions made in Canada. Henceforth, distributions in Canada are to be treated on the same basis as other distributions made outside
of the United States. See infra note 116.
52. InfraRed Associates, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Oct. 14, 1985).
53. Proposing Release, supra note 2. The Staff will not issue interpretative or no-action
letters under Release 4708 until the Commission acts on proposed Regulation S. Id. at
89,130.
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number of revisions5" and its adoption in some form is imminent. Regulation S should facilitate offshore distributions by U.S. issuers and also will
provide assurance that the long arm of the Securities Act registration provisions generally do not reach offerings made by foreign issuers outside
the United States. Regulation S will also redefine a U.S. person so that
the registration provisions of the Securities Act will no longer protect
U.S. citizens residing outside the United States who purchase securities
outside the United States and will permit U.S. institutional investors to
organize a foreign affiliate for the express purpose of purchasing foreign
issued securities outside the United States. 5 A Note to proposed Regulation S and the proposing Release stresses that Regulation S is applicable
only to the registration provisions of the Securities Act and in no way
limits the application of the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Acts. 6
Regulation S also is not applicable to securities issued by a registered
investment company, which have to continue to register securities distrib57
uted outside the United States.
The Proposing Release refers to Regulation S as embodying a "territorial approach" in contrast to Release 4708 which was concerned with
protecting U.S. investors. This is largely true as to securities issued by
foreign issuers at least to the extent that they remain offshore for trading
purposes. The principal difference in this respect, however, as to U.S. investors, is the new definition of U.S. persons. Insofar as individuals are
concerned, it is probably of no great moment as it is doubtful if U.S.
citizens residing outside the United States play an important role as investors in offshore capital markets."' It will, however, make a major difference for U.S. institutional investors which have affiliates organized
under foreign laws, since such affiliates will not be deemed U.S. persons59

54. Reproposing Release, supra note 2.
55. Rule 902(i).
56. Regulation S, Preliminary Note 1. The Proposing Release stressed that "the U.S.
anti-fraud provisions should be broadly interpreted to rectify the damage suffered as a result of any fraudulent conduct." Proposing Release, supra note 2, at 89,129. On the extraterritorial application of the fraud provisions, see §11. Regulation S, of course, has no application to the blue-sky laws. Regulation S, Preliminary Note 4.
57. Rule 901(c).
58. Although Regulation S does not deal specifically with the issue and literally appears
to put military personnel on permanent duty status outside of the United States outside the
protection afforded by Securities Act registration for securities other than securities of registered investment companies, a footnote to the Proposing Release advises this may not always be the case, stating: "[O]fferings specifically targeted at identifiable groups of U.S.
citizens abroad, such as members of the armed forces serving overseas, would be deemed
made within the United States." Proposing Release, supra note 2, at 89,135 n.106. The critical term appears to be "targeted" and seems to have in mind the infamous activities of
Investors Overseas Services which although selling to others offshore initially was heavily
aimed at U.S. military personnel. See C. RAW, B. PAGE, AND G. HODGSON, Do You SINCERELY
WANT To BE RICH? (1971), at ch. 4. Compare the issue of residence of military personnel for
purposes of Rule 147. See H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW (1989
ed.) [hereinafter "SFCL"] at §4.04[4].
59. Rule 902(i)(1).
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even if organized for the specific purpose of purchasing foreign securities.
Such institutional investors will, in effect, have elected to be governed by
the laws of the country in which the offering is made insofar as registration of the securities is concerned, provided the transaction takes place
outside the United States.
Regulation S does not specifically deal with one of the more troublesome aspects of Release 4708 and that is when the securities can be resold
in the United States. Rule 906 is a resale provision, but it is limited to
resales outside the United States. Although no mention is made of this
fact in the Reproposing release, without any fanfare the revised proposed
Regulation S includes Preliminary Note 6 which states that securities acquired "pursuant to Regulation S may be resold in the United States only
if they are registered under the Act or an exemption from registration is
available." This issue is discussed below at §7[c]. Proposed Regulation S
is loosely drawn in a number of other respects and requires reference to
the Proposing Release and Reproposing Release" to fully appreciate how
it will operate in a number of situations.

§5

THE GENERAL STATEMENT (NON-SAFE HARBOR) APPROACH

Regulation S sets forth a General Statement that offers and sales
"that occur outside the United States" are not deemed an offer or sale for
purposes of the registration provisions (Section 5) of the Securities Act.'
If a transaction is within the scope of the General Statement, registration
under the Securities Act is not necessary. For a transaction to qualify
under the General Statement, both the sale and offer pursuant to which it
was made must be outside the U.S.. 2 Rule 901(b) sets forth a number of
"relevant considerations," several of which are further defined in Rule
902, which are to be taken into account in determining whether offers or
sales occur outside the United States. If the offers and sales meet these
general considerations, the offering is deemed to have occurred outside
the United States. Regulation S, however, also contains-some non-exclusive specific safe harbors63 which, if relied upon, assure that the offering
will be deemed to have occurred outside the United States. Most issuers,
presumably, will rely on one of the safe harbors and will fall back on the
general provisions if there is inadvertent noncompliance with some aspect
of the safe harbor. The General Statement provisions and definitions to
some degree recur in the specific safe harbors and to this extent are also
relevant.
Under the General Statement approach, relevant considerations in
determining whether an offer and sale occurs outside the United States

60. See supra note 2.
61. Rule 901.
62. Rule 901(a).
63. Rules 903 through 906 "set forth non-exclusive safe harbors for extraterritorial sales
and resales of securities." Proposing Release, supra note 2, at 89,133.
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include the following:
1. The locus of the constituent elements of the offer or sale."' The
following factors are indicative that the offer and sale took place outside
the United States:
a. Offers are directed only to persons outside the United States.
b. Buy orders originate outside the United States by buyers who are
outside the United States.
c. Execution of the transaction, payment and delivery take place
outside the United States. Payment into or from the U.S., however, would
not necessarily indicate that a transaction took place in the U.S., but payment from and to a foreign location could, in combination with other indicia of a foreign transaction, lend weight to finding the transaction to be
outside the United States."
d. The sale is executed on or through the facilities of an established
foreign securities exchange or designated organized foreign securities
market.
2. There is no directed selling effort in the United States. Directed
selling relates to efforts to condition the market in the United States for
securities being offered pursuant to Regulation $ S "The presence of directed selling efforts in the United States would generally lead the Com67
mission to find that the transaction occurred within the United States.
The concept of "directed selling efforts" is also relevant to the general
conditions applicable to all the safe harbors and is discussed further below at §6[b].
3. The securities have come to rest outside the United States. This is,
of course, the critical concept. The proposing Release has a general statement which makes it sound deceptively simple: "Generally, securities
would be considered to have come to rest abroad if the distribution has
been completed and resales into the United States are only made in routine trading transactions."" The Rule" includes a number of considerations to be taken into account in determining the likelihood that the securities have come to rest outside the United States:
a. The nationality of the issuer. There is a greater likelihood of the
securities remaining outside the United States in an offering made abroad
by a foreign issuer, the securities of which has no U.S. market interest,
than in an offering by a U.S. issuer. 0
b. The extent of the issuer's business presence in the United States.

64. Rule 901(b)(1).
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Proposing Release, supra note 2, at 89,131.
Rule 902(b).
Proposing Release, supra note 2, at 89,131.
Id. at 89,132.
Rule 901(b)(3).
Proposing Release, supra note 2, at 89,132.
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c. The type of security being offered. Equity securities are more
likely to flow back to the home country or primary market after distribu71
tion than debt securities.
d. The absence of a substantial U.S. market interest in the securities
of the issuer. A trading market in U.S. implies a demand for the securities
on the part of U.S. investors, particularly if the securities offered abroad
72
are of the same class as those traded.
e. The contractual or other provisions restricting the resale of securities into the United States and to U.S. persons. This provision invites a
do-it-yourself type of lock-up to prevent sales to U.S. persons and to prevent flowback. In fact, most issuers are likely to rely on the applicable
safe harbors discussed below.
4. The justified expectations of the parties as to whether the U.S.
registration provisions are applicable. A U.S. national who effects transactions in foreign securities markets under appropriate circumstances may
be relying on the laws of the country in which the securities are being
marketed or traded. The parties may adopt choice of law provisions to
make this clear. 73 A choice of law provision, however, undoubtedly would
not be controlling as to sales made in the United States or to U.S. persons
as part of a distribution.
§6

THE SAFE HARBORS

[a] Introduction-Definition of a U.S. Person
The provisions of the General Statement that are obviously difficult
to apply are those relating to whether or not the securities are likely to
come to rest outside the United States. Since the safe harbor provisions
deal extensively with this area, compliance with Rule 903, which provides
that a distribution which satisfies the conditions of Rule 904 thorough
906 shall be deemed to occur outside the United States, is likely to be the
choice of most issuers. The safe harbor provisions distinguish between
sales made by the issuer and the distributors (underwriters and dealers,
primarily) and their affiliates on the one hand and everyone else (the investors who purchase the issue).' The safe harbors attempt to assure that
the offering is distributed outside the United States and the securities
come to rest outside the United States by imposing on the issuer and

71. Id. at 89,133.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. The Commission's releases refer to two safe harbors-one for issuers and securities
professionals involved in the distribution process and their affiliates (the "issuer safe harbor") and the other for resales by other persons (the "resale safe harbor"). See Reproposing
Release, supra note 2, at 80,209. The issuer safe harbor is then divided into three separate
categories. For exposition purposes in these materials the three separate categories are
treated as three separate safe harbors and resales are discussed separately as part of a larger
problem of resales offshore and resales in the U.S. or to U.S. persons.
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distributor offering restrictions and transaction restrictions and imposing
on the investors transaction restrictions. The offering restrictions, if applicable, always follow the same general format. The transaction restrictions, both as to nature and duration, depend upon the nature of the issuer, the type of security, and who is the seller. There are also certain
general conditions that must be complied with in connection with all the
safe harbors.
The concept of a U.S. person plays an important role in all safe harbor contexts except a distribution by certain foreign issuers. The concept
of a U.S. person is concerned with purchasers rather than issuers of securities. Under Regulation S,U.S. persons, in a departure from old concepts, as to any natural person means a "person resident in the United
States."7 Thus, the appropriate consideration is residence rather than
citizenship; a U.S. citizen who is a resident of France is not a U.S. person
and a French citizen who is a resident of the United States is a U.S. person. A corporation or partnership organized under the laws of the United
States is a U.S. person. An agency or branch of a U.S. entity, however, is
not a U.S. person if it operates for valid business reasons and not for the
purpose of investing in unregistered securities and is engaged in the business of banking or insurance which subjects it to substantive banking or
insurance regulation in the country in which it operates.76 Any U.S. entity
can organize a corporation under the laws of another country even if for
the purpose of purchasing securities and not be deemed a U.S. person."
A branch or agency of a foreign entity is treated as a U.S. person if it is
located in the United States. 76 An estate or trust in which any executor,
administrator or trustee is a U.S. person and a non-discretionary custodial account or similar account held by a dealer or other fiduciary for the
account of a U.S. person are U.S. persons.7" A discretionary custodial account or similar account held by a dealer or other fiduciary located in the
United States is a U.S. person unless held for a non-U.S. person in which
event it is a non-U.S. person." Regulation S as initially proposed would
have overturned a previous no-action letter to the effect that a U.S. broker-dealer with discretion to act for a non-U.S. person would be a nonU.S. person when acting in that capacity."s After receiving comments, the2
Commission revised proposed Regulation S to be consistent with Baer.1
The fact that a discretionary account managed by a U.S. brokerdealer or investment adviser for a non-U.S. person is a non-U.S. person,
however, does not readily permit the U.S. broker-dealer or investment

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Rule 902(m)(1).
Rule 902(m)(3).
See Reproposing Release, supra note 2, at 80,217.
Rule 902(m)(1).
Id.
Rule 902(m)(1)-(2).
See Baer Securities Corp, SEC No-Action Letter (Oct. 12, 1979).
See Reproposing Release, supra note 2, at 80,217-18.
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adviser to purchase securities distributed pursuant to Regulation S for its
foreign clients if it does not maintain some type of office offshore. All of
the Regulation S safe harbors require that the transaction be offshore
which requires, among other things, that the broker-dealer or investment
adviser be offshore at the time it receives the offer." For the same reason,
U.S. persons who are permitted to purchase securities of foreign issuers
under certain circumstances pursuant to Regulation S (e.g., if issued in
reliance on the category 1 safe harbor) will have difficulty in effecting a
transaction offshore without maintaining an offshore presence. It cannot
appoint a foreign agent to receive offers for it."' It could participate in
such distributions by establishing a discretionary account with a foreign
broker-dealer or investment adviser,8 5 but would lose the ability to determine the securities to be purchased. U.S. institutional investors which are
qualified institutional investors under Rule 144A will be able to purchase
securities distributed offshore in the secondary market, but will have difficulty in becoming aware of such opportunities unless the security makes
its way into a U.S. trading system, such as the NASD's proposed PORTAL Market. 8 A foreign broker-dealer could recommend the securities
under very restricted circumstances in accordance with Rule 15a-6 without being registered as a broker-dealer, but the transaction would have to
be executed by a registered broker-dealer.8 7 A foreign broker-dealer with
a U.S. affiliate that is registered may find it practicable to engage in such
transactions, but Rule 15a-6 will discourage most others from soliciting
such business. If the security is traded on a foreign stock exchange or in a
designated organized foreign securities market, any U.S. person could
purchase securities distributed pursuant to Regulation S in such market.
If, however, the seller or the broker acting on its behalf knows that the
transaction has been pre-arranged with a buyer in the United States, it
will not be deemed an offshore transaction. 8
The fact that transactions are effected on a foreign stock exchange
has significance in a variety of contexts under the Regulation. 9 Foreign
stock exchanges, unlike U.S. exchanges, trade a number of securities in
various categories that are not technically listed, but, nonetheless, are
traded under the auspices of the exchange. In recognition of this fact
Regulation S introduces the concept of a "Designated Organized Foreign
Securities Market" ("DOFSM") and generally treats such markets like an
established foreign stock exchange for purposes of the Regulation. A Des-

83. See §6[b] infra.
84. See infra note 95.
85. This follows from the fact that such foreign entity would be a non-U.S. person, The
provision that a discretionary account held for a foreign person in the United States is a
non-U.S. person operates in only one direction; there is no counterpart that a discretionary
account held offshore for a U.S. person is a U.S. person. See Rule 902(m)(1)-(2).
86. See §8[g] infra.
87. See supra note 14.
88. Rule 902(g)(2).
89. See, for example, the discussion of resales under Rule 906 at §7[a].

DEN. J. INT'L

L. & POL'Y

VOL. 18:1

ignated Organized Foreign Securities Market is one established under foreign law, has an established operating history, is subject to oversight by a
governmental or self-regulatory body to which transactions are reported
on a regular basis, and is designated so by the Division of Corporation
Finance.90 The Reproposing Release refers to the Association of International Bond Dealers, which regulates trading in Eurobonds, and the Unlisted Securities Market ("USM"), which is regulated by the International Stock Exchange in London, as two markets which would meet such
criteria. 91
[b] General Conditions
The safe harbors for issuers and distributors are divided into three
categories which are distinguished by the offering and transaction restrictions imposed. All three categories, however, must comply with the same
two general conditions:
1. The offers and sales must be made in an offshore transaction. 2 To
be an offshore transaction: 9
a. The offer must be made outside the United States.
b. The seller must reasonably believe that the buyer is outside the
U.S. at the time the order is originated.
c. Execution and delivery must take place outside the U.S.
If, however, the transaction is executed on or through the facilities of
an established foreign securities exchange or a designated organized foreign securities market, and is not pre-arranged by persons in the United
States, the related offer must be made outside of the United States, but
the buyer does not have to be outside the United States at the time the
order is originated and the securities do not have to be delivered outside
the United States.9 4 The requirement as to a natural person is that the
offer be made to the buyer himself outside the United States; it is not
sufficient that it be made to his agent outside the United States.9 5 Unsolicited buy orders transmitted from the United States and received by
dealers outside the United States are not "offshore." 99 To be effected on a
foreign exchange or designated securities market, the sale must be executed outside the United States by or through a member of the exchange
97
and under the auspices of the exchange.

2. There can be no directed selling effort in the United States in connection with the offering. Directed selling effort includes any activity un90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Rule 902(a).
Reproposing Release, supra note 2, at 80,211 n.24.
Rule 904(a).
Rule 902(g).
Id.
Proposing Release, supra note 2, at 89,134.
Id.
Id.
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dertaken by the issuer, the distributor, a seller, or an affiliate of any of
them that could reasonably be expected "to have the effect of, conditioning the market in the United States for any of the securities being offered" under Regulation S.9 Itdoes not preclude product advertising and
routine corporate communications (including press releases relating to financial results or material developments) unrelated to a selling effort,
provided there is no reference to the offering of securities. 9 The Reproposing Release attempts to make it clear that an isolated, limited contact
with the U.S. would not destroy the availability of the safe harbor under
the "conditioning the market" standard.' 0 The Rule specifically precludes an advertisement relating to the offering being placed in a publication "with a general circulation in the United States."' 0 1 A publication
with a general circulation is one that is printed in the U.S. primarily for
distribution in the U.S.; or has had during the preceding twelve months
an average circulation in the U.S. of 15,000 or more; or during the preceding twelve months has had an average of fifty percent or more of its circulation in the United States.0 2 The 15,000 threshold was selected to separate out publications which produce a separate edition for distribution in
the United States. In such event, if the affiliated non-U.S. edition does
not meet this criterion, the advertisement can appear in the home publication provided it does not appear in the U.S. publication.'
In any
event, a publication necessary to meet the requirements of foreign law
and not including anything more than is legally required will not be
deemed a directed selling effort.1'0 "The presence of directed selling efforts in the United States would generally lead the Commission to find
that the transaction occurred within the United States."'10 On its face,
this would appear to preclude a concurrent registered or Regulation D
offering in the United States. The proposing Release, however, assures
that this is not the case, stating: "Legitimate selling activities carried out
in the U.S. in connection with an offering of securities registered under
the Securities Act or exempt from registration . . . would not constitute
directed selling efforts with respect to offers and sales made under Regu°
lation S. 106
Unlike some of the other conditions of the safe harbors, failure to comply with this condition makes the safe harbor unavailable for

98. Rule 902(b).
99. Proposing Release, supra note 2, at 89,131-32; Reproposing Release, supra note 2,
at 80,210-11. Compare the similar situation in connection with a domestic offering once the
issuer is in registration. See SFCL, supra note 58, §6.09[3].
100. Reproposing Release, supra note 2, at 80,210.
101. Rule 902(b)(1).
102. Rule 902(i).
103. Reproposing release, supra note 2, at 80,211.
104. Rule 902(b)(2).
105. Proposing Release, supra note 2, at 89,131.
106. Id. The Proposing Release also states: "[Ilt is the general view [of the staff] that
exempt or registered domestic offerings and offshore offerings meeting the conditions of the
proposed rules should not be integrated." Id. at 89,126.
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the entire offering.' 07
[c] Category 1-Certain Foreign Issuers
An offshore distribution can be made by certain foreign issuers without any restrictions other than the general conditions. Issues in this category include a distribution by any foreign issuer of any security if there is
no substantial U.S. market interest ("SUSMI") in the class of securities
to be offered or sold, if equity securities are offered or sold, or no substantial U.S. market interest in any of its debt securities, if debt securities are
offered or sold.108 An "overseas domestic offering" ("ODO") by any foreign issuer is also in category 1 without regard to whether there is a
SUSMI.1 °9 A foreign issuer is one incorporated or organized under the
laws of a foreign jurisdiction. However, an issuer is not a foreign issuer if
fifty percent of its outstanding voting securities are held by persons with
a U.S. address and any of the following factors are present: (a) more than
fifty percent of the assets of the issuer are located in the United States;
(b) the business of the issuer is administered principally in the United
States; or (c) the majority of the executive officers or directors are U.S.
citizens or residents. 110 An issuer organized under the laws of the United
States is not a foreign issuer even if 100% of its stock is owned by nonU.S. citizens or residents. Query whether the sale of stock by a foreign
issuer, the proceeds from which are to be invested in a wholly owned U.S.
subsidiary, would be deemed a technical compliance to which Regulation
S would not provide a safe harbor under Preliminary Note 2 because it is
a scheme to avoid the registration provisions."
Regulation S includes specific criteria for determining whether there
is a substantial U.S. market interest ("SUSMI") in a security. There is a
SUSMI unless "it can be established" that (1) fifty percent of all recorded trades in an equity security during the prior fiscal year occurred
on or through the facilities of established foreign securities exchange or
designated organized foreign securities market or (2) that less than
twenty percent of all recorded trading in the class of securities in the
prior fiscal year occurred in he U.S. organized securities markets and the
U.S. trading did not constitute the largest single market for such securities. "' 2 This places a substantial burden on the issuer and distributors to
show there is no SUSMI. If debt securities are offered, the criteria are
based on all of the issuer's debt securities, not merely those in the same

107. Reproposing Release, supra note 2, at 80,218.
108. Rule 905(a)(1).
109. Rule 905(a)(2.
110. Rule 902(e).
111. Cf. Rule 140 which provides that an issuer which offers its securities for the purpose of purchasing the securities of another issuer is regarded as being engaged in the distribution of the securities of the other issuer for the purpose of defining an underwriter under
Section 2(11) of the Securities Act.
112. Rule 902(l)(1).
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class. There is a SUSMI unless "it can be established" that debt securities of the issuer are held of record by fewer than 300 U.S. persons or that
less than $1 billion of the principal amount of its debt securities is held of
record by U.S. persons.1" '
An "overseas domestic offering" (ODO) is defined to include an offering by a foreign issuer "directed either to citizens or residents of the issuer's jurisdiction of incorporation or organization" and made "in accordance with customary local practices and documentation."1 " " The
definition does not elucidate on what part of the offering must be sold in
the issuer's home country to qualify although apparently it is intended to
embrace offerings primarily, if not exclusively, sold in such jurisdiction.
The Reproposing Release distinguished such offering from a multijurisdictional offering and noted that if "a substantial portion of the offering
would be immediately resold outside the domestic market," it would not
conform with the definition.'
The Proposing Release makes it clear, whether or not Regulation S is
adopted, that the Commission has abandoned the qualification made in
Release 4708 that it (the Release) was not applicable to distributions
made in Canada. Henceforth, distributions in Canada are to be treated on'
the same basis as other distributions made outside the United States."
The prior concern was that the Canadian offering might be a conduit for
a distribution in the United States. The absence of a "substantial U.S.
market interest" and the restrictions on directed selling efforts in the
U.S. are intended to deal with this problem. The Proposing Release qualifies the safe harbor by noting that "trading of a substantial amount of
such securities in the United States shortly after they had been offered
overseas would indicate a plan or scheme to evade the registration provisions,""' '

and Preliminary Note 2 to Regulation S provides that the Regu-

lation is not available notwithstanding technical compliance if the transaction is part of a plan or scheme to evade the registration provisions.
The category 1 safe harbor for a distribution by certain foreign issuers is unique in certain respects, including the following:
1. It does not preclude the sale of such issue to a U.S. person who is
in the country in which the distribution is made and buys the security
while in the country. The general conditions described above"' preclude
an offer from being made in the United States and a directed selling effort in the United States. They do not preclude a sale to U.S. persons if
113. Rule 902(l)(2). Commercial paper exempt under Section 3(a)(3) of the Securities
Act is included in making such determination, but if such securities are the only securities
that would otherwise result in such determination the issuer does not have a SUSMI. Rule
902(l)(3).
114. Rule 902(h).
115. Reproposing Release, supra note 2, at 80,214-15.
116. Proposing Release, supra note 2, at 89,129 n.64.
117. Proposing Release, supra note 2, at 89,136.
118. See §6[b].

DEN. J. INT'L

L. &

POL'Y

VOL. 18:1

the offer and sale take place outside the United States. Restrictions on
sales to U.S. persons are found in the transaction restrictions and, as is
discussed below, transfer restrictions are not applicable to a distribution
of securities of such a foreign issuer.
2. Neither the issuer nor the distributor has to adopt any offering or
transaction restrictions. There may be a "catch-22," however, since a distribution in Canada, for example, may result, if there are no restrictions
on resales to U.S. persons, in an immediate market developing in the
United States and the contention could be made that there was a scheme
to evade the registration provisions."' In an ODO, which most Canadian
offerings would be, there may be SUSMI, in which event immediate resales in the United States markets appears likely. If the Commission
adopts proposed Forms F-10 and F-9 for certain Canadian issuers, such
issuers may consider registering the offering in the United States. 2
Notwithstanding the fact that once the distribution is completed
there is no specific restriction on resales in the United States, the combined effect of Sections 4(1) and 4(3) may preclude any dealer from selling the security without registration or an appropriate exemption in the
"
United States for forty days.12
' Since it is relatively difficult to complete
an offshore transaction with a U.S. person,'2 2 the advantages of category 1
are meaningful primarily because the absence of offering restrictions
eliminates some of the inefficiencies of a category 2 offering and, in the
context of an ODO of equity securities by a non-reporting foreign issuer
with SUSMI, it avoids the onerous category 3 restrictions. 23
[d] Offering Restrictions
Securities of all issuers other than category 1 issuers sold in reliance
on a Regulation S safe harbor are subject to offering and transaction restrictions imposed on the issuer, the distributors and affiliates of the issuer and distributors and to transaction restrictions imposed on the investor-purchasers. The offering restrictions are procedures which the
issuer and distributors must follow to assure compliance with the transaction restrictions during the appropriate restricted period. The transaction
restrictions vary depending on the category of issuer and the class of se-

119. See supra note 117.
120. See supra note 18.
121. This may be true because the Section 4(1) exemption is for transactions not involving an issuer, underwriter, or dealer and the Section 4(3) dealer exemption does not
become effective until 40 days after the first date the security was bona fide offered by or
through an underwriter. Although the Section 4(3) 40 day exclusion from the dealer exemption generally has not been applied to securities issued pursuant to an exemption, it is not
clear that Regulation S is an exemption for this purpose. See infra note 159. The fact that
Rule 144A imposes special resale restrictions on securities issued by non-reporting foreign
issuers suggests that the Commission may not regard the Section 4(3) exemption as available for resales in the United States. See §8[d]-[e].
122. See supra note 83.
123. See §6[f] infra.
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curities. The offering restrictions consist of the following:
(1) The written agreement of every distributor (underwriters and
dealers)"2 ' participating in the distribution "pursuant to a contractual arrangement" to offer and sell the security in compliance with the applicable transaction restrictions and other requirements of the safe harbor, or
pursuant to registration or an available exemption."'
(2) The offering materials and documents must include statements to
the effect that the securities have not been registered under the Securities
Act, cannot be offered or sold in the United States or to U.S. persons
within the applicable restricted period unless the securities are registered
or an exemption from registration is available.
(3) Such statements must be included (a) on the cover or inside cover
page of any prospectus or offering circular, (b) in the underwriting section
of any prospectus or offering circular, and (c) in any press release or advertisement made by the issuer or any distributor or any person acting on
their behalf."6 The appropriate statements may appear in summary form
on the prospectus cover pages (presumably with a cross-reference to the
underwriting section) and in press releases and advertisements. 2 If the
offering restrictions are applicable, and they are not complied with, the
safe harbor is not available for the entire offering. 28 This is likewise the
situation if the restrictions on directed selling efforts in the United States
are not complied with, 2 ' whereas failure to comply with other conditions
of a safe harbor would result only in the safe harbor not being available
for the particular offer and sale to which the failure related.' 30 The restricted period during which the Offering Restrictions must be complied
with is a period which commences with the closing of the offering or the
date when first offered to persons other than distributors in reliance on
Regulation S, whichever is the later, and expires a specified period of
time thereafter as provided in the appropriate transaction restriction. 3 '
In the case of a continuous offering, it does not commence until the lead
managing underwriter certifies that the distribution has been completed.' s2 In any event, a distributor holding an unsold allotment will be
33
deemed in the restricted period at the time of sale.

124. The term "distributor" encompasses underwriters and dealers who participate in
the distribution "pursuant to a contractual arrangement." Rule 902(c). This definition is
broad enough to cover the underwriting and selling groups. The term, however, does not
necessarily encompass all Section 2(11) statutory underwriters. See Proposing Release,
supra note 2, at 89,133.
125. Rule 902(f)(1).
126. Rule 902(f).
127. Id.
128. See Reproposing Release, supra note 2, at 80,218.
129. See supra note 107.
130. Reproposing Release, supra note, at 80,218-19.
131. Rule 902(k).
132. Id.
133. Rule 902(k).
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Reporting Issuers and Foreign Debt Issuers

The category 2 safe harbor covers offshore debt or equity distributions by reporting issuers (U.S. and foreign) and debt issues with SUSMI
of non-reporting foreign issuers." 4 Such distributions have the benefit of
the safe harbor if (1) the general conditions of Rule 904135 are complied
with, (2) the offering is not made in the United States or to a U.S. person
for a period of forty days commencing from the date of closing or by a
distributor with an unsold allotment, (3) appropriate offering restrictions
as described above'36 are adopted, and (4) during the forty day restricted
period distributors selling securities to other distributors, dealers, and
persons receiving selling concessions or other remuneration deliver a confirmation or other notice advising the purchaser that it is subject to the
same restrictions applicable to the selling distributor.1 37 No distinction is
made as to the conditions of the safe harbor between debt and equity
securities in this category or between debt of reporting and non-reporting
foreign issuers. Although the offering restrictions require participants in
the distribution not to offer or sell the securities in the United States or
to non-U.S. persons during the applicable period, there is no specified
procedure for determining whether purchasers are non-U.S. persons, no
legend need be included on the certificates, and no agreement or certification is required from the purchasers, although, as discussed below,13 purchasers need and have their own safe harbor for resales. A specific noncomplying sale affects only that one transaction. If adequate offering restrictions are adopted, and a distributor makes offers or sales in violation
of the transactional restrictions, offers or sales by other distributors are
not affected. 39 The Reproposing Release cautions, however, that if the
underwriter knows, or is reckless in not knowing, that a dealer to whom it
intended to sell part of the issue "had consistently sold to U.S. residents
in violation of the resale restrictions," the underwriter could not rely on
the safe harbor. 40
A reporting company is an issuer with a class of securities registered
under the Exchange Act or which is required to file reports pursuant to
Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act and has filed all required reports during a period of twelve months immediately preceding the offer or sale, or
such shorter period during which it was required to file such reports.'
There is no requirement that a company have been a reporting company
for any specified period of time; hence, even a start-up issuer could voluntarily register a class of equity securities under Section 12(g) of the Ex-

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Rule 905(b).
See §6[b].
See §6[d].
Rule 905(b).
See §7[a].
Reproposing Release, supra note 2, 80,218-19.
Reproposing Release, supra note 2, at 80,219.
Rule 902(j).
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change Act and become a reporting company within the category 2 safe
harbor.
Regulation S does not specifically provide that a subsidiary of a U.S.
reporting company offering debt securities guaranteed by the parent will
be deemed a reporting issuer for purposes of the safe harbor classification. If it is not, it is subject to the more severe restrictions of category 3.
Form S-3, a simplified registration procedure under the Securities Act,
provides that, if the parent guarantees debt securities of its subsidiary,
Form S-3 can be used for the offering if either the parent or the subsidiary meet the eligibility criteria. 4" Since the investors will be looking primarily to the parent's credit reputation, there appears to be little justification not to look to it in determining whether the securities are issued
by a reporting company. If Regulation S places the debt securities of the
subsidiary into category 3 because it is not a reporting company, which
appears to be the case, parent companies may be prone to make the offering directly to avoid the category 3 transaction restrictions.
Regulation S does not define debt securities and, therefore, it is not
clear whether a debt security convertible into an equity security is a debt
security, an equity security, ' " or both a debt and equity security.
[f] Category 3 Safe Harbor - For Non-Reporting U.S. Issuers and
Equity Securities of Non-Reporting Foreign Issuers with a SUSMI
The category 3 safe harbor relates to the distribution outside the
United States of all securities not covered by the other categories. This
includes the offshore distribution of securities by a U.S. issuer which is
not a reporting company and equity securities of a foreign issuer which is
not a reporting company and which has a substantial U.S. market interest. In the case of such foreign issuers, the offering would be in category 3
rather than category 1 only if the distribution is multi-jurisdictional and,
hence, not an ODO. The restrictions and other conditions of the category
3 safe harbor differ depending on whether debt or equity securities are
offered. In the case of debt securities, the requirements are identical to
those of securities of reporting companies in terms of the forty day restricted period, the application of the offering restrictions, and the confirmation that must be used in transactions between distributors and dealers. In addition, however, the securities on issuance must be represented
by a temporary global certificate. The global certificate is exchangeable
for definitive certificates at the expiration of the forty day restricted period. The purchaser to receive a certificate must certify that the securities
are not owned beneficially by a U.S. person. In the case of equity securi-

142. Form S-3, General Instruction C.
143. Rule 405 under the Securities Act and Section 3(a)(11) of the Exchange Act and
Rule 3a11-1 adopted thereunder all provide that securities convertible into equity securities
are equity securities, but these definitions are not incorporated into Regulation S. See further discussion at §9.
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ties, the restricted period during which the securities cannot be sold in
the United States or to U.S. persons is twelve months rather than forty
days. The offering restrictions and the confirmation requirements are applicable. In addition, to comply with the transfer restrictions, (i) the issuer must refuse to transfer securities if the sale was not made in compliance with the provisions of Regulation S, (ii) the investor purchaser of
the securities must certify that he (she or it) is not a U.S. person (or is a
qualified institutional buyer as defined in Rule 144A) and is not acquiring
for the benefit of a U.S. person and (iii) the investor purchaser must
agree to resell the securities only in accordance with the provisions of
Regulation S, pursuant to registration or an exemption therefrom. " The
means to implement the transfer restrictions on transfers to U.S. persons
is up to the issuer. As a minimum, a transfer by a person with a non-U.S.
address puts the issuer on notice and requires inquiry.' 5 There is no specific requirement, however, that a legend be placed on the certificates.
[g] The Appendix A Safe Harbor Summary
Appendix A to the Reproposing Release, which is reproduced below,
is a helpful, tree-type guide and summary of how the sundry safe harbors
apply to different types of offshore distributions by foreign and U.S. issuers respectively. One can readily discern from Appendix A that any ODO
by a foreign issuer and any offshore offering of debt or equity security as
to which there is no SUSMI by a foreign issuer are within the category 1
(Rule 905(a)) safe harbor. All other offerings by a foreign issuer are in
category 2 (Rule 905(b)) except that an offering of a class of equity securities in which there is a SUSMI by a non-reporting issuer is within category 3 (Rule 905(c)). In the case of offshore distributions by U.S. issuers,
all offerings by a reporting company are in category 2 and all offerings by
a non-reporting company are in category 3.

144. Rule 905(c)(3).
145. Proposing Release, supra note 2, at 89,139.
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APPENDIX A
RULE 905 CATEGORIES

Overseas Domestic Offering

O.D.O.

SUSMI

=

Substantial US Market Interest
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REGULATION S AND RESALES

[a] Securities Distributed Pursuant to Regulation S
There is a separate resale safe harbor for persons other than issuers
and distributors. 14 6 Rule 906, however, deals only with sales outside the
United States and does not provide a safe harbor for resales in the United
States.'4 7 It is limited to resales by persons other than the issuer or distributor."" The investor-purchaser who is not a dealer or person receiving
selling compensation or other selling remuneration can resell the securities without any restrictions other than the general conditions which require that the offer and sale take place offshore." 9 The further general
condition that there be no directed selling effort in the United States is
applicable only to the person selling the security. If the seller, however, is
a dealer or other person receiving selling compensation, during the restricted period (which assumes a category 2 or 3 situation) such seller can
resell subject to the same general conditions as the investor and purchaser, but neither the seller nor any person acting on his behalf can be
aware of the fact that the offeree or buyer of the securities is a U.S. person. In addition, if the purchaser from such seller is also a dealer or person receiving a selling concession, the seller must deliver to the purchaser
a confirmation or other notice stating that during the restricted period
the securities can be sold only in compliance with Regulation S or pursuant to registration or an exemption from registration under the Act. The
restricted period does not begin anew upon resale of the securities, but
applies only to the remainder of the applicable period imposed in connection with the original distribution. 5
The reproposed regulation does not specifically refer to resales on a
foreign stock exchange or designated organized securities market since
Rule 906 requires an offshore transaction which is specifically defined to
include transactions executed in such markets. The accompanying release
states that the resale safe harbor "would also permit resales of any securities on established foreign securities exchanges and designated organized

146. Rule 906.
147. Preliminary Note 6 to Regulation S.
148. The Proposing Release contains some inconsistent statements in this respect. The
Release states that once a distributor has distributed its allotment, it is like any other person reselling the securities it may reacquire. Proposing Release, supra note 2, at 89,133-34.
Elsewhere the Release states that sales and "resales by issuers, distributors and their affiliates would always be subject to Rules 904 and 905" rather than 906. Id. at 89,139 (Emphasis
added). A reasonable construction of all of this is that reference to resales is to those that
are part of the distribution since there appears to be no reason to cut distributors out of the
trading market once the distribution is completed so long as Rule 906 is complied with. This
is reinforced by the specific restrictions applicable under Rule 906 to resales in that market
by securities professionals included in reproposed Regulation S.
149. See §7[a].
150. Proposing Release, supra note 2, at 89,137.
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foreign securities markets."'" 1 If the seller were a dealer, the notice delivery otherwise required would be required only if the seller knew that the
purchaser was a dealer or person receiving selling remuneration. 52 Rule
906 as initially proposed restricted resales on exchanges to securities in
the first two categories and specifically provided that neither the seller
nor any person acting on his behalf can be aware of the fact that any
counter-party to the transaction is a U.S. person.' 5 3 This provision has
been dropped from the Regulation, but awareness of the status of the
counter-party is significant since Rule 902(g)(2) provides that the transaction in such market is not offshore if the seller or its agent is aware that
the transaction has been pre-arranged with a buyer in the United States.
The Proposing Release had said under its initial formulation that it was
not intended to impose a duty of inquiry; the purpose was to avoid trans54
actions pre-arranged in the U.S. and executed on a foreign exchange.'
This comment appears appropriate with respect to the definition of an
overseas transaction. The alternative of selling on a foreign exchange or
designated organized foreign securities market ("DOFSM") is particularly
significant as in most offerings made in the United Kingdom or Europe
the securities are likely to be traded on an exchange or in an organized
market established by an exchange once the distribution is completed. If,
for example, a U.S. issuer which is a non-reporting company makes an
offering in the U.K., concurrently listing the security on the Unlisted Securities Market (USM), the foreign investors who purchase securities in
the offering can resell them through a U.K. broker who would sell them to
a market-maker on the London (International) Stock Exchange on which
USM securities are traded. The liquidity for such a security is as good as
the market on which it is traded.
[b] Securities Issued in Reliance on an Exemption
Rule 906 is broadly framed so that it is not limited to the resale of
securities issued in offshore transactions. It is also applicable to the resale
of securities issued in the U.S. to U.S. persons in reliance on Regulation
D or other exemption from registration and which are resold outside of
the U.S. in reliance on Regulation S. The restricted period would commence on the date upon which the investor's securities were first resold in
reliance on Regulation S.155 If, for example, a U.S. resident purchased securities offered pursuant to Regulation D, prior to the expiration of the
Rule 144 two-year holding period, he could sell them offshore complying
with the provisions of Rule 906 and the restricted period imposed on his
purchaser would commence with the sale to him, assuming it was the first
offshore sale. If the securities are listed on a foreign securities exchange,

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Reproposing Release, supra note 2, at 80,217.
Id.
Rule 906(b) as initially proposed.
Proposing Release, supra note 2, at 89,140.
Id.
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they could be resold on the exchange in compliance with Rule 906 without regard to any restricted period. '
This aspect of Regulation S may prove to have considerable practical
significance, particularly as to securities privately placed in the United
States. If the security is traded on a foreign exchange or a DOFSM, purchasers would not have to hold the securities for the two-year holding
period of Rule 144 in order to resell the security and insofar as the U.S.
securities laws are concerned would have the liquidity afforded by the
foreign securities market.
[c] Resales in the United States or to U.S. Persons
During the twenty-five years since the pronouncement of Rule 4708,
the SEC staff has given repeated no-action letters as to what it would
deem as adequate restrictions or lock-ups during the distribution and
during a period following the completion of the distribution. The Proposing Release states as follows: "The staff traditionally has not expressed
any view as to when or under what circumstances securities issued pursuant to Release 4708 could be resold in the United States or to U.S. persons. Rather, the staff has indicated that resales may be made only in
compliance with the registration requirements of the Securities Act or an
exemption therefrom."' 5' 7 The resales in the United States under 4708
had to find a Section 4(1) or other exemption;"' Regulation S as proposed, unfortunately, does not wholly dissipate this issue. The reproposed
regulation is somewhat less confusing in this respect than the regulation
as initially proposed and there is a strong implication that the securities
can be resold in the United States or to U.S. persons after the end of the
restricted period. The issue, nonetheless, is not free from doubt."'

156. Id. Presumably, Rule 906 could also be used to resell securities offered in the
United States in reliance on Rule 147.
157. Proposing Release, supra note 2, at 89,125.
158. See §3 supra.
159. To fully understand the issues in this regard from a conceptual standpoint it is
necessary to digress; a digression justified, perhaps, by the fact that it is also relevant to
Rule 144A and the somewhat timid approach taken by the Commission. See §8[c]. James
Landis and Benjamin Cohen, young proteges of Felix Frankfurter, then a Harvard Law
School Professor, drafted what became the Securities Act of 1933, with very little in the way
of a model to follow, as they rejected a blue-sky approach. See J. SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET (1982), at 63-68. In a stroke of genius, Landis and Cohen hit on an
approach that in a few short paragraphs regulated a multitude of transactional situations,
some of which they had no way of foreseeing (e.g., the development 40 years later of the
Eurobond market). Section 5 of the Securities Act provides it is unlawful, absent an exemption, to sell securities that are not registered. Section 2(11) defines an underwriter as one
acquiring shares from an issuer or an affiliate of an issuer with a view to distribution. In this
rather simple fashion they achieved two goals: (1) to require registration whenever an issuer
distributes securities, and (2) to require registration whenever affiliates (i.e., controlling persons) distribute securities. In addition, it was necessary to separate out trading transactions
so that every time someone trades a security it would not be necessary to file a registration
statement. This they did by providing an exemption for transactions not involving an issuer,
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Regulation S takes the form of a Rule defining offer, offer to sell, offer for

underwriter, or dealer. A further exemption, now Section 4(3), exempts dealer transactions
other than for a period of time following the effective date of a registration statement during
which dealers must deliver a statutory prospectus in connection with offerings by a nonreporting company and certain transactions in unregistered securities. Accordingly, for most
purposes, one can read Section 4(1) as if it were an exemption for transactions not involving
an issuer or underwriter.
Section 4(1) in conjunction with the Section 2(11) definition of an underwriter provides
yeoman services. Never have so few words served so many purposes. As noted, in the public
offering context it requires a public offering by an issuer or an affiliate to be registered. It
also permits purchasers in a registered offering to resell securities without registration and
for non-affiliates to trade the securities in the secondary market. Most importantly, for our
immediate purposes, it also determines the extent to which securities acquired from an issuer in exempt transactions can be resold without registration. Exempt transactions run the
gamut from the Section 4(2) exemption for transactions not involving a public offering, to
the three Regulation D exemptions (Rules 504, 505, and 506), the intrastate offering exemption, the Section 3(a)(9) exemption for an exchange offer of one class of securities of an
issuer for another class of the same issuer. Rule 144, which requires a minimum holding
period of two years, provides a path for leakage into the public markets of securities issued
in reliance on the Section 4(2) or Regulation D exemptions. Rule 147(e) provides a similar
route for securities issued in reliance on the Section 3(a)(11) exemption if not resold into
the interstate securities markets until nine months after the completion of the distribution.
Since Regulation S fails to specifically provide that resales in the United States after
the expiration of the restricted period are within the Section 4(1) exemption, the availability
of an exemption for such resales will depend upon the application of the Section 4(1) and
4(3) exemptions. Conceptually Regulation S provides that offshore offers and sales made in
conformity with Regulation S are not deemed offers or sales for purposes of Section 5. Rules
901 and 903. Arguably, if there has not been an offer or sale for purposes of Section 5, the
investor-purchaser is not an underwriter as it has not "purchased" a security with a view to
distribution. This would leave the question of whether there would be a Section 4(3) exemption for dealers that made a market in the security distributed offshore pursuant to Regulation S after expiration of the restricted period. Section 4(3)(A) provides that the dealer
exemption is not available with respect to unregistered securities until 40 days after the
securities are first bona fide offered to the public by the issuer or by or through an underwriter. It has been held that this period does not commence to run until the securities are
first publicly offered in the United States and this occurs when they are first quoted in an
inter-dealer quotation system (as distinguished from when first traded). Kubik v. Goldfield,
479 F.2d 472 (3d Cir. 1973); SEC v. North American Research & Development Corp., 280 F.
Supp. 106, aff'd in part, 424 F.2d 63, 81 n.14 (2d Cir. 1970); Lustgart v. Albert Teller & Co.,
304 F. Supp. 771, 772 (E.D. Pa. 1969). In all of these cases, however, the securities were sold
in the United States in violation of Section 5 as the seller was a statutory underwriter and,
hence, did not have a Section 4(1) exemption. In fact, historically, Section 4(3)(A) has been
applied only to securities distributed in violation of the registration provisions, although
literally it is not so restricted. Section 4(3) clearly has no application to securities exempt
pursuant to Section 4(2) or Rule 506 as Section 4(3)(A) is applicable only to securities publicly offered. In the context of an issuer exchange offering exempt under Section 3(a)(9),
notwithstanding the fact that it involves a public offering, the Commission early on took the
position that dealers are not subject to the requirement of delivering a prospectus under the
dealer exclusion of the then third clause of Section 4(1) with respect to securities offered
pursuant to an exemption. Securities Act Release No. 646 (Feb. 3, 1936). See also Jerome L.
Coben, SEC No-Action Letter (March 12, 1986). When Section 4(1) was amended so as to
move the dealer exemption into Section 4(3) and reduce the period of time during which
dealers had to deliver a prospectus in the secondary market after completion of a public
offering, the language of 4(3)(A) was added. It is clear from the legislative history that this
was intended to make the exemption unavailable for securities distributed in violation of
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sale, sale and offer to buy so that offers and sales made outside of the
United States are not offers or sales for purposes of Section 5 and those
made in the United States are offers or sales for purposes of Section 5.

the registration provisions and that same legislative history indicates that it was not intended to affect "the nature or extent of the dealer's exemption." S. REP. No. 1036, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1954). The critical question then is whether Regulation S is to be viewed
as an exempt offering for this purpose. The fact that Rule 144A expressly includes a dealer
exemption (See §8[e] infra.) suggests that it may not although such inclusion may merely be
to avoid any question in this context. If it is not, the 40 day period should be measured from
the public offering outside of the United States as otherwise a dealer could not effect a trade
until someone placed a quotation in an inter-dealer quotation system and initiated a 40 day
period in which all trades would be in violation of Section 4(3).
The problem of applying Section 4(1) initially achieved prominence in the context of
securities issued in reliance on the Section 4(2) exemption for private placements. Rule 144
has been a regulatory success story in terms of encouraging private placements in which
purchasers can assure themselves of acquiring a privately placed security that ultimately
will have liquidity, in providing a reliable guide to dealers and selling shareholders as to
when and to what extent restricted securities can be sold without registration, and in providing a stock of additional securities for the trading market. Conceptually, the resale exemption is based on declaring that persons reselling securities are not Section 2(11) underwriters if they comply with the Rule (Rule 144(b)) and that the broker effecting the
unsolicited transaction initially required by the Rule is exempt under Section 4(4). (Rule
144(f) & (g)).
The other way of reselling securities issued in exempt transactions is to sell them in a
private transaction. Conceptually the Section 4(2) exemption is not available for such transactions as Section 4(2) is an exemption for transactions with an issuer not involving a public
offering. Further, whether Section 4(1) is available depends upon whether the purchaser is a
statutory underwriter which in turn depends upon whether he purchased with a view to
distribution as distinguished for investment. If a view to distribution were synonymous with
a view to resale, then resales to private purchasers might result in characterization of the
reseller as an underwriter. Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 896 (1959) resolved all of this by interpreting the "with a view to distribution"
language of Section 2(11) as meaning with a view to selling in a public offering and by
applying the SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953), criteria for determining the
availability of the Section 4(2) exemption to the resales in determining whether or not the
seller is a statutory underwriter. The result is a Section 4(1-/2) exemption for resales of
securities acquired in a exempt transactions to sophisticated investors who have access to
substantially the same information that would be available in a registration statement.
Although the 4(1-1/2) exemption developed in the context of a Section 4(2) private
placement, it would appear applicable to any security issued in an exempt transaction if
emphasis is placed on the fact that it is in fact a Section 4(1) exemption and the ultimate
issue is whether the purchaser in the exempt transaction is a statutory underwriter. It could
be argued that if the repurchaser is merely sophisticated and not an accredited investor that
there are more than 35 purchasers in a Rule 506 and 505 offer if there are resales in reliance
on Gilligan, Will. The restriction on resales, however, imposed by Rule 502(d) for this purpose attributes to securities acquired under Reg. D the status "of securities acquired in a
transaction under section 4(2)" and the issuer must "exercise reasonable care to assure that
the purchasers of the securities are not underwriters within the meaning of section 2(11) of
the Act." Rule 144A is a codification, and a narrow one at that, of the 4(1-/2) exemption,
providing a conclusive presumption that if the conditions of the Rule are complied with that
the purchaser will be deemed able to fend for itself. Conceptually it also takes the form of
providing that the non-issuer seller of securities complying with the conditions of the Rule
will not be deemed an underwriter for purposes of Section 2(11) or for purposes of Section
4(1) of the Act. Rule 144A(b). See the further discussion of Rule 144A at §8.
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Regulation S includes a number of safe harbors which, if complied with,
result in the offer or sale being deemed made outside of the United States
and, hence, not subject to Section 5. Regulation S, however, does not deal
with resales into the United States except, possibly, by implication. If
such resales are to find an exemption, presumably they will have to find it
for the seller under Section 4(1) of the Securities Act for transactions not
involving an issuer, underwriter, or dealer and for the dealer under the
Section 4(3) dealer exemption.16 Rule 144A is explicitly available for
such resales. 6 ' Although securities sold offshore are not technically restricted securities for purposes of Rule 144, the staff has treated them as
such and the proposed amendments to Rule 144 make explicit provisions
for securities that ordinarily would have been distributed in reliance on
Regulation S."'
There are two relevant resale periods: while the Regulation S transaction restrictions are still in effect and after such restricted period.
There are two relevant prospective purchasers in a resale; offshore purchasers who are not U.S. persons and U.S. purchasers (sales made in the
U.S. or offshore to U.S. persons). Regulation S deals directly only with
offshore purchasers; it does not distinguish explicitly between the two relevant resale periods, and the offering restrictions, which are intended to
give notice of the specific conditions to which the offshore purchasers are
subject, do not deal with the status of the securities after termination of
the restricted period except by implication.
The category 1 safe harbor has no specific restricted period as there
are no offering restrictions or transaction restrictions, merely general conditions one of which is that the securities be sold and resold offshore.
Presumably, this condition does not continue for category 1 securities any
longer than it would for category 2 securities. One cannot be certain, however, since Rule 144A as proposed and the proposed amendments to Rule
144 appear to be designed to keep securities of non-reporting foreign issuers either offshore or within a market confined to qualified institutional
investors.' 6 3 The category 2 safe harbor precludes any sales of securities
of a reporting issuer in the U.S. or to U.S. persons for forty days after the
closing; 64 and the category 3 safe harbor imposes a forty day restricted
period on debt securities in that category and a twelve month restricted
period on equity securities. 6 5 Sales can be made in the United States or
to U.S. persons if the securities are registered or an exemption from registration is available during the restricted period. There is nothing in the
restrictions relating to sales in the United States or to U.S. persons of
securities of reporting companies and debt securities of non-reporting

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

See supra note 159.
See §8.
See §8[e].
Id. See also supra note 121.
Rule 905(b)(2).
Rule 905(c)(2)-(3).
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companies that extends beyond forty days after the closing nor as to category 3 equity securities beyond one year. The purchaser, however, as to
category 3 equity securities must agree to resell such securities only in
accordance with Regulation S,or if the securities are registered or exempt
from registration. These conditions literally continue indefinitely.166 The
offering restrictions, however, which are designed to put the purchaser on
notice of the transaction restrictions specifically refer to limitations on
offers and resales by the purchaser "within the restricted period."'167 Similarly, the notice disclosure required of dealers under Rule 906 (which is
applicable to both categories 2 and 3 securities) also refers to limitations
on resales "during the restricted period." 6 ' The reasonable construction,
therefore, appears to be that all the transfer restrictions in the Regulation
are applicable to the restricted period only.
Regulation S,however, purports to deal only with offshore distributions and does not specifically provide when shares may be resold to U.S.
persons or in the United States. The implication that one wauld ordinarily make is that once the restricted period has expired the securities can
be freely resold in the United States. There is, however, the troubling fact
that under Release 4708 the staff always insisted that at the end of the
lock-up period an appropriate exemption had to be found for the sale of
the securities in the United States or to U.S. persons." 9 Somewhat ominously, the reproposed Regulation includes a Preliminary Note 6 which,
although not specifically referring to the period after the restricted period, says something very similar: "Securities acquired overseas, whether
or not pursuant to Regulation S,may be resold in the United States only
if they are registered under the Act or an exemption from registration is
available."
The Proposing Release contains a number of statements that deal
with this issue although it is difficult to reconcile them with Preliminary
Note 6. Commenting on the General Statement, the Proposing Release
observes that "if the distribution has been completed and resales into the
United States are only made in routine trading transactions," generally
the securities "would be considered to have come to rest abroad."'"" Spe166. Rule 90b(c)(3).
167. Rule 902(f)(2).
168. Rule 906(b)(2).
169. See supra note 157. The following is a fairly typical statement of the old staff
position. "[W]e express no view as to when or under what circumstances the securities may
be reoffered or resold in the U.S. or to its citizens or residents. Any such reoffers and resales
must be made in compliance with the registration requirements of the 1933 Act or pursuant
to an exemption thereunder. The availability of any such exemption would depend upon the
facts and circumstances existing at the time of such reoffers and resales." Sears Overseas
Finance N.V., SEC No-Action Letter (June 11, 1982).
170. Proposing Release supra note 2, at 89,132. The comment was prefaced with the
reiteration of a statement in Release 4708 to the effect that trading in the United States
shortly after completion of the distribution would be an indication that the distribution was
"in fact being made by means of such trading." Id. The Release then discusses flowback,
noting that equity is more likely to flowback to the issuer's home country or primary market
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cifically, the Release states, referring to securities of a reporting issuer,
that the purpose of the transactional restrictions is not to prevent
flowback, but "to prevent securities from entering the U.S. capital markets while the market has been preconditioned for such securities
.". 17 The Proposing Release further sets forth as one of the basic
propositions of the safe harbor provisions "that periodic reporting under
the Exchange Act can be relied upon for the protection of investors once
the marketing effort has been completed. After the foreign distribution
has been completed and the marketing efforts have terminated, routine
secondary trading may begin as a matter of course. Where issuers are not
subject to the reporting requirements of the Exchange Act, resale restrictions previously developed under Release 4708 to protect against
flowback would continue. 1 7 2 This suggests that once the restricted period
has expired, the securities of a reporting issuer can be traded in the
United States; presumably, in reliance on the Section 4(1) exemption for
transactions not involving an issuer or underwriter and the Section 4(3)
dealer's exemption, but that securities of a non-reporting issuer may have
to be registered or an exemption established. The Proposing Release also
specifically states in the section dealing with securities of a reporting
company as follows: "Upon expiration of the restricted period, securities
sold in reliance on the safe harbor will be viewed as unrestricted.""1 3
The Proposing Release expressed concern about the flowback of equity securities of non-reporting companies because of the lack of information about them in the marketplace.' 17 This may or may not explain the
staff's apparent reluctance to acknowledge as to such securities that after
the appropriate restricted period the securities can be resold in the
United States without registration in reliance on Section 4(1) much as
securities which are registered or offered pursuant to Regulation A can be
resold by the ordinary investor."' The Proposing Release suggests that
Regulation S imposes substantially the same restrictions as InfraRed on
securities of a non-reporting issuer." 6 Those restrictions required that after the restricted period the securities could be resold in the United
States only pursuant to registration or if an exemption was available, or
they could be resold offshore on a foreign securities exchange. This obvi-

than debt and that the existence of a trading market in the security in the United States
increases the likelihood of flowback. Id. at 89,133. This seems to assume that so long as
there is any danger of flowback to the United States that the securities have not come to
rest offshore. Perhaps, it means no more than that a longer period of time must elapse
between the completion of the distribution and routine trading transactions in the United
States in the case of equity securities that have a trading market in the United States in
order for the securities to be deemed to have come to rest offshore.
171. Proposing Release, supra note 2, at 89,136.
172. Id. at 89,129.
173. Proposing Release, supra note 2, at 89,137 n.113. The same note observes that this
would not be true as to securities held by a distributor representing an unsold allotment.
174. Proposing Release, supra note 2, at 89,138.
175. See SFCL, supra note 58, §4.08[2][e].
176. Proposing Release, supra note 2, at 89,139. On the InfraRed restrictions, see §3.
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ously is something less than being unrestricted after the expiration of the
restricted period (twelve months as to category 3 equity securities).
Regulation S, although cast in terms of offers and sales that occur
outside the United States, nonetheless, focuses on the concept of securities coming to rest outside the United States as being determinative of
whether a distribution is in fact completed outside the United States.
The other side of that coin is whether or not purchasers are statutory
underwriters as that term is defined by Section 2(11) of the Securities
Act. If the securities have come to rest, the distribution in the Section
2(11) sense is completed and, absent extraordinary circumstances, 17 7 persons other than affiliates of the issuer can resell the securities in reliance
on the Section 4(1) exemption for transactions not involving an issuer or
an underwriter. 1 78 On this basis, once the restricted period of the specific
safe harbor provision has expired, the securities should be deemed to
have come to rest and the distribution ended so that thereafter the securities can be resold in the U.S. or to U.S. persons in reliance on the Section
4(1) exemption. 79 Unfortunately, neither proposed Regulation S nor the
Proposing or Reproposing Release explicitly so states.
The question is somewhat less disconcerting if the securities are
listed on a foreign exchange or traded in a designated organized foreign
securities market. In that event, the securities could be resold on the exchange or the DOFSM during the restricted period as well as after under
the provisions of Rule 906.8 ° The issuer, however, in the case of category
3 equity securities, would have an obligation not to transfer the securities
unless such transfer is made in compliance with Regulation S."' Query
whether this precludes a transfer to a U.S. purchaser of securities resold
pursuant to Rule 906 on a foreign stock exchange.' 8 ' A distributor is precluded from selling category 3 equity securities to a U.S. person for a
period of one year, but there is no express limitation on the resale by the
foreign investor-purchaser under Rule 906(a) other than the general conditions. To be an offshore transaction under Rule 902(b)(g) neither the
seller nor any person acting on the seller's behalf can know that the

177. The now largely discredited presumptive underwriter doctrine might treat someone purchasing a large part of the offering as a statutory underwriter even after the securities have come to rest. See SFCL, supra note 58, §5.06 n.7.
178. See supra note 159.
179. Compare the coming to rest concept of the Rule 147(e) safe harbor under which an
intrastate offering is deemed to come to rest within nine months after the completion of the
distribution. A court has held that under the particular circumstances of the case securities
sold in reliance on the intrastate offering exemption and resold in the interstate market
after seven months had come to rest notwithstanding Rule 147(e). Busch v. Carpenter, 827
F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1987).
180. See §7[a] supra.
181. See §6[f] supra.
182. If the buyer during the restricted period turns out to be a U.S. person, the buyer
will have no notice of the restrictions and will be quite surprised if on transfer the issuer
refuses to transfer the securities in compliance with the category 3 restrictions relating to
equity securities.
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transaction has been pre-arranged with a buyer in the United States.
This probably does not impose any duty on the seller to inquire as to the
residence of the buyer provided the transaction is not pre-arranged with a
U.S. buyer.183 The transaction restrictions, however, expressly require the
issuer to refuse to transfer the securities to a U.S. person during the restricted period. The effect will be to require the U.S. purchaser to resell
the securities during the restricted period in the foreign market and keep
the securities from being traded in the United States during the restricted period unless registered.
There is also the opportunity for securities sold offshore to make
their way back to the United States through the private market that is
expected to develop as a result of the adoption of Rule 144A. One of the
purposes of Rule 144A is to permit qualified U.S. institutional investors
to acquire securities, particularly securities of foreign issuers, distributed
offshore. If a Rule 144A purchaser acquires securities of a reporting issuer
during the forty day restricted period, an interesting question arises as to
whether the securities would no longer be restricted after the expiration
of the forty day period. On the assumptions made above, such securities
would be unrestricted if held by the foreign investor for the entire period.
Securities sold in reliance on Rule 144A, however, are restricted securities
as defined by Rule 144(a)(3).8 If this is the appropriate classification,
Rule 144 would require a two year holding period measured under proposed revisions to Rule 144(d)(1) from the date initially purchased from
the issuer. Under these assumptions, qualified institutional investors presumably would purchase the securities only if convinced that there will be
a liquid Rule 144A market for them and ordinarily will prefer purchasing
them on the foreign market in which they trade. In the case of category 1
securities issued by a foreign issuer, the qualified institutional investor
(or, for that matter, any institutional investor) could purchase the security in the initial distribution in an offshore transaction, but that would
require a presence offshore to effect the transaction.185
The proposed amendments to Rule 144 and the reproposed Rule
144A 1s8 treat securities of foreign issuers which are non-reporting companies differently from all other securities in an apparent attempt to prevent their leakage into the public U.S. markets. The approach is discussed below as part of the discussion of Rule 144A. 8 7 The implication is
that such securities do no lose their restricted character after the expiration of the restricted period (as to category 3 securities) and that category
1 securities of a non-reporting foreign issuer are restricted notwithstanding the absence of a restricted period.
The extent to which trading will be precluded beyond the restricted

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

See supra note 154.
Rule 144A.
See §6[c] supra.
See §8[e].
See §8 infra.
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period depends on resolution of the issues discussed above. Such issues,
unfortunately, give rise to the type of theology prevalent for years relating to "investment intent" prior to the adoption of Rule 144.18 For the

most part, it will not be a concern of the underwriters who can rely on the
safe harbor except to the extent some of the participants in the underwriting may be concerned about their clients and insist on an opinion as
to the free trading nature of the securities after the restricted period.
Qualified institutional purchasers will also have concerns in this regard
and may want assurance in the form of an opinion of counsel. It will also
be of concern to issuers, particularly with respect to category 3 equity
securities, as to which issuers must establish a mechanism for preventing
transfers of record to U.S. purchasers. Although in most instances, a-resale after the restricted period, if a violation of Section 5, should not
place the entire "exemption" in jeopardy, 8 9 it, nonetheless, will be a
troublesome transfer agency problem and will place a premium (as was
the case of pre-Rule 144 opinions) on obtaining an opinion from counsel
who tends to see the issue in oversimplified terms. The most concerned
party, perhaps, should be the National Association of Securities Dealers.
The NASD proposal to establish the PORTAL market assumes that the
NASD and its members will be responsible for determining when securities can exit the private market19 and uncertainties in this regard as to
securities distributed under Regulation S could introduce severe
inefficiencies.
In the case of reporting issuers, there may be little difficulty in relying on statements in the Proposing Release that after the end of the restricted period the securities can be traded in the United States. This was
probably the general position of the bar under Release 4708, notwithstanding the staff's admonitions. There is little evidence that enforcement
personnel of the Commission attempted to police leakage into the U.S.
securities markets of securities distributed under 4708 once the lock-up
period expired. It would, nonetheless, be helpful if Regulation S specifically stated that persons acquiring securities issued in compliance with
the provisions of Regulation S will not be deemed an underwriter for purposes of Section 4(1) and that dealers have the Section 4(3) exemption
with respect to sales in the U.S. or to U.S. persons after the expiration of
the restricted period. If the Commission is intent on making distinctions
in this regard (e.g., reporting issuers versus non-reporting issuers generally or non-reporting foreign issuers specifically) on the basis of public
policy, this should be done by Rule and not through ad hoc staff interpretations of Section 4(1).

188. See SFCL, supra note 58, §§4.08[2][d], 4.10.
189. See supra note 130.
190. See §8(g).
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PROPOSED RULE

144A AND INTERRELATIONSHIP OF REGULATION
144 AND PROPOSED RULE 144A

S WITH

RULE

[a] Introduction
Although not referred to in Regulation S, it was the position of the
staff under Release 4708 that securities distributed in reliance on the Release would be treated as restricted securities for purposes of Rule 144
and could be resold in compliance with Rule 144 after the appropriate
holding period."' This would require a two year holding period before
such an exemption would be available' 92 and would be relied upon only if
there is not a Section 4(1) exemption at the end of the Regulation S restricted period. It provides a conservative (and last resort) means of assuring that securities sold offshore can be resold in the United States
without violating Section 5. The Commission has proposed to amend
Rule 144 so as to increase the liquidity in the "market" for restricted
securities. However, it has done so in a fashion, as is discussed below, that
reflects considerable concern about the flowback into the United States of
securities of non-reporting foreign issuers offering securities offshore in
reliance on Regulation S.
Rule 144A was proposed in October of 1988193 and reproposed in a
drastically revised form in July of 1989.19" The reproposal was accompanied by requests for comments in a number of areas and the Rule as finally adopted may differ from the proposed rule. Rule 144A is not an
exemption for issuers, but like Rule 144, is an exemption for persons
reselling securities acquired in exempt transactions, including for this
purpose, securities sold pursuant to Regulation S. If Rule 144A is
adopted, securities distributed offshore could be resold at anytime by the
purchasers to institutional investors meeting the prescribed qualifications
of the rule whether the sale is in the U.S. or offshore. The availability of
the exemption depends upon (1) the buyer, (2) the security, and (3) complying with the formalities imposed by the rule. It is a narrow and restricted codification of what has been referred to as the Section 4(1-1/2)
exemption, involving the resale of securities acquired in an exempt transaction to purchasers able to fend for themselves." 5 As Gilligan, Will emphasized, the purchasers to meet the Ralston Purina criteria (1) must be

191. Int. Income Property, Inc., SEC Div. Corp. Fin. No-Action Letter, [1981 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,785 (Dec. 12, 1980).
192. Rule 144(d)(1). In many instances, for securities not traded in the United States it
would require a three year holding period since it would not be possible to effect the transaction in the manner required by Rule 144(f) and/or to satisfy the current information requirement of Rule 144(c). Reliance in that event would have to be placed on the three year
holding period of Rule 144(k). Query, however, if Rule 144 would be available at all under
those circumstances since the no-action position does not specifically deal with the availability of Rule 144(k) for securities distributed offshore.
193. See Rule 144A Proposing Release, supra note 2.
194. See the Rule 144A Reproposing Release, supra note 2.
195. See supra note 159 for a discussion of the Section 4(1-1/2) exemption.
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sophisticated and (2) must have access to the same information as would
be available if the securities were registered.19 Under Rule 144A, certain
institutional investors as to certain categories of securities are deemed to
be sophisticated and are conclusively presumed to have access to the appropriate information. Being freed of the latter responsibility is no insignificant concession; Gilligan, Will found a Section 5 violation because the
sophisticated investors had not been furnished with adequate information. 197 Rule 144A is not exclusive and it is apparent that many transactions that will not have the benefit of Rule 144A in its initial incarnation
are exempt under a Gilligan, Will Section 4(1-1/2) analysis.'
[b] Qualified Institutional Buyers
To be a qualified institutional buyer, the buyer must be an institution described in Rule 144A(a) and at the end of its last fiscal year it
must have assets invested in securities that were purchased for more than
$100,000,000. Institutional buyers are defined substantially in the same
manner as accredited institutional investors in Rule 215 and Rule
501(a)(1)-(7) of Regulation D except self-directed pension plans and accredited investors who are natural persons are not included.' 99 Institutional buyers include banks, savings and loan associations, insurance companies, broker-dealers, registered investment companies, an employee
benefit plan if investment decisions are made by certain specified plan
fiduciaries, broker-dealers registered under the Exchange Act, any corporation or Massachusetts or similar business trust, and tax-exempt charitable corporations. The $100 million investment in securities criterion excludes a large number of institutional investors. According to statistics
cited by the Commission there are approximately 3,000 of the institutional investors in the principal categories that will meet the criteria."'
Qualified institutional buyers also include any investment company registered under the Investment Company Act which is part of a family of
registered investment companies with aggregate total investments in securities at a cost exceeding $100 million, and any registered investment
adviser with investments in securities at a cost in excess of $100 million
(including for this purpose investments in securities which it purchased
and which it manages for the accounts of others). 0 '
There is an important qualification relating to most of the qualified
institutional investors; that is, they are qualified institutional investors

196. Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 466 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896
(1959).
197. 267 F.2d at 466-67.
198. See supra note 159.
199. Rule 144A(a)(1).
200. Reproposing Release, supra note 2, at 80,224 n.16.
201. Rule 144A(a)(2). There are also special provisions for determining the
$100,000,000 invested in securities criterion for banks and other institutions investing in a
fiduciary capacity and for bank holding companies. See Rule 144A(a)(4)-(6).
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only with respect to purchases for their own account. This will be particularly difficult for investment advisers since, although they may include
managed portfolios in determining whether they meet the $100 million
criterion, they are not Rule 144A purchasers with respect to purchases
made for the accounts managed by them.2 0 2 There is, however, a special
category for banks and savings and loan associations and similar institutions which exercise investment discretion with aggregate assets invested
in securities purchased at a total cost of more than $100 million. Such
institutions are Rule 144A purchasers when "acting in a fiduciary capacity. 20 3 The high qualification requirements will also exclude most brokerdealers; according to statistics included in the Reproposing Release only
102 broker-dealers will qualify as Rule 144A purchasers. 2 4 This is unfortunate because the real promise for a liquid Rule 144A market lies in
broker-dealers acting as market makers and only those meeting the definition of a qualified institutional investor will be able to do so. There may
well be a number of revisions in the definition of qualified institutional
investors in the rule when adopted.
[c] Eligible Securities
Although not used in the Rule and not a defined term, the concept of
"fungible securities" plays an important role in determining securities
that do not have the benefit of the Rule. The concept under the reproposed rule embraces securities which are part of the same class as securities listed on a U.S. securities exchange or traded in an automated U.S.
inter-dealer quotation system (which includes NASDAQ, but excludes the
pink-sheet market), and securities issued by a registered open-end investment company, unit trust, or face-certificate company. 20 5 Securities not
traded in any organized securities market or only traded in the "pink
sheets" or other non-automated inter-dealer trading system, and securities traded on a foreign securities exchange or DOFSM are not fungible
securities for this purpose. Securities which were not fungible when issued and which are sold to a qualified institutional buyer have the benefit
of the safe harbor provided for by Rule 144A provided the additional conditions of the Rule are complied with.20 6 A convertible security, if it can
be converted into the underlying security within three years from the
date of issuance, is two securities both of which (the convertible security
and the underlying security) must be non-fungible in order for the safe
harbor to be available.2 0 7 Fungible securities do not have the protection of
Rule 144A and reliance would have to be placed on the Section 4(1-1/2)
exemption even though the transaction is with a qualified institutional

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Rule 144A(a)(2).
Rule 144A(a)(4).
Reproposing Release, supra note 2, at 80,224 n.16.
See Rule 144A(d)(3).
Rule 144A(d).
Rule 144A(d)(3)(i).
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investor.
[d] Informational Requirements and Other Conditions
In all transactions in which the seller relies on Rule 144A, the seller
must take reasonable steps to assure that the buyer is aware that the
seller may rely on Rule 144A. If the issuer of the securities sold in a Rule
144A transaction is a reporting company and the foregoing conditions are
complied with, there are no further conditions. If the issuer is a non-reporting company, with the exception noted below, upon request of the
buyer the seller must furnish the buyer with a brief description of the
issuer's business and the product or services it offers; its most recent balance sheet and income statement and similar statements for the preceding two fiscal years which should be audited to the extent available. 0 s If
the issuer is a foreign issuer, which is a non-reporting company but which
is exempt from registration under the Exchange Act by Rule 12g3-2(b)
(which requires it to file with the Commission such reports and other related information that it must file with the authorities and the stock exchange in the country in which it is domesticated), the seller does not
have to furnish such information. 0 9
The requirement that information relating to non-reporting companies be furnished by the seller upon request has drawn the criticism of
the investment banking community. 210 There is concern as to how the
sellers will obtain such information which will have to come either from
the issuer, reports of the issuer if such are available, or from secondary
sources. The need to furnish such information, if requested, will introduce inefficiencies to the market process. There is also concern about potential liability for the information the sellers furnish. The PORTAL
market discussed below will not rectify this situation as the NASD has
rejected the notion that such information be inputted on the PORTAL
computer. Since qualified institutional investors have extensive research
resources available to them, imposing such obligation on the seller appears unnecessary. By the same token, however, it appears unlikely that
most eligible purchasers will request such information unless it is not
conveniently available to them.
There are approximately 1500 foreign issuers which file the necessary
home country reports with the SEC in order to maintain the Rule 12g32(b) exemption from the registration and reporting requirements of the
Exchange Act.21' Presumably, most of these securities trade in the United

208. Rule 144A(d)(4).
209. Id.
210. See letter of the Securities Industry Association (SIA) dated September 12, 1989
commenting on the reproposed Rule 144A.
211. See Multi-Jurisdictional Disclosure Release, supra note 2, at 80,284. According to
this release there were also 516 foreign issuers that filed periodic reports (that is were registered) with the Commission under the Exchange Act which includes 150 foreign securities
traded on U.S. securities exchanges and 291 quoted in NASDAQ (99 in the National Market
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States to some extent, generally in the National Daily Quotation Sheets
(the "pink sheets"). Although treated as a reporting company for the limited purpose under Rule 144A of determining the information that has to
be furnished upon request to purchasers, the securities of such companies
are subject to restrictions on trading in the Rule 144A market not applicable to reporting companies or non-reporting U.S. issuers. If securities of
a non-reporting foreign issuer are traded on a foreign exchange or in a
designated organized foreign securities market and have been quoted in a
U.S. inter-dealer quotation system (which would include the "pink
sheets") during the previous twelve months, certain additional conditions
designed to prevent flowback to the United States must be complied with
in connection with a Rule 144A sale involving securities of the same class.
Specifically, the seller or any person acting on its behalf must take reasonable steps to assure that the securities are resold in the United States
only if the securities are registered or exempt from registration. Such
steps are conclusively deemed to be reasonable if they include an undertaking from the buyer to resell them only if the securities are exempt or
registered and a procedure is established that is reasonably designed to
prevent the securities from being transferred to other than qualified institutional buyers unless registered or exempt from registration." ' Such a
procedure would ordinarily require the cooperation of the issuer, although
trading the restricted securities exclusively in the PORTAL market discussed below is an alternative, assuming that PORTAL becomes
operational.
[e] Resales of Rule 144A Securities
The qualified institutional investor purchasing shares sold to it in reliance on Rule 144A has acquired restricted securities ' and may rely on
Rule 144 or Rule 144A for the resale of the securities. Rule 144, which
requires a two year holding period, will be a more practicable alternative
(except as to securities of certain foreign issuers) if Rule 144 is amended
as proposed concurrently with the proposal of Rule 144A so as to permit
the tacking of holding periods by successive purchasers of restricted securities. 1 4 The proposed amendment, however, specifically excludes securities of a foreign issuer which is not a reporting company at the time
of the resale. As to securities of such issuer, a new holding period would
commence with each Rule 144A purchase. This may mean as a practical
matter that once such securities enter the Rule 144A market they cannot
enter the U.S. public market if the issuer does not become a reporting

System). Id. However, a list of foreign issuers relying on Rule 12g3-2(b) published by the
SEC, according to the author's count, included only 948 companies. See Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 27325 (Sept. 29, 1989), 44 SEC Docket 1193 (Oct. 18, 1989).
212. Rule 144A(d)(5).
213. Rule 144A, Preliminary Note 5.
214. Proposed amendment to Rule 144(d)(1). See Reproposed Rule 144A Release,
supra note 2.

DEN. J. INT'L

L. & POL'Y

VOL. 18:1

company. The commencement of a new holding period each time the securities trade will make it difficult for any Rule 144A purchaser to satisfy
the Rule 144 holding period requirements. The holder, however, could
exit the private market by selling the securities in reliance on Rule 906 in
the offshore market in which the security trades, if there is one.2 15
The special regimen for non-reporting foreign issuers suggests that
the staff believes that the information available relating to such issuers is
less informative than information available relating to non-reporting U.S.
issuers. Rule 15c2-11 requires that before dealers can submit quotations
in the "pink sheets" relating to a non-reporting issuer that has not made
a recent registered or Regulation A offering the market maker must have
in its files certain basic information pertaining to the company and make
it reasonably available upon the request of a prospective purchaser. There
is no requirement that such companies file any information with the
Commission. A non-reporting foreign issuer whose securities are traded in
the "pink sheets" in most instances is relying on the Section 12g3-2(b)
exemption and will have filed and continue to file its home country reports with the Commission. In addition, a market-maker submitting quotations to the "pink sheets" must have in its files the information filed by
such foreign issuer with the Commission and make it reasonably available
upon the request of a prospective purchaser." 6 Both disclosure systems
are seriously flawed, and it is illusory to believe that one is better than
the other.
If Regulation S continues to be treated as involving shares issued in
transactions not involving a public offering, presumably the holding period of the initial purchaser for purposes of Rule 144 will run from the
date of acquisition by the initial purchaser from the issuer. If the securities are resold in reliance on Rule 144A or in successive Rule 144A transactions, the holding period will also run from that date if Rule 144(d)(1)
is amended except as to securities of foreign issuers which are non-reporting companies at the time of the sale. Presumably, to the extent purchasers in a Regulation S distribution can resell the securities after the expiration of the restrictions imposed by Regulation S, 217 the purchaser in a
Rule 144A transaction should be able to do so as well. In that event, reliance would be placed on Section 4(1) in connection with the resale rather
than the Rule 144A safe harbor. The parties to such a transaction will
have an interesting dilemma since the seller in order to have the benefit
of Rule 144A must notify the buyer that the seller may rely on Rule
144A. In that event, the buyer may be reluctant to purchase the securities
if it assumes that the Section 4(1) exemption is available. If it is in fact a
Rule 144A transaction, the buyer must conform with the Rule 144 two
year holding requirements.

215. See §7[b] supra.
216. Rule 15c2-11(a)(4).
217. See discussion at §7[c] supra.
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[f] Rule 144A and Regulation S in Tandem
Rule 144A, if adopted, although broader in application, will work in
tandem with Regulation S and to a limited extent will expedite the
purchase of foreign securities by U.S. institutional investors. This may
occur in several ways. Foreign issuers may place their securities directly
with U.S. institutional investors as a private tranche of a public offering
being made outside the United States in reliance on Regulation S. A
dealer participating in the offshore distribution may purchase part of the
issue for distribution to Rule 144A purchasers. Rule 144A is generally not
an exemption for the private placement itself, since it excludes issuers
and dealers from the provisions of Rule 144A which provides that one
selling in reliance on Rule 144A shall not be deemed an underwriter for
the purposes of Section 4(1). However, Rule 144A provides that a dealer
selling securities in conformity with Rule 144A is not deemed a participant in a distribution within the meaning of Section 4(3)(C) and is not
deemed to have offered the securities to the public within the meaning of
Section 4(3)(A) which should provide a Section 4(3) exemption for its
transactions as a dealer. The nature of the offering should assure that the
dealer is not an underwriter for purposes of Section 4(1). This does not,
however, assure the issuer of an exemption and presumably it would have
to rely on a conventional Section 4(2) exemption under these circumstances, which it may be reluctant to do notwithstanding Preliminary
Note 6 which provides that the fact that purchasers of securities from the
issuer may purchase with a view to reselling the securities under Rule
144A does not affect the availability to the issuer of the Section 4(2) exemption. The issuer, nonetheless, has made a private placement to the
ultimate purchasers which conceptually would not be available if they did
not have access to appropriate information relating to the issuer. Further,
assuming a violation by the issuer, the dealer, conceivably, may be a secondary violator of Section 5 notwithstanding the dealer exemption." 8
The dealer alternatively could act as a placement agent for the issuer
making the offshore distribution and sell the private tranche to a larger
prospective group of institutional and other accredited investors under
Regulation D. The Regulation D offering in the United States will not be
deemed integrated with the public offering offshore.2 9 It is not clear,
however, that foreign issuers will be as willing to utilize Regulation D as
they have not rushed to do so in the past. There appears to be a misconception as to the complexity of the documentation required under Regulation D vis a vis Rule 144A. In fact, no disclosure document is required
under Regulation D if all the purchasers are accredited investors which
can be assured if the offering is made only to institutional investors.2 2 It

218. Cf. United States v. Wolfson, 405 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
946 (1969).
219. See Rule 502(a) NOTE.
220. Rule 502(b)(1).
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will, however, be necessary for the issuer to file a Form D and to adopt
appropriate restrictions on resales. The availability of Rule 144A for resales and the potential for a liquid secondary market in privately placed
securities that Rule 144A promises should minimize this problem. This
could very well prove to be the principal impact of Rule 144A in encouraging offshore issuers to offer securities privately in the United States.
On the assumption that most of the foreign issuers that will be inclined to tap the U.S. private placement market will desire to avoid registration and reporting under the Exchange Act, the provisions of Rule
144A and Rule 144(d)(1), discussed above, applicable to non-reporting
foreign issuers may serve as a deterrent to the placement of equity securities if securities of the same class are traded or are likely to be traded in
the "pink sheets." The additional restrictions are particularly obnoxious
because they are applicable not only to the initial Rule 144A transaction,
but to subsequent Rule 144A resales as well. This is likely to result in
Rule 144A purchasers demanding a severe discount because the securities
have less ability to exit from the private placement market than securities
of U.S. issuers.
Rule 144A should facilitate distributions made by foreign issuers in
reliance on the category 3 safe harbor of Regulation S for equity securities of non-reporting foreign issuers with SUSMI. Domestic U.S. institutional investors which do not have a foreign affiliate could not purchase in
the primary distributions. The foreign purchasers, however, will be subject to a twelve month restriction on sales to U.S. persons or in the
United States in the absence of an exemption. During the period of such
restrictions, the securities can be sold under Rule 906 to U.S. persons if
the conditions of Rule 144A are complied with, including transactions in
the United States with qualified U.S. institutional investors. The certification provisions of the category 3 Regulation S safe harbor specifically
contemplate such resales.22 1 The institutional purchaser, however, presumably would be acquiring restricted stock for purposes of Rule 144. If
the foreign issuer does not become a reporting company, under the proposed amendment to Rule 144(d)(1) such purchaser would not only have
a two year holding period from the date of acquisition but any subsequent qualified institutional purchaser from the foreign issuer would have
a two year holding period commencing with the date of its acquisition.
The probabilities under such circumstances are that the purchaser would
be looking to a resale of the security on a foreign stock exchange or in a
DOFSM.
[g] The PORTAL Market For Rule 144A Sales
The NASD has proposed a closed market which would deal exclusively in securities traded in reliance on the Rule 144A exemption.22 The

221. Rule 905(c)(3).
222. See Securities Act Release No. 27470, 54 Fed. Reg. 49164 (Nov. 29, 1989) [herein-
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computerized screen based market, to be known as the PORTAL market,
will be available for both primary offerings and secondary trading. Since
Rule 144A is not available as an exemption for issuers, and since only
qualified institutional buyers and dealers are participants in the contemplated system, this apparently assumes that Rule 144A will be available
for dealers purchasing a tranche of a private offering or an offering distributed pursuant to Regulation S.222 The NASD has proposed establishing a number of safeguards to assure that securities traded within PORTAL involve transactions exempt under Rule 144A except as to the
informational requirements of the Rule which would be the responsibility
of the seller. The proposal also assumes responsibility for policing the exit
of securities from the system.22 4 This should be no great burden if Rule
144 is available for the resale of the security in the public trading markets
as dealers have well established procedures for handling such transactions
and for delivering a clean certificate. Nor will it be a problem if a registration statement is filed covering the exiting securities. It could be a significant burden, however, if the resale into the U.S. issues after the end of
the Regulation S restriction period discussed at §7[c] are not clarified.
The fact that such ambiguities are likely to create inefficiencies for the
PORTAL market should provide an incentive for the staff to remove the
uncertainties.
§9

CONVERTIBLE SECURITIES

There is no definition in Regulation S of a debt security, raising the
issue of whether convertible debt securities are debt or equity and reviving old conceptual differences as to whether such securities are one security or two securities.22

1
As discussed below, 2 26
convertible securities are

after the "PORTAL Release"]. See also discussion at supra note 9.
223. See discussion, supra note 218.
224. See PORTAL Release, supra note 222.
225. Prior to the adoption of Rule 144, similar conceptual problems existed with respect to privately placed convertible debentures. If the Section 4(2) exemption was available
for the private placement of the debentures, arguably the Section 3(a)(9) exemption of the
Securities Act for an exchange offering by an issuer with its own security holders exempted
the conversion. The Commission, however, took the position that Section 3(a)(9) exempted
the conversion, but not the resale of the underlying security which had to find its own exemption. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., Securities Act Release No. 3825, [57-61 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,539 (Aug. 12, 1957). Rule 155 codified this position.
Securities Act Release No. 4248, [1957-61 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,710
(July 14, 1960). Rule 144(d)(4)(B), however, superseded Rule 155 and takes essentially a
one-security approach providing for a single holding period which commences with the acquisition of the convertible debenture. Rule 144 should be applicable with respect to resale
of securities distributed offshore to the extent reliance is placed on the Rule so after a two
year holding period either the convertible debenture or the underlying common stock could
be resold in compliance with the conditions of the Rule. It does not resolve, however, the
issue of whether the Regulation S safe harbor is available and when the underlying securities can be resold in reliance on Section 4(1) prior to the expiration of the Rule 144 holding
period.
226. See infra note 236.
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probably equity securities for most purposes,"" and such securities may
be debt for the purpose of determining the aggregate debt securities held
by U.S. persons in connection with the determination of whether there is
SUSMI for the purpose of a debt offering.22 It does not, however, necessarily follow that a separate determination would have to be made as to
whether there was a SUSMI with respect to the convertible debt security
and the underlying equity security. If a convertible debenture is deemed
a single security, the distinction is not an important one with respect to
reporting companies since, whether debt or equity, it will be in category 2
and subject to the same offering and transaction restrictions. In the case
of a non-reporting U.S. issuer, whether debt or equity, it will be a category 3 security. However, as to such issuers, the period and nature of the
transaction restrictions depends upon whether the security is a debt or
equity security. In the case of a non-reporting foreign issuer with SUSMI,
if a convertible debt security is debt it is in category 2; if equity, it is in
category 3 and subject to the more rigorous transaction restrictions of
that category.
If the convertible debt security is both a debt security and equity
security, there will be important different consequences in all of the situations described. In that event, there would be transaction restrictions
not only with respect to the convertible security, but also as to the underlying security. In the case, for example, of a convertible debenture issued
by a non-reporting foreign issuer, it would be necessary to first determine
whether there is SUSMI with respect to both debt and common stock.
Assuming there was SUSMI with respect to both, the convertible debenture would be in category 2 and the underlying common stock would be
in category 3. If there was SUSMI as to the common stock, but not as to
the convertible debt, the convertible security would be in category 1 and
the underlying common stock would be in category 3.
The staff's position historically in applying Release 4708 has been
similar to Rule 155229 in regarding a convertible security as two securities
and limiting the Section 3(a)(9) exemption to the conversion and not to
the resale of the underlying security which must be registered or find its
own exemption prior to resale. International Telephone and Telegraph
(ITT) in September of 1972 sold $50 million of convertible debentures in
the Eurobond market in reliance on Release 4708 adopting a ninety day
lock-up as to the debentures. The conversion price was at a premium of
approximately forty percent above the current market price of the common stock at the time of distribution.23 The underlying common stock

227. Section 3(a)(11) of the Exchange Act and Rule 3all-1 adopted and Rule 405
adopted under the Securities Act all provide that securities convertible into equity securities
are equity securities, but these definitions are not specifically incorporated into Regulation
S.
228. See §6[c].
229. See supra note 225.
230. See Int. Tel. & Tel. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1973 Transfer Binder] Fed.
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was listed on the New York Stock Exchange and the issuer was, therefore,
a reporting issuer. Counsel for ITT requested a no-action letter asserting
that Section 3(a)(9) would exempt the conversion and the resale of the
underlying shares. The staff replied that based on counsel's opinion it
would recommend no action if the convertible debentures were converted
into common stock without registration in reliance on Section 3(a)(9).
The letter, however, went on and stated: "[W]e cannot agree that the exemption provided in said Section 3(a)(9) would cover resales by the holders of the common stock received upon such conversion. Any such resales
would require registration under the Act absent some other available exemption." Counsel then came back with the argument that resales would
be exempt under Section 4(1) as transactions not involving an issuer or
underwriter. The staff responded that notwithstanding "the facts and arguments presented, we are unable to conclude that this Division would
not recommend appropriate action to the Commission if the subject debentures or the underlying stock were to be distributed in the United
States without registration under the Securities Act of 1933." The ITT
letter, nonetheless, represented a concession from the position previously
asserted that the underlying securities had to be registered prior to
conversion.2"'
A $60 million offering by Sperry Rand (Sperry) of convertible debentures in the Eurobond market in February of 1973 posed substantially
identical issues.232 The debentures could not be converted until March of
1974. Counsel to Sperry expressed the opinion that the conversion would
be exempt under Section 3(a)(9) and the shares could be resold in reliance on the Section 4(1) exemption. The staff gave essentially the same
response; no action would be recommended with respect to the conversion, but no views were being expressed as to when the debentures or the
shares underlying the debentures could be resold in the United States. In
a number of subsequent convertible debenture offerings made in reliance
on Release 4708, the debentures were subject to tight lock-up procedures
and provision was made for the registration of the common stock prior to
conversion apparently to provide the holders with the ability to resell the
33
underlying shares.1
The Proposing Release, however, sends some different signals. A
footnote to the Proposing Release states that a convertible security is an
equity security unless it cannot be converted into the underlying security
until the expiration of the restricted period.134 The Proposing Release

Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 179,462 (July 27, 1973).
231. See California Business Communications, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Aug. 9,
1972), in which the staff stated: "[lilt is our opinion that the underlying shares must be
registered sometime prior to their issuance resulting from the conversion of the debenture."
232. Sperry Rand Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (March 1, March 13, 1974).
233. See, e.g., Ni-Cal Finance N.V., SEC No-Action Letter (April 30, 1984); Fairchild
Camera and Instrument Corp. Int. Finance, N.V., SEC No-Action Letter (Nov. 15, 1976).
234. Proposing Release, supra note 2, at 89,139 n.122.
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also states that conversion would ordinarily "be exempt from registration
under §3(a)(9)." 23 5 Further, the Proposing Release specifically states that
the restricted period would be restricted only for the remainder of the
applicable restricted period that applied to the convertible securities."'
This sounds like a single security theory and an adaptation of the Rule
144 treatment of convertible securities. One confusing aspect of this regulation by release rather than rule is that the no-action letter cited for the
proposition that the convertible debenture is an equity security2 37 is one
of a series of letters taking the position that Section 3(a)(9) does not exempt the resale of the underlying security.2 3 8
This approach has the virtue of simplifying the application of Regulation S to convertible debentures, making for a nice tidy package.
SUSMI for foreign issuers of a convertible debenture would probably be
determined on the basis of whether it existed with respect to the underlying common stock. If SUSMI exists and the issuer is a non-reporting
company, the convertible debenture as an equity security would be in category 3 and the twelve month restricted period and related restrictions
applicable to category 3 equity restricted securities would come into
play.23 The restricted period applicable to the underlying security, however, would commence with the completion of the distribution of the convertible security.
If the security could not be converted until the end of the transaction
restriction period, it would be a debt security. SUSMI of a foreign issuer
would be determined on this basis. If there was no SUSMI for its debt
securities, it would be in category 1; otherwise it would be in category 2.
The appropriate Regulation S restricted period which determines the period for which the securities must not be convertible in order to be debt,
is "the restricted period, if any, applicable to the equity securities of the
issuer."2 10 There are no transaction restrictions for category 1 securities of
certain foreign issuers provided there is no SUSMI. But whether there is
SUSMI may depend upon whether the convertible securities are debt or
equity. The reasoning, therefore, becomes circular. One way to break that
circle is to determine whether there is SUSMI for the equity securities of
the issuer and if there is not to assume that it is a debt security. In that
event, applying the foregoing criterion literally, the securities can be immediately convertible since there are no restrictions applicable to its equity securities. If there is SUSMI as to the equity securities of a foreign
issuer, the restricted period is forty days as to a reporting company and
twelve months as to a non-reporting company. In order to be classified as
debt, therefore, the securities of a reporting company could not be con-
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237.
238.
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Proposing Release, supra note 2, at 89,137 n.113.
Proposing Release, supra note 2, at 89,137.
Sperry Rand Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (March 1, 1974). See supra note 232.
See supra note 230.
See §6[f].
See Proposing Release, supra note 2, at 89,139 n.122
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verted for forty days and those of a non-reporting company for twelve
months. The same analysis (i.e., non convertible for forty days if a reporting company and twelve months if a non-reporting company) would be
applicable to convertible securities issued by a U.S. company.
The foregoing suppositions based on the Proposing Release are all
premised on the assumption that the Section 3(a)(9) exemption is otherwise available. In order for the Section 3(a)(9) exemption to be available,
no commissions or other remuneration can be paid for soliciting the exchange. If the exemption is not available, the Proposing Release provides
that the conversion will be treated as if it involved the exercise of a warrant.2" 1 Further, this analysis, if correct, although extremely helpful in
determining the transaction restrictions that have to be imposed and providing a blue-print for construction of the conversion terms of the convertible debenture, does not necessarily resolve the issue of whether the
securities acquired on conversion can be resold in reliance on Section 4(1)
or for that matter, whether the convertible securities can be sold in reliance on Section 4(1). The problem with respect to resales in the United
States of the convertible debentures is the same as that discussed
above. 42 The problem is somewhat different with respect to the underlying securities, which, for example, assuming that they are not converted
until after the expiration of the restricted period, the seller may attempt
to resell on a U.S. stock exchange the day following acquisition from the
issuer since there is no separate restricted period for the underlying securities. The niceties of the Section 4(1) arguments this scenario might
produce are likely to have a deja vu ring.

§10 WARRANTS
Regulation S does not work well with respect to warrants or convertible securities that would not have the benefit of the Section 3(a)(9) exemption. This is not surprising as a similar dichotomy exists with respect
to convertible securities that are registered and warrants that are issued
with a debt security, both of which are registered. Once a registered public offering of convertible securities is completed, that is the end of the
matter for the conversion is exempt under Section 3(a)(9) and historically
Section 4(1) has been available for the resale of the underlying shares. In
the case of warrants issued as part of a unit consisting of debt and warrants to purchase common stock, if the warrants are presently exercisable,
there is a continuing offering of the underlying securities and a registration statement covering the underlying shares has to be kept in effect for
the life of the warrants at least if the warrants are "in the money" (that
is, a favorable relationship of the exercise price to the market price raises
the likelihood the warrants will be exercised).2 4 If the warrants are issued

241. Proposing Release, supra note 2, at 89,137, n.114.
242. See supra note 230.
243. See SFCL, supra note 58, §7.24[1].
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by a foreign issuer and neither the warrants nor the debt security have a
SUSMI, the Regulation S category 1 safe harbor would permit the offering without restrictions on either security. The question is whether this
would be true in the event of an overseas domestic offering. To be in
category 1 the offering would have to be made in the issuer's home country. In that event, however, there may be a strong likelihood that the
underlying securities will be resold immediately in the United States and
the underlying security (as distinguished from the unit) may not satisfy
the requirement that it be "made in accordance with customary local
practices." ' For securities in any other category there will be a restricted
period. The offer of the underlying securities is a continuous one that is
not completed until all the warrants are exercised or expire. The restriction on sales to U.S. persons or in the United States would, therefore,
remain in effect throughout the exercise period and for the specified restricted period that commences with the completion of the offering. The
Proposing Release states: "Generally, the safe harbor of Regulation S
would not be available for the issuance of securities on the exercise of
warrants to a U.S. person."24"
The Proposing Release refers to the no-action letter relating to Sears
Overseas Finance N.V. 24 as reflecting this position. In Sears, the company offered offshore units consisting of Notes in the principal amount of
$100 million and warrants to purchase other notes with a different maturity date in the principal amount of $200 million. The Notes originally
issued were subject to conventional lock-up provisions for ninety days
and the definitive notes and warrants were not delivered to purchasers
until the expiration of the ninety days and certification of non-U.S. ownership. The warrants included a legend that they could not be sold to or
exercised by any national or resident of the United States. On exercise of
the warrants, the holder was required to certify that he was not a U.S.
national or resident and undertake not to resell the notes received on exercise of the warrants for ninety days to a U.S. national or resident. No
lock-up procedures, however, were adopted as to the notes received on
exercise of the warrants. The staff's no-action letter included the usual
statement that "no view" was expressed as to when the notes could be
reoffered or resold in the U.S. or to citizens or residents of the U.S. without registration under the Securities Act. Although not explicit in this
24 7
regard, the implication of the Proposing Release discussion of warrants
is that the securities received on exercise of the warrants would be subject
to the relevant transfer restrictions to U.S.- persons or in the United
States in order for a safe harbor to be available. To this extent, it goes
beyond Sears as to certain securities since, it would, for example, with
respect to warrants to purchase a debt security of a non-reporting U.S.
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Rule 902(h).
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issuer require the use of a global certificate in connection with the issuance of the debt securities.24 8 Since the restriction remains in effect for
forty day after the completion of the offering, which would not be until 40
days after the expiration of the warrants, warrant holders exercising well
in advance of the expiration date would go for an extended period of time
without a definitive certificate relating to the security acquired on exercise of the warrants. Similarly, in the case of category 3 equity securities,
warrant holders exercising the warrants early would be subject to the restrictions for a period in excess of twelve months. Under these circumstances it would appear imperative for the securities to trade on a foreign
stock exchange to provide holders on the exercise of the warrants a market in which they could resell the securities under Rule 906.20
§11

EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH OF THE FRAUD PROVISIONS

The liberal attitude of the SEC relating to the sale of unregistered
securities outside of the U.S. does not mean that the U.S. securities laws
have no application to transactions effectuated within the scope of Release 4708 or Regulation S. The potential extraterritorial scope of the
fraud provisions of the U.S. securities laws is as broad as the definition of
commerce, which includes the use of any means or instrumentality of
commerce between a state of the United States and a foreign country.25
The Second Circuit in particular has gone very far in finding subject matter jurisdiction with respect to the fraud provisions of the securities laws
as they apply to sales made to non-nationals of the United States if the
jurisdictional means have been used and significant activities relating to
the offering have taken place in the United States. Although the Second
Circuit conceptually distinguishes between mere preparatory acts which
have taken place in the United States (no subject matter jurisdiction) and
acts occurring in the United States which directly caused the loss (subject
matter jurisdiction), as a practical matter, the preparation of the prospectus (or other disclosure document) of a U.S. issuer has to take place primarily in the United States, in which event it appears that the fraud provisions are applicable."" It does not appear (as to private placements)
that the failure to make any disclosure will avoid jurisdiction since a culpable failure to act which occurs in the United States can be the basis for
subject matter jurisdiction.2 52
Judge Robert Bork, then sitting on the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, approached the question of extraterritoriality from a

248. See §6[f].
249. See supra §7[a].
250. 15 U.S.C. §77b(7); 15 U.S.C. §78c(a)(17).
251. Compare Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975), with ITT v.
Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980).
252. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, supra note 251, at 993. See also Continental Grain
(Australia) PTY, Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1979).

DEN. J. INT'L

L. & POL'Y

VOL. 18:1

slightly different perspective. 52 The plaintiffs were citizens of West Germany who bought securities consisting of interests in a West German limited partnership that contemplated investing in U.S. real estate. Arthur
Anderson & Co. GmbH (GmbH), a West German limited liability corporation, prepared a report relating to the "entire plan" and the defendant,
Arthur Anderson & Co. (AA-USA) furnished information to GmbH to be
included in the report. The information was alleged to be false and misleading. AA-USA challenged the subject matter jurisdiction of the U.S.
courts.
Judge Bork surveyed the case law in the other circuits, referring to
the Second Circuit's position as evidenced by Bersch as more restrictive
than the views of the Eighth Circuit in Continental Grain 4 and the
Third Circuit in Kasser.65 It is sufficient, under Continental with respect
to the sale of securities by foreigners to foreigners that the conduct of the
defendant in the United states "was in furtherance of a fraudulent
scheme and was significant with respect to its accomplishment. 2 5 The
Third Circuit's test in Kasser "where at least some activity designed to
further a fraudulent scheme occurs within this country,115 7 is even "more
permissive." '58 Kasser, however, may be appropriate (although the court
noted it was not deciding that issue) since it involved an action by the
SEC which "is a responsible governmental agency" and can take into account the policy concerns of the State Department in initiating an action
involving foreign contacts.2 59 To a degree all of the decisions are policy
oriented since the statute is not explicit and there is no relevant legislative history. Judge Bork, if writing on a clean slate, might have been inclined "to doubt that an American court should ever assert jurisdiction
2
over domestic conduct that causes loss to foreign investors.""
In view of
"the Second Circuit's preeminence in the field of securities law," and out
of a "desire to avoid a multiplicity of jurisdictional tests," the court opted
for adopting the Second Circuit test since it opened up the door to American courts the least. 61 The court then applied its restated version of that
test as one that required that the acts of the defendant committed in the
United States satisfy all the elements of a Rule 10b-5 claim other than
reliance and damages. 62 The court concluded that since the defendant
did not furnish information used in any disclosure document, but merely
furnished it to another party who in turn used the information, that the

253. Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
254. Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409 (8th
Cir. 1979).
255. SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977).
256. 592 F.2d at 421.
257. 582 F.2d at 114.
258. 824 F.2d at 31.
259. Id. at 33 n.3.
260. Id. at 32.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 33.
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defendant's acts were not in connection with the purchase or sale of a
security."' Since one of the elements of Rule 10b-5 was not established as
to the defendant, subject matter jurisdiction did not exist.
The court invited a comparison with the leading Rule 10b-5 case on
the issue of whether misrepresentations were made in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security in which the test is whether "assertions are
made . . .in a manner reasonably calculated to influence the investing
public, e.g., by means of the financial media ... ."I" Judge Bork, however, appears to have disregarded the allegations of the complaint that
AA-USA knew that the information it furnished would be included in the
report and relied upon by investors by referring to the "private" nature of
the communication. Similarly, he glossed over Texas Gulf Sulphur by
contrasting the private communication with the use of the "means of the
financial media," disregarding the fact that the "e.g." in the quote reflected that the financial media was illustrative rather than exhaustive
and ignoring the end use of the information. He also reinforced his views
by reference to Section 30(b) of the Exchange Act which excludes the
application of the Act to conducting a business in securities outside of the
United States unless the Commission explicitly adopts rules necessary or
appropriate to prevent evasion of the Act. He drew from this the inference that Congress intended to limit the extraterritorial application of
the Act. What he fails to note is that this provision deals with the regulation of the securities business outside the United States; that is, activities
of broker-dealers. Chief Judge Wald, in concurring, disassociated herself
from the rationalization of the opinion, concluding that under any approach the misrepresentations alleged were insignificant and so indirectly
related to the fraudulent scheme that federal jurisdiction did not exist.
Where AA-USA issued certified consolidated financial statements for
DeLorean Motors Co. and its subsidiaries, the field work for which, it
contended, was largely done in the United Kingdom and Ireland, the district court, nonetheless, refused to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.26 5 The purchaser-plaintiff was an agency of the British government and the securities sold consisted of preferred stock of a UK
subsidiary. In addition to concluding that there was at least a dispute as
to the amount of work done outside of the United States on the audits,
AA-USA also, since it certified the statements, had a duty to supervise
the work under generally accepted auditing standards. Further, the close
relationship of the American parent and its foreign subsidiary, based on
Cornfeld, permitted the court to regard the securities as being "in substance" American securities rather than foreign securities."6
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CONCLUSION

The adoption of Regulation S and Rule 144A will stimulate offshore
distributions, will provide a less regulated access to the U.S. market to
foreign issuers, will enhance the liquidity of securities issued in the private placement market, and will enhance the access of U.S. institutional
investors to issues of securities by foreign companies. The impact, however, is likely to be a modest one in all of those areas notwithstanding the
predictions for dramatic change.
U.S. and other issuers have been distributing huge amounts of securities in the Eurobond market for well over a decade, with the U.S. issuers
using lock-up procedures to prevent flowback and many foreign issuers
oblivious to the theoretical subject matter jurisdiction of the SEC. Regulation S will make the restrictions somewhat less cumbersome, should improve the efficiency of this market and, hence, make it at least marginally
more attractive than presently. Unfortunately, Regulation S does not say
point blank that once the safe harbor restricted period has expired the
securities can be resold to U.S. persons and in the United States. The
ambiguities in this area will continue to be of concern although they are
greatly alleviated by the fact that the securities can be resold at any time
if the securities are traded in an appropriate foreign securities market.
The extent to which foreign issuers will be more likely to offer securities in the United States is more a matter of perception than rule-making.
Rule 144A does not provide an exemption for issuers making a private
placement although it will facilitate purchases of a block of securities
from an issuer by a dealer which can rely on Rule 144A in connection
with the resales. Nor does Rule 144A provide greater flexibility as to the
disclosure document that can be used in a private placement than Regulation D. Regulation D does not require the use of any disclosure document in sales to accredited investors.2 "7 A foreign issuer can use its foreign prospectus, assuming it complies with the fraud provisions, or it can
use no disclosure document in an offering of a private tranche made in
reliance on Regulation D. If the assumption is that the dealer will buy a
block from the foreign issuer and distribute it in the United States under
Rule 144A, the issuer must still be concerned about its exemption.2"" Reliance on Regulation D rather than Section 4(2) appears to be advisable
and would permit a much broader market for the primary distribution
since the offering could be made to any accredited investor. 2 9 In that
event, Rule 144A would add liquidity by providing a secondary market

267. Rule 502(b)(1).
268. See discussion at supra note 218.
269. The PORTAL market, however, would not be available for the primary distribution if made to accredited investors who are not qualified institutional purchasers under
Rule 144A. Purchasers that are Rule 144A qualified could go directly into PORTAL to resell
the securities and non-qualified purchasers could access PORTAL for resales through a broker with access to PORTAL. See discussion, supra note 9.
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which would not be inconsistent with the resale restrictions of Rule
502(d). It would be necessary for the issuer to file a Form D, which is the
simplest of procedures.2 70 There may be an assumption that if the securities are purchased by the dealer and resold in reliance on Rule 144A that
only the dealer will have Section 12(2) liability for misrepresentations in
the selling materials."' This issue has not been fully resolved and appears
to be a risky assumption from the standpoint of the issuer.
Regulation S will facilitate purchases of securities distributed offshore, including foreign securities, by U.S. institutional investors who organize a separate subsidiary based offshore since such subsidiaries will
not be U.S. persons. Those that do not have a subsidiary will be able to
purchase securities distributed offshore by foreign issuers relying on the
category 1 safe harbor, but only if the transaction (including the offer)
takes place offshore. This will be no easy matter for an institutional investor that has neither an offshore subsidiary nor an offshore presence. It
is further complicated by the fact that there can be no directed selling
effort in the United States; hence, there is a problem as to how such institutional investors will become aware of the offering. Qualified U.S. institutional investors can effect Rule 144A transactions with the original purchasers in a Regulation S distribution. The primary way most U.S.
institutional investors will participate is by purchasing the securities distributed offshore in the organized offshore securities market in which
they are traded and by purchasing securities of foreign issuers that are
placed privately in the United States.
A principal impact of Regulation S and Rule 144A will be to significantly enhance the liquidity of the secondary market in securities privately placed in the United States. This will be particularly true once the
PORTAL market is in place. Institutional investors will be encouraged to
purchase securities privately placed in the United States by foreign issuers because they are likely to have an outlet before the expiration of the
Rule 144 two year holding period through PORTAL or a foreign trading
market. Purchasers of privately placed domestic securities will have the
same outlets, but it is less likely that there will be a foreign market for
the security.
There has been a tendency to overlook the significance of the General
Statement to the effect that offshore offers and sales of securities are not
subject to the registration provisions of Section 5.21 Although one obvi-

ously prefers to rely on a safe harbor, the General Statement may be useful in situations in which the safe harbor is unduly restrictive. This might
be the case, for example, with respect to the resale of shares underlying

270. See SFCL, supra note 58, §4.05[7].
271. See Collins v. Signetics Corp., 605 F.2d 110 (3rd Cir. 1979). See also Pinter v.
Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, (1988). But see Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1115 (5th Cir.
1988) ("everyone who invested in the initial offering bought from the underwriters and the
issuer"). Cf. SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1980).
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warrants in which the restricted period is measured from the expiration
of the exercise period rather than when the warrant is exercised because
the offering of the underlying shares is a continuous offering. The existence of the General Statement also affords the basis for attempting to
obtain a no-action letter in situations in which Regulation S did not get
everything right in the first instance. It may also be of some comfort with
respect to resales in the United States after the end of the restricted period as to which Regulation S is silent.
A frustrating aspect of both proposed Regulation S and Rule 144A is
the tendency to regulate by the legislative history reflected in the proposing and reproposing releases rather than in the regulation. A consequence
is that one must scour the releases (and particularly the footnotes) for
important nuances not covered by the proposed rules. One purpose of this
article has been to perform that function for the reader, but someone
with a specific problem will have to repeat that process to be sure that
nothing has been overlooked.
The possible combination of transactions that will arise as the result
of the interrelationship of Regulation S and Rule 144A is almost limitless,
as are the various scenarios relating to offshore distributions that will be
subject to Regulation S. Part II of this article will approach Regulation S
and Rule 144A from the vantage point of specific offerings and transactions rather than in general abstract terms.

BOOK REVIEW

International Law and the Use of Force by
National Liberation Movements
Reviewed by Dr. Ranee Khooshie Lal Panjabi*
WILSON, HEATHER A., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF
FORCE BY NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS, Clarendon
Press, Oxford, England (1988); ISBN 0-10-825570-5, 209 pp.
This very readable and interesting book is a revised version of the
author's doctoral thesis submitted to Oxford University in 1985. The research is thorough with a judicious blend of primary and secondary
sources. The subject is explored from a variety of perspectives with emphasis on the changing perceptions concerning the legitimacy of force as
an instrument in securing self-determination. The role of the United Nations forms a vital part of the thesis and there is detailed discussion of
the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. This book
would be useful for university students in international law, international
relations, history and political science.
Wilson makes the reader aware of the progressive development of international law and international practice in the subject of national liberation movements. The rapid decolonization process which occurred after
the Second World War brought a new set of 'actors' onto the 'international stage.' Newly-independent countries eager to play a significant role
in international politics could, by force of numbers at the United Nations
General Assembly, influence the passage of resolutions granting approval
to wars of national liberation. Overriding the Western approach which
preferred to think of war in its traditional sense as an inter-State exercise, the new nations of Asia and Africa pushed for the recognition of
national liberation movements in those areas still ruled by colonial powers. They dismissed the colonial argument that such movements were internal rebellions and purely domestic problems, insisted on internationalizing anti-imperialist conflicts and even granted premature recognition to
some revolutionary groups in order to enhance the latter's status and
global prestige.
* Associate Professor, Memorial University of Newfoundland.
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While the Charter of the United Nations does not condone the use of
force to acquire political sovereignity, in practice, the United Nations has
affirmed its recognition of the legitimacy of populations struggling to be
free of colonial and alien domination. Such people have, according to the
General Assembly, the right to self-determination and independence and
can, presumably, utilize all necessary means at their disposal in the attempt to exercise that right. This would, in the perception of most AfroAsian countries, legitimize the various national liberation movements.
The passage in December 1960 of General Assembly Resolution
1514(XV), The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples, proved to be a significant milestone. This encouragement to the principle of self-determination and condemnation of alien
domination heralded a new approach in international thought leading to
a recognition of an existing reality, in that independent Afro-Asian States
were actively pursuing the mission of helping to free their less fortunate

neighbors. In that sense, the General Assembly was merely echoing existing thought in a significant area of the world.
The rapid pace of change in political approaches caught Western
states somewhat off guard. Traditional ideas of international war as an
exercise confined to States possessing the usual criteria for statehood land, population, sovereignity - have been challenged by the commitment of independent Afro-Asian nations to using the international forum
at the United Nations to confer legitimacy, recognition and even prestige
on certian liberation movements. Most important of all has been the dismissal of the idea that international war has to be fought only between
States. The concept of international war as applying to peoples fighting
against an alien ruler has also gained acceptance. While resolutions of the
General Assembly may not have binding force on Member States, these
declarations are a significant indication of world public opinion. To that
extent they play a role in formulating and reflecting changing international perceptions.
The blurred distinctions between internal and international conflicts
have been amply explored by Wilson who points out that the reason why
national liberation movements seek international status is largely to free
themselves from the constraints of municipal law and to acquire belligerent status for their armed personnel, which would give them rights in
international law.
For third party States, the developments of the past four and a half
decades have been momentous. Traditionally, assistance to insurgent, rebellious movements by outside Governments was deemed to contravene
the principles of international law. A number of authors still support this
view. However, the practice of States, including Western nations, indicates that occasionally assistance can even be given to indigenous rebellious groups fighting against their own national governments. The United
States government's assistance to the Contra movement in Nicaragua is a
case in point. The American Government's justification of its actions as
being in support of a legitimate liberation movement proves that even
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Western States have been influenced by the new perceptions brought to
the international scene, largely by Third World nations. While generally
denying the validity of these novel ideas in the United Nations, countries
like the United States have not hesitated to use the new rhetoric where
their own interests are thought to be directly affected.
Hence, one might argue that the legitimacy of liberation movements,
their international status and their right to justify the use of force in
ousting a colonial or alien or dictatorial government are already accepted
as custom in international practice. The extent of third party intervention in such conflicts is now so routine that traditional concepts of international law may well need revision.
Wilson has conducted a detailed study of the humanitarian implications of these new perceptions of the right to use force by national liberation movements. However controversial the idea that rebellious groups
have some inherent right to resort to violence to oust their governments,
it is now widely recognized that international law must seek to protect
the innocent victims on both sides by extending and expanding the perimeters of international conventions currently in force and by applying
them rigorously in any conflict. The conferring of prisoner of war status
to captured armed personnel is only one possibility. Cooperation by all
parties with Red Cross efforts to alleviate the plight of the wounded and
of civilian populations in the fighting zones is another. The 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions have attempted to expand the boundaries of international humanitarian law. The reluctance of
governments under fire from liberation movements has delayed the universal acceptance of these obligations. Ironically, as Wilson points out,
national liberation movements have generally been more willing to cooperate in enforcing international legal principles and obligations largely because this assists their attempt to gain acceptance as legitimate
movements.
In seeking to prove her point by example, the author has referred
briefly to a number of revolutionary movements. One can only wish that
she had spent more time on some of these examples. A more in-depth
study of the Palestinian uprising and a more detailed analysis of the
South African situation would have enhanced the book. Hopefully, she
will continue her research in this topical field of international law and
apply her conclusions to specific national liberation movements in future
monographs.
Wilson's conclusions are basically sound: that 'peoples' can possess
status and even personality in international law and society; that the current defintion of 'people' is not exclusively ethnic but more territorial in
scope; that national liberation movements have successfully challenged
the exclusive right of the state to use force; that wars of national liberation are now largely deemed to be international wars and international
law must apply in such cases. The percepts of international law are generally slow to catch up with the realities of international politics. This has
been the case in the topic under discussion as indeed in other areas of
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international law.
Finally, the period since the Second World War has witnessesd the
emergence of a new group of nations whose actions and ideas have
brought about rapid change in attitudes and policies, particularly in the
United Nations, which replaced the smaller League of Nations. No longer
is international law created by the consensus and compromise of a handful of powerful States, mainly in the West. Each day, the traditional
norms are being chipped away by the challenges posed by the new players
in the game. While their participation makes the entire process uncertain
and full of risks, it also makes the process dramatic, daring and more in
line with public opinion as represented by the majority of the world's
population. For the West, this implies both promise and peril. Too rigid
an adherence to outmoded norms will put the North American-European
world out of touch with its global neighbors. Too eager an acceptance of
dynamic definitions of self-determination and national freedom can only
be made at the sacrifice of traditional long-held ideas. A flexible, pragmatic approach would benefit both the West and the Third World. The
next few decades will determine whether we in the Western world are up
to the challenges posed by our Afro-Asian neighbors and whether we can
adjust our patterns of thought to fit the new realities of international
practice.

